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Perrida amd Economics; 
.uu: flaonollics ai depression 
Derrida and Economics analyses two essays of Jacques Derrida on the 
Public and Democracy, alongside other essays reflecting these 
political works. However, Derrida's political thought will be taken 
seriously by emphasising Economics before Politics. Economics will be 
viewed as a detour, a detour inflecting every attempt to present a 
meaningful political position or stable political realm. For Derrida, 
economics has the force of an oblique ruse. 
Derrida ADd BconoDdcs aligns Derrida's view of economics with the 
Eighteenth Century realisation that a stable SOciety, analogous to 
the Antique ideal of the Polis, is neither a common goal nor a proper 
object for Political philosophy. Here, Classical economics emerges as 
an oblique attempt to construct the conditions for the possibility of 
a political body through economic relations. This epistemological 'en 
passant' is familiar, in Britain, as Adam Smith's' Invisible Hand'. 
For Derrida, the equi valent Continental ruse is distinguished by a 
faith in 'dialectical idealisation'; a process bent upon securing an 
idealised po 11 tical space, but unable to limit its more speculati ve 
drifts. 
If Classical economics represents an attempt to construct the 
possibility of the Body Politic, Derrida's political essays 
deconstruct this possibility. His emphasiS upon the 'possible' 
highlights the effects of risk and competition in an economy that 
could never comfortably be identified wi th a stable Polt tical realm. 
For Derrida, economics is not simply an attempt to secure or rewrite 
more direct Political discourses. As he argues, its every detour is 
haunted by the possibility of speculative failure. Derrida argues an 
enthusiasm for economics can also imply a preoccupation with the 
finitude of the Body Politic. This observation allows him to comment 
upon the valorisation of death or redundancy in certain poli tical 
discourses; i. e. those analyses that, in the throes of Depression, 
remain devoted to the idea of redundancy as though to the object of a 
renewed political will. 
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Where possible, this thesis has abbreviated authors works though using 
their surnames followed by a page reference. The following works by 
Derrida were abbreviated as follows: 
D La differance 
DA La democratie. a journee 
Derrida and EcpnoDdcs 
Introduction 
The following thesis takes Jacques Derrida' s political work 
seriously, focusing on his two essays on Democracy: Iha HDdQ at ~ 
of 1968 and LA. democratie ajpurnite of 1991. These two are the most 
obviously political of all Derrida's works. Here, they will be 
distinguished as pivotal texts in an essentially political oeuvre. 
This thesis is, primarily, concerned with the kind of political forum 
enli vened by Derrida' s participation. When LA. democratie aj ournee 
insists upon the necessity of questioning the future of democracy it 
does so by emphasising the contours of political debate: 
"The dilllBnsion of the 'public' sp.!Jce which, without doubt, 
attained its philosophical JDDdernity with the Enlightenment, 
with the French and A mer i clJn Revol uti ons or di scourses 1 ike 
those of Kant which bind the Enlightenment ... to the freedom 
to make a pub11c use of reason in every do~in." [DA 113)1 
That is, the contours of each and every domain open to the 
public, thereby reflecting a common realm of debate and 
enfranchisement. A public space that, although distinguished by its 
(Eighteenth century) modernity, remains analogous to the integral 
Polis, the political ideal of antiquity. 
This approach might be regarded with suspicion, as it condenses 
Derrida's wider concerns into a single theme: the Politicalj 
specifically, a tradition of Western democratic politics. Here, two 
points might be made. Firstly, if this suspicion demands an answer, 
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nothing could dispel the shadow of the Polis. A defence depends upon 
a public forum. This symbiosis might be defused, perhaps through a 
sense of ironic distance. However, since Socrates' Apology, irony 
demands a forensic appreciatlonj it is the stuff of juridical 
apologies to the broader public. The following thesis asks only how a 
forum analogous to the Antique ideal of the Political might be 
articulatedj arguing such a space is elaborated through economics 
rather than a Pol! tical or Juridical discourse. Secondly, if this 
forum 1s taken to be common to Derrida's 1968 and 1991 papers, this 
is tantamount to suppressing the differences between these works or 
the times they were produced. This issue is taken up in the 
conclusion, but only to emphasise that Derrida manifests a disquiet 
at popular politics, a disquiet approacbed differently at different 
periods. Could such an argument be supported? The point, surely, is 
how it might be received: To whom might one appeal with this kind of 
insight? In an attempt to remain true to Democracy, Derrida appeals 
to an uneasy or agonistic readership; to a forum that is resolutely 
non-popular, even marginal. In doing so, he resists any concept of 
the Popular which does not take the form of a lively and uncertain 
debate. He resists a popularism that, in effect, surrenders its 
democratic quality. The conclusion notes only that if Derrida's 
oeuvre is democratic, the popularism to which he is opposed need not 
be confused wi th the idea of popular hegemony, the dream 
totalitarianism. If Popularism survives without a debate, it need not 
mean debate is suppressed, only abandoned. 
• • • • 
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1: Political-econoDics 
The major terms of this thesis can be detailed under three headings. 
In the first instance, perhaps paradoxically, the concept of the 
Political is taken seriously by denying that an open political forum 
could be an object, an end or, even, a coherent ground-plan for 
public discourse. Instead, this thesis argues any attempt to 
construct the conditions for the possibility of the Political will be 
cast in terms of the Xarket. This has been true, in the West, at 
least since the advent of the Classical view of political-economics. 
Which is to say, Economics is the milieu through which the Political 
is approached or postulated. Whatever is taken, primarily, as a 
Poli tical formation, wi 11 have been read as the oblique result of 
economic processes. One striking example of this epistemological en 
paSSLJnt is Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' which, almost accidently, 
provides for the possi bi li ty of a social body or a public ethos2 • 
Another instance would be Kant's account of the relations forming the 
milieu of experience. This synthetic element, in its 'commerciuJJJ', is 
reflected upon as a 'trl bunal'. By way of this ruse, a series of 
economic relations are read as the oblique articulation of 
consciousness, in general; a human conscience or a political 
conscience by any other name3 • Derrida holds the assurity of such a 
reading is now 'trembling' [5' ebranler EX 161]. When Derrida speaks 
of the medium of political communication in ~ ~ 0.1. !a.n. he 
states: 
"For something !DUst hLJppen, or have happened, to the 
diaphanous purity of tbis element." [EX 132)· 
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Derrida calls this disrupted element an 'oikono1Dia' (economy) [EM 
1611. In exploiting an hellenic term, Derrida accentuates both the 
continuing Western philosophical tradition and the ripples distorting 
its stately passage from antiquity to modernity. The term 
'economics', particularly, emphasises a moment of nascent insecurity; 
the turn associated, here, with Eighteenth century philosophy: 
Classical Xodernity. Through terms like 'detour' and' ellipsis', 
expl ici tly economic terms in his work, Derrida can be seen to mark 
the moment at which Western thought risks an economic en passant, 
alongside its more traditional investment: the concept of a Public 
ethos at home only within the limits of a Political foruma . It might 
be said such a turn views the Politics otherwise, or that it honours 
the ideal of the Polis only in the breach and through the fluidity of 
the market. 
In Derrida's work, this turn is seen not as the oblique 
construction of the possibility of the Political, but the 
Deconstruction of this possibility. Which is to say, the dream of a 
possi ble and coherent Poli tics is both promoted and confounded by 
virtue of economic processes. Further, these processes, in their 
every turn, now inflect political thought, and every philosophy open 
to forensic, or Public, debate. In short, as every debate is 
articulated through economic relations, the 'Poll tical' remains a 
vague but insistant secret - in every sense, a reserve - of the turn 
through economicsj an ellipse which can itself be highlighted in the 
copula of 'Political-economics'. 
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2: Depression 
In the second instance, this thesis is subtitled: The Economics of 
Depressionj according Depression a special role. ~ democratie 
ajournee argues that in the "absence of a general foruIJI', economic 
forces tend towards 'depoliticisation' [DA 116-117, cf. below]. This 
claim will be related to Derrida's earlier work by showing not only 
the importance of economics in both essays, but also the way in which 
economic difficulties (the symptoms of depression) are reflected upon 
in the absence of a general forum. 
~ democratie ajournee argues public opinion is, above all, 
susceptible to any process offering the Public a kind of reificationj 
1. e. to represent its qualt ty of being the element of the socio-
polt tical sphere in a more substantial form. In this respect, LA.. 
democratie ajournee echoes Iha ~ ~ lan, where Derrida states: 
II the process of finding a rapport between differences, this 
is also the complicitous promise of a c01D1l1Dn ele:ment: the 
forum can only take place within a medium or, rather, within 
the representation of a certain transparent ether, in which 
every participant is necessarily involved," [EX 1321 6 
As in LA.. democratie aJournge, this process of representation is 
the reificatton of the public mi1eu, the concretisation of this 
element in its Economy. In the later essay this possibility belongs, 
preeminently, to the Xedia and its ability. in general. to present 
itself as a public mouthpiece: 
II This techno-economic power allo!JiS opinion to consti tute 
itself, lind to recognise itself, as public opinion." [DA 
106]7 
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Here, Derrida is speaking of the Xedia in the sense of 
newspapers, television etc. He is also, notably, talking about a 
technology of the Media, qua a medium. Specifically, about the 
possi bi! tty of a techno-economic mutation of what had earlier been 
termed a common 'ether'. By the tim9 of ~ democratie aiournee, the 
'something' that has happened, or must happen, to this element is its 
"mediatique" mutation COA 117]; a possibility explicitly associated 
with the 'free-market' [libre marche OA 115]. There is, however, no 
cataclysmic turn from the earlier work; Derrida is simply 
reemphasising certain terms. Notably, the use made of economics in 
the earlier paper is now inextricably turned towards the Market, and 
its technology. He is, in addition, accentuating the more worriesome 
aspects of economics for the public. For Derrlda, socia-economic 
forces tend to " depoliticise" , according to a logic which, although 
most clear in the Xedia, is not "confined there" [DA 117]. 
The following thesis takes the presentiment of Depression, its 
shadow or its symptoms but also its symptomatic power, to be closely 
associated with the demise of the idea of the Political. For Derrida, 
the power associated with the milieu of society, its economic 
'element', is no longer wholly democratic, nor even Polt tical, in 
form. The economy has stranger mutant powers. It 1s the shadow of the 
Pol i tical. When asked • Vllat, today, is publ ic opinion?", Derrida 
answers: 
"Today? The silhouette of a phantom, the haunting of the 
democratic conscience." CDA 103]8 
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Here, the 'Kediation' of the 
economic relations, is cast as 
(depoliticisation) and its spectral 





of the Political 
(the haunting of 
democracy). Derrida's interest in depressive dispositions, manifest 
in many papers, becomes indissociable from polt tical-economicsi an 
• Economics of Depression'. Depression is normally distinguished as 
the degree-zero of economics, the moment an economy succombs to 
inertia. It is also, a propos Freud, to be associated with either the 
dri ve towards death, or an obsession with the nearly departed~. It 
might, then, be cast as the intuition of the utter hopelessness of 
any Political dream. Which is to say, depression could not be 
considered the object of a political discourse in the sense of an end 
or an aim, but might be thought of as the End of Poli ticsi the 
bankruptcy of this Ideal. A general interest in the problem of 
depression might also, however, be taken to reflect a sense of 
political commitment yet haunting the verges of a collective 
forgetfulness. It will be seen, in the following thesis, that 
Depression frequently appears as the most imperious and most 
intractable lynch-pin of political-economic discoursesi the nebulous 
heart of political commitment. 
Following the formula of ~ democratic a1ournge, Depression will 
be understood as the haunti ng of the democratic conscience j this 
shadow is a gallow upon which the Body Politick is hung. Through a 
reading of such concepts as 'the economy of death'lO, in other 
essays, Derrlda's account of depressive dispositions, like Xourning, 
wi 11 be seen to occur through economics, as a posi ti ve cri tique of 
the role of Depression in philosophies with political pretensionsi 
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i.e. those philosophies manifesting a devotion to Depression as to a 
renewed Political will. 
3: Forensics 
Thirdly, the conflation of Depressive sympathies and market forces 
informs the major heuristic tool of this thesis: a distinction 
between the shadow of the Pol i tical and the fluidity of the market i 
or, a distinction between the arena where, it is feared, nothing 
might ever reflect a lively public debate, and the space were a 
vestigial hope remains to be speculated upon. In locating an aporia, 
this distinction marks a certain confusion; the fears for the health 
of a Politics might always be confused with the intuition of economic 
fluidity, and the deferrals and exchanges common to the market. For 
Derrida, the term 'Economics', itself, suggests this kind of effect; 
denoting both the dream of a stable political 'home' and a discourse 
inflected with symptoms of mourning: 
II That which is, perhaps, trembling today, is it not the 
security of the near ... such as it inhabits or is itself 
inhabited by the language of the West, such as it is sunk 
into its olkonOJna, such as it is inscribed or forgotten 
there in accordance wi th the hi story of metaphysi cst' . [ EM: 
161]11 
Here, Derrida refers to the value placed upon the 'near', and its 
securi ty, in Western philosophy. The conflation of the idea of a 
secure home with that of a tomb, through speaking of the 'oikonomia' 
as a memorium against forgetting, i6 reenforced in his ~ differance 
which associates the Greek term for house (OlEOS) with an 'economy of 
death'12. The effect Derrida attributes to such terms as 'Economics' 
is, here, termed 'Forensics'i conflating the two Antique connotations 
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of a forum: a public tribunal and a market. The term 'Forensics' is 
intended to: (i) elaborate the nascent uncertainty associated with 
the Pol! tical ideal of a public forum, the sense of remove 
distinguished in Classical political-economics, whilst, 
(ii) continuing to make an issue out of the way the Political forum, 
or its spectral image, maintains a role in a certain sort of 
discursive medium; here, one characterised by depressive forebodings. 
The term 'forensics' is intended to broach this question; how might 
one make Public a use of reason? and where? 
'Forensics' is designed to accentuate the risks underlying the 
presentation of any formula. As an aporetic term, it cannot assume 
easy or complacent acceptance. In effect, it cannot hold a debate or 
articulate a stable posi tien. The Forum receptive to such terms is 
agonistic. In highlighting the effects of competition and risk, a 
forensic term exploits uncertainty; as it could not presume to 
exploit a predetermined advantage. It will, however, have drawn 
attention to the way a certain position might seek to exploit 
uncertainty in order to establish an advantage or edge; risks work to 
the favour of monopolies when those monopolies engender a sense of 
trust in their favoured positions. 
The kinds of aporetic effect denoted by 'forensics' are 
widespread, even international. Both ~ ~ oL ~ and ~ 
democratie a10urnge begin by considering questions upon national and 
poli tical representation and move into an analysis of economics13• 
Which is to say, both end by focusing on a mi lieu which only 
obliquely reflects poU tical questions. It is in this latter space, 
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as Derrida says of the 'security of the near', that political 
integrity is inscribed and forgotten. An economical and cosmopolitan 
spacej it is in the deconstruction of this milieu, as Derrida goes on 
to say of the value of security in western metaphysics, that 
poU tical questions are 'reawakened' u. Which is to say, in its 
'internationalism' economics articulates a process reflecting the 
forgetting and reawakening of Politics, or a process that both 
promotes and confounds the dream of a 'homeland'. 
It is possible to think of more extreme examples of this same 
problem: the distinction between the closed, quasi-fascist state and 
the wholly open market. On the one hand, Fascism seems almost 
excusable when it becomes an issue alongside the market i when the 
collapse of an international market is experienced as a lational 
tragedy. How could a slump be experienced otherwise? how else might a 
nation be asked to express sympathy or to pass judgement?15. Here, 
the spectre of protectionism is the shadow of democracYi an 
international issue must haunt the electorate in order to appear as a 
national-poU tical issue. On the other hand, the so-called 'free 
market' will be justified or condemned as it reflects socia-political 
freedoms. The problem returns - is both promoted and confounded - as 
a problem concerning justice. If justice is to be thought in terms of 
a forum, a forum in which a specific citizenry are enfranchised 
within the terms and limits of a national debate, how might Justice 
be experienced outside of a national-political structure, within an 
economy of international relations? 
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There is another problem. Why does the 'international' bear an 
uncommon resemblance to the West? How could the West, which is 
nei ther a unified nor a uni flable structure, operate as though it 
were a single entity: a First World. Derrida's occasional emphasis of 
Jewish terms raises this issue at the level of the nation and 
national sympathiesi insofar as, historically, the Jew has been born 
outside of nationhood, become the object of vicious xenophobia, been 
disenfranchised wi thin societies prof! ting from their industry and 
been credited with the most effective exploitation of usury16. 
Derrida's constant emphasis upon the West, and 'its' economy, raises 
this problem at a cosmopolitan level. It may be, indeed, that the 
figure of the Jew can be made to operate at both levels of this 
problematic. The dispossessed Jew raises the issue of national 
justice by remaining, in commerce, at the margins of this idea, the 
state of Israel exploits a wider margin in a discourse unable to 
decide whether the 'Israeli issue' is one of politics or expediencYi 
a question of justice or mercenary interests. On the one hand, should 
Israel be cast in terms of a lew World Order, where the idea of 
international justice might be properly delimited? On the other, will 
it always be bound to the idea of a Great Satan, where the First 
World (or its representation as America) exercises a coercive effect 
everywhere the internationalism of justice is proposed? Israel, 
above all, is an effect of the explosive mix and the effective 
exploi tatton of a discourse that confuses the possi bi 11 ty both of 
Nationhood and Political oblivion (the Israeli's, the Palestinian's), 
with an idea of the international which, by rights, is only an 
economic element. 
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Unfortunately, this thesis ends not with an account of the New 
World Order but with a look at the forensic appeal of the formulae 
bound to such a cosmopolitan view. It ends with an apology, a public 
justification of the kind of the terms it has chosen to exploiti or 
rather. an examination of the kinds of apology Derrida makes as he 
throws suspicion upon the texts of western philosophy and their 
pretensions. Derrida recognises his negotiation through other texts 
eludes any popular appeal. due both to the aporetic quality of his 
terms and the fact he deconstructs the kinds of Forum apparently 
promoted by those texts. As a teacher and writer, Derrida exploi ts 
terms with a more or less divisive appeal, for the sake of a divided 
public opinion. 
MAs it is primarily promoted, this opinion, I scarcely dare 
to say this fiction, remains that thing in the world best 
divided." CDA 124]17 
Derrida. modestly and apologetically, affirms the ways in which 
his work eludes a popular ethics. In fact, as can be seen above, 
Derrida believes the Popular, in the sense of a popular movement or a 
popular will, is thoroughly suspect. It is better divided. The 
conclusion to the following thesis will ask if Derrida's suspicion of 
popularism is either warranted or desirable. 
• • • • 
The following thesis comprises a foreword, three chapters and a 
conclusion. The Foreword introduces the general parameters of the 
issues raised in the main body of the thesis, as they are found in 
Derrida's work and as his work redoubles upon an older tradition. It 
argues that Depression might be taken to reflect a traditional 
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political problem; the collapse of a Political order or the demise of 
Sovereignty. However, it also argues that if Depression marks the 
elision of Sovereignty, its form is such as to both promote and 
confound a. single Pol! tical objective. Outside of any pol! tics, the 
problem of depression opens onto economics. 
The First chapter begins to work away at the movement from 
Poli tics to Economics characterising both the. Eru1Q Ili !all and I&. 
democratie ajournge. Specifically, it focuses on the aspects of 
revolution or insurrection touched upon in both papers. Insofar as 
modern European governments are said to owe their enlightened 
features to a series of revolutions this chapter repeatedly 
interrogates the notion of 'revolution' as the fundamentally 
political act. It will be argued that the significance of any 
political initiative remains an issue only on the wider world stage 
and, in consequence, the act commemorating the founding of modern 
politics has a significance beyond that presupposed by the notion of 
government, especially national government. It will be argued that, 
so long as economic ties defuse any idea of the stable poll tical 
realm, the event commemorated by the 'revolution' remains nebulous, a 
memorial to the idea of government. 
The Second chapter continues to ask what is commemorated as the 
Political or is recollected as a question of political will. Turning 
away from the notion of a founding revolution, it suggests political 
commi tment might be reflected through the withdrawn quality of the 
depressive; 
dereliction. 
those elements betraying only a. sense of incipient 
It will be argued that Twentieth Century philosophy is 
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distinguished by the realisation that insofar as symptoms of 
depression might command public interest whilst, still, reflecting a 
sense of the withdrawn, they have a significance that cannot easily 
be recouped under the notion of the Political. The appreciation of 
such elements might be claimed to represent the ultimate Pol i tical 
risk; a transcendent end refracted through a sense of political 
impotence. Derrida, however, provides a positive account of such 
risks. For Derrida, the presentiment of depression continues to 
express economic uncertainty before it reflects any sense of the 
poli tical. This informs his reading of the break between Classical 
and Modern philosophy, providing the formal denominator underlying 
the way he casts metaphysical issues into an economic framework. 
The last chapter looks at the way a space which only imperfectly 
reflects an idea of nationality might inspire commitment. Taking the 
form of a history, it argues the move into a christian or ecumenical 
worldview has disposed Western philosophy to search for its 
principles and stability upon a multinational stage; that is, through 
an economy that insistantly deviates from the ecumenical faith in a 
world community. This chapter claims that, at the birth of either 
technologies of credit or the iniquitous exploitation of usury, every 
international debate takes the form of an economics. Which is to say, 
the international, multinational or cosmopolitan are economic 
articulations. By way of illustration, it is noted the status Derrlda 
accords to economics is simi lar to that held by warfare in Hegel's 
politics. It will be remembered that Hegel advances the issue of war 
in order to deny any concept of cosmopolitan peace. The dirty secrets 
produced through war only make sense wi thin a national context and 
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the intuition of these secrets could only be alleviated within an 
understanding Ration. The crucial difference between Hegel and 
Derrida is that, as Derrida argues, in the fractious arena of the 
international, a closed political space cannot be appealed to as the 
substance underpi nni ng the accidents of war. It is nat that war 
generates prejudices working to the advantage of nationalism; rather, 
all such interests are the stack in trade of economics,e. 
The Conclusion reasserts that the international economy, in the 
variety of its relations, remains external to the issues it 
articulates; traversing rather than surrounding the positions it 
brings into play. If a specific issue seems especially pressing. it 
does so by virtue of its economic elaboration and could never be 
determined as a Political position. Which is to say. every issue is 
immanent only to economicsj there is no Political interior, no forum 
in which a specific issue reflects a general interest. Does this 
DEan, then, that through a process of depoli ticisation all sense of 
the polt tically relevant is now undone? By way of a reading of the 
Apology, the conclusion asks how one might express political 
involvement in the absence of a Forum? 
The Apology plunges the possi bi 11 ty of a general forum into 
doubt. It concerns the relation between a private figure and an 
unsympathetic public. As a public address, it might be thought to 
play to its audience: at least. to anticipate a form under which its 
possIbilIty, as Public, becomes conceivable. The ApolPiY. however, 
curries no favours. Socrates exacerbates the suspicion his position 
is more or less redundant as regards the publIc realm. In effect, he 
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agitates on behalf of a forum so riven by the appreciation of 
redundant and private elements, it is unable to close upon the idea 
of a secure public, thoroughly at home with all aspects of a debate. 
Derrida resembles Socrates insofar as he refuses to abandon the 'best 
divided' ground. This site, as will be argued, becomes an 
inner-limi t, a space where marginal positions have a certain public 
force. Derrida maintains this limit, just safar as he refuses to 
forgo the question of what is undergone, in Public, through force. 
Here, economic forces. 
Derrida remains on the margins of a nebulous inner-limit, but not 
on the 'inside' of a closed debate nor, like a spectre filling the 
air around a graveyard, does he haunt an already doomed debate. He 
circles Socratic ground without giving way to mourning. He finds, 
rather, something to affirmi a new force at work. It is always a 
question of force. Socrates was expected to answer a powerful charge 
by slewing it off. Instead, he put himself in the way of a force 
that, as he argued, more powerfully called for his indictment. How 
might one negotiate a position in relation to powerful interests? How 
might one appeal, through one's style and the terms one exploits, to 
a public already absorbed by other interests? How might one exercise 
a new appeal, against the grain of an already entrenched position? 
For Derrida, today, tbis is a question of monopOlistiC rather than 
political coercion. 
-It is not only necess~ry to struggle ~g~inst 'censure', in 
the dOnUn~nt sense, but ~lso ~g~inst ~ 'new censure', so to 
speak. wbicb thre~tens llber~l societies: ag~lnst 
~ccumul~tions, concentrations, monopolies; in short, against 
~ll the qu~ntit~tive pbenomen~ which effectively ~rgin~lise 
or reduce to silence wh~tever c~nnot be me~sured upon their 
sc~le. However, we my no longer peti tion sl.aply for 
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plurality, dispersion, fractioning, for the mobility of sites 
of cross-fertilisation or for the subjects disposed that way. 
For, soci a-economic forces my ever be abused through such 
mrginalisations and through the absence of a general forum. 
Thus, the ' new censure' in the force of its stra tage11JS, 
combines concentration and fractionalisation, acculDulation 
and privatisation. It depoliticises. At its most forceful in 
the 'audiovisual' (Xedia), this terrible logic is not 
confined there." (DA 116-117] l' 
LD.. democratie ajournee turns upon the fear that the Xedia has 
come to control public opinion through affording the public a kind of 
mutant reification. The so-called 'new censure', which 1s primarily 
economic and only predominately of the Xedia, effectively exploi ts 
the traditional formulations of the majority, the pleasure of the 
majori ty and the appeal of the marginal. Derrida argues this 'new 
censure' pushes some into silence as into shadows, into "the night of 
a semi-private enclosure" [la nuit d' un enclos quasiment prive DA 
118]. Which is to say, Derrida accentuates elements el ided by the 
techno-economic power of tbe Xediaj private insofar as they remain 
redundant wi thin the public, without the cachet to publicise their 
enfeebled positions. Derrida's texts negotiate what it means to 
operate from a position of strength or weaknessj i.e. they negotiate 
the question of 'censure'. Derrida's work, as has been seen, does not 
pretend to construct the conditions for its reception nor, as will be 
seen, to compete where such conditions seem to have been 
predetermined upon a macro-scale. This does not mean, however, he 
reconciles himself or his texts to the remaindered bin. He argues the 
possibilities are heightened. Derrida's analyses continue to insist 
upon the sense of risk; specifically, the chance of purchlJse or of 
leverage. 
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.. The enfeebled cachet, yet, holds a chance: semi-private, it 
nevertheless has access to the public s~ce. Between the two, 
the sa~zdat." (DA 120)20 
Li beral economics depend upon the possi bi 11 ty that a minority 
enterprise might promise an edge; a moment of purchase into the 
Public market. This is only partly Derrida' s poi nt. The paradox and 
the risk negotiated here is that, as the greatest risks attend the 
weakest positions, so weaker positions promise the greater 
possibilities. The samizdat articulates the 'better divided' option: 
promising an access, a relation between the public and the private, 
even as it emphasises an elliptical failure to determine or to 
anticipate a stable form of public deliberation. The samizdat hovers 
at the margins of the relation binding the powerful to the more or 
less powerless. It stands out against any monopoly position which, 
just so far as it is a ~intained position, virtually silences every 
extraneous possibility. 
What would it mean to trade from a wholly weakened position? A 
pasi tion which eludes any measured scale? To articulate the diffuse 
or divided possibilities opened only as a samizdat becomes an issuej 
i.e. when a samizdat stands in relief against an entrenched position? 
In the end this form of negotiation depends upon Derrida's texts 
being resolutely marginalj whatever they offer cannot be the subject 
of easy or complacent acquiescence. Derrida's work, in effect, 
depends upon its difficulty. dari ving its piquancy from this fact. 
His writings are directed against a form of popular mass cuI tura 
which remains inherently passive, irredeemably effortless, or appeals 
to the broadest common denominator. If something like a liberal 
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democracy can live through economics, in the absence of a general 
forum, the' centrality' of the: 
.. deJDOcra ti c foruJlJ JlJust not be confused with the mss, wi th 
concentrati on. wi th hOJlJOgeneity Dr wi th the JIJOnopoly" [DA 
116) 21 
This is not to say Derrida petitions on behalf of a cultured 
eli teo Rather, nothing could maintain a popular appeal which also 
bore the effects of the samizdati's negotiation of the margins of 
public favourj allowing no single position to decide the .. goods in 
culture's supermrJret" [les ventes dans les supermarches de la 
culture DA 117]. The samizdat effectively mediates whatever presents 
an immediate appeal, rei nscri bes whatever claims a broad appeal, or 
exercises whatever offers an ingenuous appeal. In sum, where 
Derrida's appeal remains non-popular. it is less elitist than 
teJlJpered, markedly narrow. uncomfortably haunted by a sense of 
leverage and aspirant to the more difficult only as to something 
borne of an uneasy relationship. 
This thesis broaches such themes, to address them in the conclusion. 
All that remains, is to ask what it would mean to abandon Derrida's 
inner-limit. If this limit reflects the attempt to mark the 
unregarded chance, what would the abandonment of this access entail? 
This would. again, not be the abandonment 'of' the Political but. 
rather, an abandonment that comes with economics. Derrida' s attempt 
to negotiate techno-economic powers leads him to highlight the Kedia 
as the clearest purveyors of its logiC. This is true both of La. 
democratie a10urnee and Iha ~ Qi~. which speaks disparagingly 
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of "cultural, journalistic gossiP' [Ie bavardage culturel et 
j ournal1stique EK 16U. Derrida has 11 ttle sympathy for j ournal1sts; 
he has none for philosophers who fail to negotiate the delinquency of 
economics, who choose instead to affirm the deconstruction of every 
seemingly stable position; 'naively' missing the way powerful 
posi tions might reconvene upon this displacement22 • Kore recently, 
even, than ~ democratie ajournee, Derrida raises the question of the 
'stupidity of those who, through economics, abandon theIlEelves to 
the merely gratuitous23 • Can these, the stupid, the naive, the 
casual, be grouped together? Certainly not as a stable position, in 
betraying economic forces they do not themselves maintain a definite 
posi tion. In their abandonment they do not even remotely reflect 
older, polt tical posi tions. However, they may be grouped together 
insofar as they display an abandonment through deconstruction: or at 
least, have apparently abandoned the access between the more or less 
weak and the more or less strong. Both too strong and too weak, 
abandoned to a weakness for culture's supermarkets and to the 
strength of currents which bypass the limits raised by Derrida. 
Perhaps, then, simply popular: repeating profanities i nd1fferently, 
and producing profane passions indiscriminately. 
Vhat is the abandoned inner-limit of deconstruction? How does 
Derrida resist abandoning this inner-limit; or, how does he resists 
stupidity as though he were resisting a transcendental evil? 
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If Then I looked on all the works that my hands bad wrought, and 
on the labour that I had laboured to do: and, behold, all was 
vanity 12nd vexation of the spirit, and there was no profit 
under the sun. 
And I turned myself to behold wisdom, and madness, and 
folly: for "hat can the lIaD do that COJIeth after the kl1Jlf? 
even that ",hlch hath already been dDlJe.1f [Ecclesiastes 2.11-12] 
When all's said and done, what is Depression? perhaps we already know. 
Deprived of sovereignty and devoid of profit, depression suggests a 
feeling for death but also a torpidity that evades description. If 
Depression fails to reflect an invariable objective or dominating 
principle, it could not be represented as a single, unvarying temper. 
Outside of this island, the world economy falters according to different 
dances of depression: now torpid, now indifferent, now morbid. If 
Depression is so complex, are we looking for interpretation or 
alleviation? understanding or relief? 
Understanding and alleviation are not easily separable. If the 
possibility of relief depends upon understanding, the silence of 
depression stifles any possible initiative. Perhaps this inability to 
communicate demands a new sort of understanding i as though one last 
insight could prise Depression open. It seems, however, that so long as 
Depression remains hopeless, intelligence is only that quality 
exacerbated by the problem of Depression. Whatever is promised through 
insight, this promise lies still-born in Depression. 
• f • • 
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Freud suggests both that there are varieties of depression and that 
a common theme links its psychic and economic manifestations. The 
common element is a kind of involved indifferencej an attempt to hald 
together a variety of disjointed projects, with no question of any 
initiative nor any expectation of relief. In both mental and economic 
depressions, the possibility of alleviation is lostj nothing remains but 
a thoroughgoing devotion to dereliction. 
"Wben tbe ego is involved in ~ particularly difficult psycbical 
task, as occurs in mourning, or wben tbere is some tremendous 
suppression of affect or wben a continual flood of sexual 
pbantasies bas to be kept down, it loses so mucb energy at its 
disposal tbat it has to cut down tbe expenditure of it at many 
points at once. It is in the position of a speculator whose 
money bas become tied up in bis various enterprises. 1 caJJe 
across an instructive example of tbis kind of intense tbougb 
sbort-lived, genertJ1 inbibition. Tbe patient, an obsessional 
neurotic, used to be overcome by a paralysing fatigue wbicb 
lasted for one or more days whenever sometbing occurred wbicb 
sbould obviously have tbrown bim into tJ rage. Ve bave here a 
point from wbicb it should be possible to reacb tJn 
understanding of tbe condition of genertJl inbibition wbicb 
cbaracterises states of depression, including tbe gravest form 
of tbem, mel~ncholi~ ."1 
The melancholic Ego cannot take the chances offered, refusing to 
take up any energy usefully or react against any stimulus posi ti vely. It 
abdicates its place in the community as it spreads itself throughout the 
economy. Freud hopes to understand Depression at this point, but even 
this hope carries a melancholic trace. Freud wrote on depression ten 
years earlier and, apart from re-emphasising the symptom of 
indifference, is no nearer an understanding2 . What is clear is the 
depressive is not inclined to help itself. In its hopeless positions, the 
depressive is neither tuned to the possibilities of the economy nor to 
the protestations of the analyst. However, from Freud's description it 
should, at least, be possible to recognise depressions. 
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Ecclesiastes puts Depression at the heart of one of the more widely 
known discussions of wisdom in the West. In a few beautiful but sick 
verses wisdom is found to be rank with all the symptoms of Depression: 
personal. fiscal. social. Ecclesiastes exacerbates the problem of wisdom 
through its lasting devotion to dereliction. In its commitment to 
wisdom. there is no chance of alleviation. Ecclesiastes does. however. 
serve to frame the problem of depression in all its hopeless variety. 
Below. what 1s obscurely termed the • long home' is contrasted with the 
places, 1n a city. the social whirl is at its most constant: 
"Remember ... when thy shall be afraid of that which is high, 
and fears shall be in the way, LJnd the almond tree shLJll 
flourish, and the grLJsshopper shall be a burden, and desire 
shall fail: because man goeth to his long home and the 
mourners go about the streets." [Ecclesiastes, 12.5] 
The long home casts a shadow over what the Greek translation of the 
Hebrew text terms the lagon' (above, 'streets'), the place of disputation 
and decision. Here. the clement winter provides no joys and the least 
thing becomes irrevocable. In these derelict streets there is no further 
chance of a decision. A few verses earlier it states: 
• A good name is better thLJn precious ointment: LJnd the dLJy of 
death than the day of one's birth. 
It is better to go to the house of mourning than to go to 
the house of f~sting: for tbLJt is the end of all menj and the 
living w111 lay it to his heLJrt." [Ecclesiastes, 7.1-2] 
The injunction to remember, and the reminiscences laden with 
mourning, is contrasted with the bl1theness of those addicted to greed. 
The depressive lives through memories, memories which anticipate the 
grave. Kemory places the peculiarly depressive cast onto the relation 
between the house and the streets, and between the house of remembering 
and the house of forgetting. 
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The text opens with the speaker remembering when he was king in 
Jerusalem. Ecclesiastes, then, describes the passage from a certain 
political order into the mournful aspect that, in remembrance, 
characterises the social sphere. However, the text ellJborates a social 
Forum. Despite the title 'Ecclesiastes', the speaker is not a preacher but 
a participatory member of a pol1tkised laity: a jurist, a prosecutor, a 
proposer3. As a secular discussion of wisdom, Ecclesiastes anticipates 
Kant's view that a juridical understanding is "freedom from self-incurred 
tutelagfJ"·,. In Ecclesiastes the figure of the Sovereign is only a shadow, 
the laity has assumed political responsibility in its deliberations. It 
has, especially, assumed responsibility for those marks or memories 
which exasperate the understanding without the understanding ever being 
able to fathom them. Ecclesiastes describes a sense of liberation 
insofar as the deliberator is released into popular responsibility. 
Throughout Ecclesiastes it is reiterated there is no end. Although 
wisdom, the understanding, is the great issue no judgement is expected; 
at least, not under the sun. There is no temporal hope of relief. This 
would highlight the pessisimism that flows beneath Kant's view: 
"If we are asked 'Do we live in an enlightened age?' the lJnswer 
is, 'No', but we do live in an lJge of enllghtenment."5 
In Ecclesiastes, the weight of a shadow never ceases to press down 
upon and excite the processes of enlightenment. Yet, Bcclesiastes throws 
out the hint that wisdom might provide relief. It does so as it offsets 
the 'long home' against the streets. The movement from the one to the 
other I from Death to the place of disputation, is both dialectical and 
the confusion of dialectics. Which is to say, relief remains an object of 
speculation but of endless speculation. The old political order, 
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characterised by Sovereignty, continues to claim every attention of the 
new popular political order. It should be possible to imagine a moment 
of reconciliation, a moment when mourning ends and the life of the new 
order begins. However, in mourning, the commonwealth remains 
irremediably riven by an attention to the least detail and the most 
uneasy variety of thoughts. Ecclesiastes is written for a juridical 
society, a juristocracy, it both promotes and confounds. It delineates a 
society that could never escapes dereliction. The possibility of relief 
is raised, but without end. Here, dialectics, as a process of recovery, or 
a process of raising issues and initiatives, could offer a dream of 
political liberation. Xarcuse stated: "1 believe that all dialectic is 
liberation ... think of Plato ... think of Hegel think of Xarx."7 What, 
all of them? in the same way? Without end? 
The dialectical cleavage would be between the late Political order 
and the mournful deliberation which characterises the Commonwealth; or, 
rather, the one is to become an issue for the ather. The sphere of wise 
deliberation is found to be riven by the dereliction of depression. The 
society modelled upon wisdom remains obsessed with the redundant 
ephemera of its memories. The society attempting to discover some order 
in its deliberation is contrasted with the society oblivious to such 
issues, self-satisfied in its greed. In each instance there is a movement 
from assurity to dereliction, although a movement that remains too 
various, too pointless and, always, tao uncertain. What remains decisive 
is the belief that understanding bas a home and a responSibility towards 
this home. The imperative, in every instance, is to assume responsibility 
for the home and for the issues promoted there. Thus, whilst relief is 
apparently the central issue, no relief is to be accepted. Dereliction is 
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the only issue. Dialectical resolutions are chimerical, every speculative 
leap risks compounding or forsaking the nature of the problem. But, what 
is the problem: Was there ever a stable political homeland or a firm 
political duty? Was there ever a King in Jerusalem? 
The Greek term for home, 'Oikas', provides the root of economics: 
house-law. It was, however, also used to describe the perfect political 
order of the City: a synonym for 'Polis', a synonym which brought home 
the duty owed to the commonwealth8 • Thus, the use of the term was 
allusory, an allusion based upon the supposed stability of the home. 
Ecclesiastes employs the same analogy. However, the home is not 
Jerusalem, or not the Jerusalem of the Kings, but an organisation 
reflecting upon an 'older' order. Sovereignty becomes an issue in the 
ci ty, as the home is its memorial. The image reflected in memory 1s not 
simply one of the statei it is rather, an image of the state organisation 
at its most troubled. The 'house of mourning' is an image of the state 
on the verge of distraction. Through this painful memory, this image of 
the state's imminent dereliction, Wisdom, which would be the 
Understanding of a principled order, necessarily fails. The Oikos, or the 
issue of the 'Oikos', is the site of an understanding so impossible, 60 
cluttered with the many small and large things held there, that any 
thought of relief remains illusory. Speculative dialectics are the 
excited effects of such a delirium. 
Kant terms the distractions faced by the Understanding in its 
hopeless speculations a 'dialectics'. He, also. describes these 'necessary 
illusions' of the Understanding in terms of economics'. Later, Hegel 
described the milieu of dialectical or speculative reason as an economYi 
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this time, as though ~isdom had already discovered the leverage (either 
the impetus or the chance) needed to triumph over whatever still 
res is ted its a tten tions or its programme 10. As though relief from the 
suffocating grip of depression were always the First possibility. 
The way Depression exercises a thrall has recently been elaborated 
by the French philosopber of 'deconstruction', Jacques Derrida. Derr1da 
broaches depression through an analysis of the problem of economics. 
Derrlda, chiefly, uses 'Economics' in two ways. Firstly, he means the 
formal presentation of a problem 1 1 • Economics is a means to present a 
political problem, a way to reflect upon the political 'home'. Here, 
however, it is recognised that the formal expression of a problem is not 
necessarily coincidental with the way any such expression excites 
interest, or betrays the worrying nature of a problem. Economics does 
not quite frame the problem, it presents a problem but does so as an 
economics. an imperfect representation. The representation is necessary 
in order to present a public use of reason but with the representation 
the presentation, itself, is pushed further awaYi who of those present 
understand the representation? who is present when the forum, itself, is 
problematised through its representation? In speculation, at least, it is 
believed a cohesive or stable SOCiety would understand about politics. 
Such an order might reflect upon a problem through its representation, 
but would it recognise the representation itself as problematic? The 
representation opens out into a space where the Present, those who are 
present, or those who enjoy a presentation, are becoming all the more 
remote. This basic idea is found in Ecclesiastes, the 'house of mourning' 
represents a fallen Political orderj simultaneously expressing both 
current fears and the hopeless commitment to a past organisation. 
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Ecclesiastes represents a commitment to Sovereignty but does so 
otherwise; in mourning. dialectically and. insofar as its dialectical 
expressions will never get to the root of its problem, in a way that is 
symptomatic rather than certain about the nature of the problem. 
Secondly, the antique strains apparent in any analogy between the 
home and the state, or between domestic organisation and social 
dereliction. nowhere approaches what 'economics' now means. Economics, in 
its now classical sense, means market economics. Those who champion 
economics or those who attack its vagaries accept that the issues 
arising in the normal flow of the market do not reflect upon any socio-
political ideal. What is rarely noted is that this was also true in 
Antique thought. The Hellenic term for what now is known as economics 
is 'lrhrematilros'j l.e. money lending, business etc '2 • Greek philosophy 
provides a vision and history of Statescraft. of political nous or of its 
analogy in the term 'oikonomia', in which politics will always be 
preferred over business. Behind this Cleavage lies the belief that 
business evades the most urgent issues of Statej even. that business 
promotes an easy sense of relief, which the philosophy of political 
science has learnt to mistrust. To emphasise the market over politics 
would, then, be to subvert an important distinction. In short, to promote 
all those effects which conspire to erase or weaken basic political 
motifs, which simply means state-wide laws and national government; 
even, to promote a usurious supra-national effect over the familiar and 
comfortable proximity to order and intelligibility to which 'politics' is 
pledged. A pledge residing solely in politics declared proximity to the 
stability of the familial home. 
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Khre11Ja promotes a dream of fluidity sped on the seas of the world 
market, drifting in the credit relations of the major clearing houses, 
awash in the technosphere where the signals from telecommunication 
satellites are interwoven with the microwaves and gamma rays of the 
global economic blur. To emphasise fluidity over the corporeality of the 
Body Politick is anti-wisdom: Ecclesiastes states, -a drea11J cometh 
through the multitude of business; and a fool's voice is known by 
multitude of words.- [Ecclesiastes, 5.3], To underplay such a difference, 
however, is deconstructive. Derrida employs such a tactic in Whit.e. 
Mythology, where he emphasises 'usury alongside the supposed propriety 
of equitable exchange. This strategic 'inversion' is collateral with 
Derrida's more widely regarded subversion of speech through writing; his 
emphasis of the way writing seems ineradicably dissolute in comparsion 
to an audibly intelligible presentation13• However, an emphasis upon 
credit and of market forces over any dream of political cohesion has 
been the distinction of British philosophy for four hundred years. Which 
is not to say Derrida reworks a British thought, nor that deconstruction 
is naturally British. It is, only, to note that Derrida heightens the 
symptoms of distress or delirium that accompany modern economics. 
Derrida's work conspires to accentuate a break with tradition, and to 
raise the stakes around this break. Such a break seems both less 
natural, and more radical, when formulated in a way that renders 
economics relation to an older tradition uncertain. Derrida's work comes 
to stress the way in which the modern sense of economics deviates from 
the antique sense, with the accent upon deviancy. On the one hand, the 
organisation modelled on poU tical order. On the other, the space of 
fluid and nonsymmetrical eXChanges; either the space of those passions 
common to writing or the fluid space of market forces. Freud says that 
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writing entails making a fluid run
'
•. In economics, this fluidity never 
returns to the home. Freud continues by stating if this fluidity is 
inibited, it does so as it assumes "the significance of copulation". In 
economics social intercourse is inhibited as the depressive are 
abandoned by economics to the dereliction of their various and hopeless 
affairs, and the belief their position is either deviant or untenable. 
If it is a question of deviancy, it is also one of a detour from a 
space of juridical deliberation, into a space of fluid and nonsymmetrical 
exchanges. What kind of relation is, then, denoted by the 'detour'? Is it 
that speculation could only become free in escaping from the shadow of 
the Political? Is it, perhaps, that every attempt at reasonable 
deliberation remains inhibited? or, is the possibility of fluidity fully 
organised around depression and, thus, more or less inhibited from the 
outset? Finally, is all deliberation necessarily inhi bi ted? It has to be 
said: Derrida relishes a formal commitment to understanding and to 
deliberation. He believes in fluidity only as in another dream. This does 
not mean, however, that the significance of depression has to be taken 
as read. It might be that, as depression remains untenable, it offers a 
different kind of communication. Derrida remains at the margins of a 
forum of open and intelligible debate, even as he is sucked into the 
whirl of economics. 
Ecclesia~ represents a political organisation by expressing 
commitment to the idea of a forum. It does so, however, only as it also 
elaborates a mourner's inhibitions. Commitment and inhibition, 
Ecclesiastes evokes an apology for a state that could never contemplate 
its uninhibited other, represented as 'the house of feasting'. As an 
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apology, its style is not constrained by an idea of the home, but 
habitually loathe to fully abandon themj uncomfortable and unable to 
leave without losing the grace of commitment. Mourning acts as noose and 
scaffold. Derrida, too, insists on the lingering symptoms of depression. 
Without overturning the traditional political limits, he attempts to read 
the deviancy of this economy in a more responsive way, in a way that 
promises something less stale than the same, solid organisation, with 
its one hope of relief. 
In sum, Derrida is interested in Understanding before Relief. 
Specifically, in the variety of ways the possibility of understanding 
might be raised. Derrida does, however, take the possibility of relief 
seriously, as an insistant effect and one inseperable from the chances 
and the necessity of the 'forum' promoted as an economy. His Ill.e. ~ of. 
Kan. and La. democratie ajournee are concerned with 'depol:1ticisl1tion', 
whether this is a retreat into silence, or a willful ignorance of the 
problems of the forum. Derrida still hopes for a formal rigor that will 
broadcast understanding forensically. Here, Forensics refers to both the 
agon in which a politic1sed public takes an effective responSibility I1nd 
the market in which a commonwealth remains receptive to the 
distracting possibility of new or stranger symptoms. Finally, 'Forensics' 
is intended to express the attention to symptoms, specifically to the 
symptoms of mourning, which habitually exercise a commonwealth in its 
divisive or elliptical passage between one space and its fluid other. 
Derrida's strategy is to question the symptoms that promise relief or 
respi te in order to communicate more discrete currents than had been 
assumed. To see if they might be read otherWise, outside of the same old 
inhibitions, towards something wiser. 
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On the successive revolutions which created .adem govern.ent 
• The epoch when the masses h12d no means of improving their 
lot except by storming the Bl2stille or the fiinter Pal12ce has 
gone into the past." Xikhail Gorbachov [The Sunday Observer, 
July 28 19911 
Within a Democracy, or within the democratic relations reproduced 
between states, Revolution remains a memory. Bow, opinion can be 
expressed publically; as part of a Public and not an anonymous mass. 
This is the post-revolutionary age, as Gorbachov suggests. Perhaps the 
memorial to Revolution lies in the way the anonymous dissolves into the 
Public; but which is the memorial and which the spirit of the revolution: 
a space haunted by long past revolutions, or the public space which 
opens on the day of Revolution? What could be credited to a revolution 
or emphasised in a valediction? What, finally, is a revolution? If its 
form allows the dispossessed to force their way into alien or over-
powering institutions, the revolution seems only to replicate democratic 
emancipation. albeit in storms of destruction. As though the Public both 
precedes and succeeds the Mass. Could Gorbachov have anticipated that a 
'revolution' might be distinguished by the defence of an institution; the 
occupation of Moscow's White House in August 1991. or the occupation of 
a university in May 1968. Certainly, a series of revolutions 11e behind 
the style of government now enjoyed in the West. Yet a vague anonymity 
haunts the Public's affairs. Enframed only in memory, the revolution 
might present a purely nebulous origin. The unfolding of public opinion 
might obey another law entirely to revolutionj a law all the more 
anonymous as revolution continues to enthrall the public memory. 
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This first chapter deals with the significance of the 'revolution' as 
the fundamentally politically act. It will argue that the role of the 
revolution remains vague. The post-revolutionary age is too international 
to have its origins represented by a single event likened to a 
revolution. The advantages enjoyed, and the pressures suffered. under 
post-revolutionary conditions are not Political, as such. This scene 
might. however. be termed an economy, as it is in Derrida's work. There 
will be three sections: 
(1) A comparison of Derrida's view on revolution, and the origin of 
democracy, with those of F A Hayek. This comparison is intended to show 
why the idea of a revolution might be treated with suspicion. 
(11) An account of why the variety of discourses which distinguish a 
modern, liberal public could be thought of as an 'economics'j as they are 
in Derrida and Hayek's work. 
(iii) A study of the law according to which the economy of public 
opinion unfolds. A law. so Derrida avers, that sustains greater 
imperatives than that accorded to the revolution in the work of writers 
with political pretensions. By way of contrast, Xartin Heidegger's appeal 
to revolutionary action will be set beside the very different appeal of 
Mikhail Bakunin. 
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On suspicions concerning the Revolution 
Derrida has twice written on Democracy: rna ~ of !an of 1968 and 
La.. democratie ajournge of 1989 <published in full in 1991>. 1968 has 
become known for 'les evenements de mai'i the year Derrida saw the 
universities "invaded by the forces of social order" at the rector's 
instigation [EX 135). La. democratie ajpurnge originally marked the 
bicentennial of the French Revolution. Both essays have significant 
dates. However, revolution remains, only, an undercurrent. Both essays 
insist that to make an issue of Democracy is to distinguish a form of 
Government. A form that, itself, distinguishes the liberal West'. As 
Derrida understands the 'form' of democracy, he intends that which 
guarantees the right of response. For Derrida, to ask about the 'form' 1s 
to ask about the conditions for the possibility of response2 • 
Derrida regards enfranchisement as a right, the 'form' of democracy 
ensures this Right. Democracy is formally distinguished as it raises the 
issue of representation; particular responses become issues in a general 
forum as they are 'represented' for the sake of the forum. Derrida also 
sees this benefit in terms of a duty, stating that the formal conditions 
of Democracy ought to excite a commitment to the questioning of any 
given representation, even the questioning of Democracy itself: 
• To take responsibility, is that not primarily to attempt to 
reconsider it? .A philosophical and political task, theoretical 
lJnd prlJctical, a difficult but also dangerous task because it 
risks tOUChing the concept of representation itself, the 'idea 
of representatives' that Rousseau called 'modern '. But is it not 
the responsibility of a democrat to think the axioms or the 
foundations of democracy?' (DA 112)3 
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Here, the imperatives of Democracy are associated with Rousseau's 
work and, as Derrida also states, with revolutionary enthusiasms. He is 
not, however, simply binding the issue of representation to that of 
insurrection. Derrida also considers the Kantian revolutioni an event 
taken to be synonymous with the Enlightenment. He is doing so, he 
states, from a position of "post-revolutionllry modernitY"'i as though the 
form of democracy proceeded from a past event. Thus, Derrida's appeal to 
a revolution is problematic. It could not primarily be a violent break. 
It seems, rather, to concern a way of thinking and one developed, at 
least in Derrida IS post-revolutionary account, through Franco-German 
relations. Aside from the issue of Democracy I the question of Franco-
German relations distinguishes both La.. demqcratie ajqurnee and lh.e. E..n.da 
ci !an. If this relation is held to be the central one for the 
Enlightenment or for Democracy I there is a danger of forgetting other 
voices. The philosopher F A Hayek is vociferous on this paint: 
.. It is always misleading to label an age by a name which 
suggests thllt it WllS ruled by a comlDon set of ideLJs. It 
particularly fillsifies the picture if we do this for Il period 
whicb was in such II state of ferment llS was the eighteenth 
century. To lump together under the name of 'Enlightenment' (or 
AuftliirllnH> the French philosophers from Voltaire to Condorcet 
on tbe one hand, LJnd the Scottish LJnd English thinkers from 
Kandeville througb BUlle and Adam Smith to Edmund Burke on the 
otber, is to gloss over differences wbich for the influence of 
these men on tbe next century were much more iJlportlJnt tban 
any superficial siJlilllrity." [Hayek, p. 335)15 
Hayek's paper is a resume of Hume's legal philosophy and its uneven 
influence. He is at his most vehement when he considers Hume's failure 
to influence Franco-German thought. In the French vision of democracy, 
Hayek detects an autocratic slant he later terms .. totalitarian 
democracy" [Hayek, p. 359]. This blot upon the age of Enlightenment 
amounts to the mark of Hume's obliteration. 
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"The habit of speaking of the Auflclii.rung as if it represented a 
homogenous body of ideas is nowhere so strong as it is in 
Germany, and there is a definite reason for this. But the 
reason which has led to this view of eighteenth century 
thought has also had very grave and, in my view, regrettable 
consequences. This reason is that the English ideas of the time 
(which were, of course, mainly expounded by Scotsmen but I 
cannot rid myself of the habit of saying English when 1 mean 
British) became known in Germany largely through French 
intermediaries and in French interpretations and often 
miSinterpretations. It appears to me to be one of the great 
tragedies of intellectual and political history that thus the 
great ideals of political freedom became known on the 
Continent almost exclusively in the form in which the French, a 
people who had never known liberty, interpreted traditions, 
institutions and ideals which derived from an entirely 
different intellectual and political climate. They did this in a 
spirit of constructivist intellectualism, which I shall briefly 
call rationalism, a spirit which was thoroughly congenial to 
the atmosphere of an absolute state which endeavored to design 
a new centralized structure of government, but entirely alien 
to the older tradition which ultimately was preserved only in 
Britain." [Hayek, p.336J 
Hayek's account of Franco-German relations might be used to charge 
Derrida wi th implici t prejudicej something to which Derrida is 
sensitive6 • Despite his insistance upon Franco-German relations, Derrida 
manages to echo Hayek's concern. Ille. E.IJ..d.a 01 Ian. looks at the way 
German existentialism was systematically mistranslated into French j an 
event or mis-event that blended into a specifically French strain of 
post-war philosophy. Derrida is not treating a historical event in a 
continuous or seamless way. Like Hayek, with his account of the 
Continental erasure of a thought preserved only in Britain (via Scotland, 
as it is all but erased by Britain), Derrida takes an interest in the 
way secret or suppressed currents are developed in other situations. 
However, if Hayek is used as the basis of a possible indictment, 
Derrida can be seen to exploit certain prejudices. Firstly, Derrida is 
appealing to 'form' in an i i d b H k' d lllper DUS an, y aye s standar s, 
42 
chapter one economics of depression 
rationalist manner. Democracy, as the formal instantiation of the right 
of response is, in LD.. d..elII..ocr:a.Ue. ajournee, apparently guaranteed by some 
kind of revolution; as though the authority of Democracy derived from 
the possibility of constructing its fOI7DlJl edifice frOID scratch. 
Secondly, Derrida treats democratic liberties as a positive benefit, in 
La.. democratie ajournge as the positive effect of Rousseau's influence. 
Hayek also treats Democracy, in its rationalist guise, as an enthusiasm 
fired by Rousseau; he, however, derides both Rousseau and the kinds of 
liberation offered by formally rational structures 7 : 
"the emotionally unstable, unaccountable lJnd half-mad idealist 
... it was RousselJu lJnd not HUIDe who fired the enthusiasm of 
the successive revolutions which created modern government on 
the Continent1'. [Hayek, p. 358) 
Hayek credits Hume with the insight that: 
"the grelJtest politiclJl goods, pelJce, liberty, lJnd justice, were 
in their essence negative, lJ protection lJglJinst injury rather 
thlJn positive gifts." [Hayek, p. 3591. 
A negative 'advantage' should not be misunderstood. Hayek. quoting 
Hume, insists that an active principle cannot be founded on an inactive 
one [Hayek. p. 344); the 'negative' could not found positive enthusiasms. 
Rather, apparently inactive dictums corral or temper over-bearing 
enthusiasms; the weaker in a society come to be protected as a society 
begins to be laid out upon weaker lines, around (negative) formal 
dictums and legal insti tutionsj specifically, around common, secular 
magistrates rather than around Sovereignty or its simulacrum in the 
absolutely magisterial personage of a King. Hayek's claim is that 
nothing positive accrues to the state through its institutions; its 
formal edifices. Certainly not, as Hegel would argue, through the 
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aufhebung of the 'negative's. Hayek's argument is that the State is 
weakened (even removed, in the state-nationalist sense) by its supposed 
'power' structures, not enriched. This would mean, as Hayek seems to have 
calculated, that it is as redundant to criticise the power of 
institutions as to affirm them. Whilst Hayek implicitly recognises the 
legitimacy of a debate that centres upon the question of what is weaker 
and what is stronger within a state, he argues State power is neither 
secured nor liberalised through taking its formal attributes (its 
institutions) as representative of State strength. Power, what is 
effective in or throughout a State, lies in the processes that 
communicate, publicise or prosecute the interests and initiatives of more 
or less weaker figures. The Conclusion to this thesis will look in more 
detail at this liberal argument; specifically, as it may be cast in terms 
of the weak and the strong. Here at least, Hayek shows the weakness of 
the state is by no means terminal, It has become an advantage', 
Hayek's attack on Franco-German thought springs from a deep 
distrust of the tradition trusting in the 'revolutionary' aspect of a 
reforming Ra tionali ty, For Hayek, it is a massive confidence trick to 
have ever believed that the 'past' of an institution is the sort of 
effect that may be reformulated anew or, even, overturned, a dangerous 
piece of foolishness that ends with 'totalitarian democracy' j the belief 
that the State embodies Reason 10. Hayek argues institutions are "grown 
inst1tutioDS"j meaning <paradoxically), they develop artificially and 
obliquely to personal interests as current expressions of social desires. 
However, as this idea of the growth or, better, the spread of the 
'artificial' might be emphasised, so Hayek would communicate with a 
Continental tradition, The Humean term 'artifice' is the word Kant's 
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'syntheses' translates. When Kant asks: "How are synthetic a priori 
judgements possiblf!', he has found they already are possible; they are 
the currency of the ~erciu. of experience described throughout the 
first half of his Critique 01 ~ Reason. Kant's Critique attempts to 
trace such artifices, to mark them in their possibility and the variety 
of their functions. As Hayek's 'Humean' tradition is fed through Kant's 
critique, it might still not depend upon rational constructions. It has, 
however, come to insist upon showing that Rational enthusiasms and 
pretensions might be interrupted, or reduced to near-nonsense, by intra-
social reflection <1.e. by critique: by discourse and communication), as 
the second half of the Critique 01 f.J.u:.e. Reason shows 1 1. The passage of 
'artifices', in every sense (differing terms, translated terms, relations 
between differences), amounts to a wide and loose social ethos. It does 
so in two ways: both as a philosophical tradition and an ongoing 
process. Hayek exemplifies both these effectsj a 'British tradition' that 
includes Kant (and amig~ like Hayek) and the persistant effect of this 
trend to have made a mockery of rationalist pretensions. Is this not a 
strength? A strength of weakness? The term 'artifice' comes to represent 
the advantage Hayek stresses. Derrida's point, fortuitously I centres upon 
the way in which the artificial character of developing institutions 
comes to represent a peculiarly modern advantage. Even, a revolutionary 
advantage. Speaking of las Avena.ents he recently said: 
• Through both the spontaneity and a certain naturalistic 
utopianism we undoubtedly became aware of the artificial, 
artefactual character of the institution. Certainly, we did not 
need to wait for 1968 to know this - but perhaps, rather, to 
come to a more practical, more effective awareness:... since 
these non-natural, incorporated , bistoriclJl institutions no 
longer worked, we no longer found tbem incorporated at all, 
incorporated in Right, legitimated. One should add to this the 
fact tbat the media lJnd with it the ",hole of culture took on 
tbe forms and dimensions of a total mutation, even as regards 
the production of the events of 1968. This liberated all kinds 
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of questions upon tbe legitimllcy and the origin of knowledge: 
of assent, of eVlJluation, of publication, of com111unication 
etc.N12 
Derrida describes an event which finds institutions provoke neither 
respect nor paranoia. They are not overpowering but, in some sense, 
weakened. Derrida speculates this realisation takes a revolution, like 
the events of 1968. It is clearly, however, not a revolution as such. 
Rather, it is the presentiment that institutions have always already 
been weakened; in some sense, they are post-reval uti anlJry. Here Derrlda 
suggests another sense of revolution, one only reminiscent of violent 
insurrection or the philosophical insurrection frequently represented by 
Kant. That is, Derrida speaks of a revolution that has already produced 
a shock-wave, a variation, a realisation that initiatives occur in a 
forensic arena of assent, evaluation, publication et cetera. 
The first quotation of this section asks: If is it not the 
responsibility of a democrat to tbink the axioms or tbe foundations of 
democracy?' Which is to say, it is not something that ought to be done, 
but already a source of disquiet. How might a sense of unease surround 
the fact that society is not governed through or by a rational 'Form' 
but, rather, through forms of oblique, discursive relations? How have 
such anxieties been communicated as though they were discursive issues; 
that is, forensic issues? It is not a question of a definite revolution, 
but of the form of post-revolutionlJry uncertainty. Here, despite his 
residual emphasis on revolution, Derrida 1s close to Hayek. Certainly t 
for instance, in that because the issue of Government could provoke 
either one reaction or another (affirmation or criticism) there is no 
question of one side finally surmounting the other. A theme of both I.he. 
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E.ruia 01 ID..n. and LD.. democratie ajournee is that common political issues 
are as easily emphasised by the right as by the left and so imply a 
common or commonly fought over political ground '3 • However, Derrlda more 
closely resembles Hayek in that social relations cannot be relieved by 
politically loaded structures. Institutions provoke commitment only to 
the extent they are both artificial and diversionary; which is to say, 
they provoke a questioning commitment or a sense of unease. 
Hayek has more to sayan the conditions for the possibility of any 
initiative in this artificial milieu; he is also an economist. Derrida too 
insists economics is the milieu of any venture or any issue. Speaking of 
the 'democratic' form of the forum of international philosophy in ill 
~ o! bn, he accentuates "the promised complicity of .!! common 
element ... the represent.!!tion of a certain tr.!!nsparent ether" [EX 132]; a 
complicity he understands as economical. The economic forum is clearly 
not a place of stable and equitable exchanges, the Kantian 'tribunal' of 
Pure Reason where the claims of reason are whittled down through 
rational analysis '4 . It is not the self-same forum persisting throughout 
any discussion. However, in its artifices or 1n the development of 
different issues, it is nothing other than a common medium. Then~ is a 
curious disjunction here: the forum is not the same for everyone but is 
nothing other than similar for every partiCipant. In its common 
representation, it might be said to be 'democratic' if a paranthetic 
style could show the uncertainty of this form. Derrida, however, believes 
the benefits of this element, the promise that more or less discrete 
possibilities might be profitably broadcast, is enframed "outside of 
politic.!!1 or corpor.!!tive representation~ [lien dehors des representations 
pol1tiques au corporatives". DA 1081. Which is to say, it is represented 
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away from a Political structure, in another kind of milieu. Specifically, 
it is en framed as the Liberty of the Press [DA 1081. Above, in speaking 
of las l!vlmeJlents, Derrida raises the issue of the Xedia as a mutation. 
~ democratie ajournee speaks of a techno-economic mutation of the 
Media. The 'adjournments' of the title refer to the kinds of artificial 
relations characterising the loose, weak ethos of an economy; Le. a 
distorting delay accompanying the referring and deferring of 
differences. It also, however, refers to journals and to the 
communications Media, the formal representation of this new advantage. 
In short, economic processes are everywhere, even to the point their 
mutant power can be taken as 8. Political power; insofar as they have 
came to represent the articulation of public opinion. After considering 
the place and the effects - the 'economy' - of 'public opinion', it will 
be necessary to ask again why Derrida stresses the ubiquitous memory of 
a revolution. It will be found that Derrida is stressing a symptom akin 
to Revolution; a presentiment that something new has occurred, as 
something like a Political order has been passed over. That something 
unwieldy like 8. derelict institution has been jettisoned. Finally, a sense 
that once important issues have sunk into silence as public opinion, in 
its techno-economic mutation, passes lightly over everything. 
I • I I 
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On the indifference of post-revolutionary .odernity 
and its ecano.ic articulation 
!he. E.n.da o.f. hn. and La.. democratie a10urnee trace the move from a 
Political ideal, a form of government, into the discursive milieu termed 
an economy; a move from politics into economics, from one supposition 
upon power into another, at once vague, weakened and less easily 
formulable. In ill ~ ci K.a...n. this move frames the problem of 
Democracy as a distinction of the West. Even as Derrida begins by 
placing his accent on II far-. no less than on deacx:racY' [EI 1341, he 
closes by framing this problem in terms of economics: opening and 
closing upon the 'West'u. L4. democratie ajournee treats economics with 
more suspicion, as a threat to democracy; warning of its "depoliticising" 
power. Nonetheless, as both papers move away from a notion of the 
Political. their respective differences are differences within the same 
movement: an economic movement. As L4. democratie a10urnee states. 
II It is necessary to maintlJin a formlJl rigour, without which no 
Right is protected. and so to invent more finite institutions, 
a legislation more differentilJted, better adjusted to the 
techno-economic mutations of the 'free-l1Jarket '." CDA 115)16 
Derrida recognises that only in economics, within its "deviating 
topology" [UTopologie deroutante." DA 105], could politics still be an 
issue. It is here the question of political rights will have been both 
proposed and threatened. What, then, might Derrida mean by 'maintain' or 
'protect', as the ability to pOlice Rights cannot be attributed to 
Political institutions in the way that a critical or conservative 
philosophy is accustomed to account for political power. If the role of 
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any institution is articulated by virtue of economics, the institution 
will not be 'of' Politics but, rather, of the economy as the milieu of all 
relations; formal Dr otherwise. Why, then, when Derrida speaks of the 
need to police the market, would he wish to invent, let alone maintain, 
something already finite as regards economics? Why reserve the idea of 
an institution, or linger over an already redundant idea? 
Ihe. Ends. of !.an. exploits the idea of a II reserve' [EX 133), a term 
intended to broach the idea of what philosophy habitually strives to 
maintain. The 'capital' to which philosophy aspires. In political 
philosophy the 'object' of commitment, the subject of the political 
sciences, would be the socia-political body; a corpus whose integrity is 
revered as an institution. Derrida implicitly regards such 'reserves' as 
inhibiting factors. As the title of The. ~ Ili !a.n. implies, such an 
object represents an 'end' for its proposer; a concrete social body, a 
proper form of life. For Derrida, the issue 'represented' as politically 
or ethically desirable redounds upon an idea of 'Presence': an original 
or eternal 'Present' or an object with a futural tense whose imminent 
presence only accidentally depends upon its re-presentation in debate. 
For Derrida, this hypostasisation of 'presence' holds as true for 
revolutionary thinkers as conservatives. The 'reserve' codes all desires. 
For Derrida it is never simply a question of jettisoning all reserves. In 
political thought he criticises a view he terms 'negl1tive politologTi the 
view denying that any expression calls for a form of political 
commitment. Derrida regards this latter strategy as being symmetrIcally 
complicitous with its oppositej an attack upon every political 
representation in careless abandonment to the real terrors of poU tical 
thought in its death as in its life. In either case, the end of 
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representation has been predetermined. This leads to a certain blindness, 
their opposition fails to broach the slighter nuances and differences 
apparent in debate. In their different kinds of faith, they remain 
indifferent to discursive currents they neverthless depend upon: 
"Thus the god of a negative politology may not take the sign 
of life, of its great day, without a certain 1Ied1U11. The 
everyday rhythm, which is essential to it, supposes the massive 
diffusion of something like a daily paper." (DA 106]17 
Whatever is said in the end, of the life or death of politology, the 
underlying assumptions or 'reserve' remains stable. Thus, from the 
variety of possible critical representations of political forms, Derrida 
abstracts and opposes the tendency towards destruction promoted in 
nihilism to the concentration of the Political corpus proposed by 
totalitarianism. Whilst emphasising that such political 'representations' 
can only become an issue in the 'element' of public opinion, he insists 
the 'everyda)t currents of this milieu will not tend towards the abstract 
aims proposed by these warring factions. Such proposals, finally, fail to 
control 'the massive diffusion' Derrlda associates, here, with the power 
of the media. Hence, Derrida's apparent indifferencej the great 
revolutionary oppositions have become a dead letter. This indifference 
belongs to the everyday milieu and, as will be seen, to the techno-
economic mutations, exemplified by the media, that exploits this 
indifference. LA. demQcratie ajQurnge lingers over the 'indifference' of 
any reserve, as over its apparent redundancy: 
"What then becomes of this pool [reserve) of experience, of 
evaluation and even of determination (styles, tastes, mores) 
which remains unrelieved by judgement <yes or no) and by 
representation, in all the senses of this word?' CDA 110p8 
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The 'reserve' has become a more or less redundant issue, not only in 
classical revolutionary situations but also around the question of 
d ti h i ( ) Derrida 's account of the post-emocra c c a ce yes or no. 
revolutionary age, then, is uncomfortable in its indifference to the dawn 
or the ends of great oppositional positions. He urges caution (r~serve) 
as it is in caution, alone, that the redundancy of these older reserves 
continues to be an issue. This new sense of post-revolutionary modernity 
recognises the Public is no longer at stake in the accepted way. This 
does not mean it should be surrendered. As has been seen. Hayek insists 
the 'enthusiasm of the successive revolutions ""hich created modern 
government' should be regarded with suspicion. Derrida cautiously reads 
these past events in the light of stranger or more diffuse enthusiasms 
than the idea of 'modern government' has allowed for, or expressed 
reservations against. In a similar way to Hayek. Derrida treats the 
object of suspicion, modern government, as a product of the metaphysical 
philosophy of France and of Germany. Wi thin the unfolding of an 
economic milieu it is found that 'modern government'. as the proper 
representative form for the Public, does not inspire commitment. The 
similarities between Hayek and Derrida may, then, be amplified. Derrida 
however, closer to a Franco-German relation, is less prone to abandon 
the 'metaphysical reserve'. He attempts to understand in what way, and 
by virtue of what processes, it might seem a dead issue. 
Derrida's 'reserve' seems irreducible to Hayek's piecej it tempers 
suspicion with unease, a real sense that the move from Politics into 
Economics has entrained a process of 'depol:1tlclsatlon'. Exercised by a 
disquiet that escapes Hayek, Derrida introduces this qUiet terror into 
his analysis of indifference. A terror marking. even inhibiting, the 
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unfolding of indifference. Both ~ E.nd.s. Ill. !all.. and La. democratie 
ajournee talk of risks and dangers. In !he linda of ~ Derrida contrasts 
the risk of "autisJi' with a brutal and blind thirst for noveltiesj Brutal 
in its aptitude for discontinuous movement, Blind to the way themes are 
regulated or repeated in the economy of this element '9 • Thus, the 
indifference of autism is contrasted with the risk of becoming blindly 
indifferent to the artifices of an economy. In LD.. democratie adjournee 
Derrida evokes 'depoliticisation' in a similar way: political philosophy 
is mute whilst the Public remains addicted to novelties, to 'passive 
con SU111111 eri S111 , WA 1211 i insistantly identifying with everything hyped in 
an economy in an "accelerating cycle' WA 118], Despite a distance of 
twenty years, these two kinds of depoliticisation bring Derrida's 
separate papers on Democracy together. On the one hand, the formation of 
silent or autistic groups either not listening to, or not being reached 
within, the wiles of any economy. On the other, a blindness failing to 
express any 'reserve' in its Violently accelerating flight. In his 
attempt to think risks or 'liberties', Derrida is drawn to relate these 
two instances of indifference. This can be thought through the relation 
between commi tment and expression. Specifically, the necessary 
commitment to forensic communication and the possible expression 
communicating a difference or new issue to a forum. As autism is 
inexpressive, so blind addiction remains uncommitted, despite its wild 
flight after every new venture. As always the question concerns the 
conditions as well lJS the possibilities of communicative relationsj the 
necessary condition of an open forum (as an object of commitment), and 
the possible chance of a new opening (as the expression of a new 
venture), As Derrida insists; the problem is one of the necessity (the 
condition) lJnd the risk (the possibility) of any programme. 
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There is a clear similarity between Ecclesiastes and I.h.e. E.D...ds. 01 
h.n., as they work towards, and react to, a forum of general 
communication: a public space. Which is to say, they both maintain the 
'forum' as a kind of essential fall-back position or common denominator 
in every kind of communication. However, more crucially if less 
obviously, they each attempt to articulate the wayan issue becomes 
significant or interesting within such a forum. In each work, the 
implication is that a real sense of the public space (in its general 
extent) and of public issues <in general, or in every eventuality) are 
only maintained so long as a certain disquiet inflects the communication 
of any issuej contributing to a sense of necessity or exigency in every 
issue risked. Both Ecclesiastes and I.h.e. ~ 01 !An come to identify the 
necessity of the possible (of a risk) with an ambiguous presentiment of 
finality. Depoliticisation maybe infinite, but the question of what is 
elided in such a process continues to be insistant, exhaustive and finite 
(determinable). Here, Ecclesiastes insists upon Death upon 1ts 
certainty and its possibility - as Derr1da alludes to death insofar as 
it might represent The Bnds of Ian. The idea of the already exhausted 
risk informs the mournful demeanour of much of Derrida's work, 
particularly his reappraisal of the redundancy of Revolution's promise in 
the post-revolutionary age. ~ democratie ajournee states: 
" The '11 berty of the press' is the llIost preei ous benefit of 
deIDDCr~cy but this funda11lent~1 'liberty' relll~ins to be 
invented. Each day. At least. And de1DDCr~cy with it." [114)20 
The exhaustion of this 'liberty' occurs through economicsj as 
economics allows for the possibility of the Xedia's exploitation of its 
liberty. However, as Derrida's political papers insist that the move away 
from the Political is a movement within economics, so he detects in 
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Economics an insistant appreciation of the urgency of a public problemj 
the problem of how competing possibilities might be broached under 
general and social conditions. As Ecclesiastes sought to associate the 
urgency of this problem, as an imperative, with mourning, so Derrida 
insinuates a sense of quiet unease into otherwise indifferent economic 
formulas. His treatment of economics is intended to frame the idea of 
'public opinion', as such an idea anticipates both the conditions for the 
possibility of a public forum and its exhaustion: 
"It is there that we may interrogate the authority of public 
opinion - not in its restrained content, but in its form of 
pre-electoral judgemen -e'. CDA 11 0 ]21 
Here, Derrida identifies the way he makes an issue of finitude with 
a form of 'pre-electoral judgement'. Which is to say, even as the freedom 
of the press continues to exhaust its right to take 'liberties', there 
remains a 'pre-electoral' sense of 'reserve' (cautious suspicion). A 
moment of anXiety standing in relief against indifference, without 
actually having been relieved. Such 'reservations' might express a 
respite (adjournment) from relentless indifference. However, this trace 
of caution cannot be determined by reference to the Political (to the 
proper 'form' of judgement), insofar as it is articulated by virtue of 
economiCS rather than Politicsj as an issue, it anticipates the political 
whilst being uncomfortable only as regards economics. The day of 
judgement is, as ever, found to have been delayed or distorted but this 
time through a lapse which also distorts the economic scene. Derrida is 
not reifying this lapse from indifference. He is certainly not treating 
post-revolutionary indifference as though it had decided upon a form of 
respite. Rather, he is treating a moment of unrelieved anticipation as a 
symptomi as a symptom anticipates a decision without being reducible to 
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it. A symptom marks a sense of disquiet, not a diagnosis. Such symptoms 
cannot be coded as being 'for
' 
or 'against' the status quo; for 
conservation or for change. Derrida believes the risks or dangers of 
liberty are, here, again fermented. It is here he makes a profession: 
"of an~lysing, witbout respite. tbe bistorical determinations: 
those wbich, in 1989, may be delimited ~nd those wbich may DOt 
be." CDA 112-113]22 
This is DecoDstruction, an 'economics ' in which the necessity of 
mutual commitment and the possibility of expression, as these factors 
are entailed by a forensic farm, are strained to the paint of 
distraction. In this distraction, economics begins to express symptoms 
not yet coded in the the final exhaustion of the Political forumj 
symptoms that cannot be made to refer simply to the end of Politics. 
Here, Derrida continues what he sees as the exercise of formal rigour 
which, if nat the rigour of the 'ecclesiastical ' court, is neither at home 
in, nor a respite from, the Xarket. Here, Derrida aims to communicate the 
variety of distracting differences, to note how symptoms of public life 
became issues in their variety rather than in their univocity (1.e. 
univocally referring to a single farm). As Hayek says, the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment became interesting through their differencesj they 
cannot be represented by a common set of ideas. For Derrida, the 
question is how differences might be of interest in the absence of 
commonality; differences which have become almost universally compelling 
and - more importantly - those whose attractions still eludes analysis. 
In metaphysics, Derrida avers, 'differences' are taken as 
symmetricalj l.e. as mutually supportive and, hence, as exchangeable. For 
instance, the impetus towards conservation highlights a similar issue as 
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the impetus towards change. For Derrida, such a view works at the 
expense of the non-symmetrical or minutely distracting issue. He will 
not, then, reinvest in the common position as though it were the reserve 
of every position. There is no elevated position, distinguishable only 
from its symmetrical opposite, which represents the most desirable 
object or end. It is not that the desire for an object confers a mark of 
distinction upon that object. It is wholly different; objects 
differentiate desire. The variety of eXChangeable issues in any economy 
- the variety of analogous commodities, coins, issues etc. - articulate 
an 'agon' where a variety of desires are in play. The ends of Han are 
found to be uneven, different and differentially compelling. In 
can seq uence, if these issues are no longer of the Pol! tica 1, in its 
Presence or integrity, they are not siJ1Jply depoliticised. They remain 
different and compelling; set in relief against a sea of indifference. 
Some interests may seem both commonly and supremely desirable, but 
these could never afford a respite from the uncommon attraction of 
objects that escape all sense of community. 
If Hayek's disgust at Franco-German misreadings of Hume's providence 
could fuel an indictment of continental thought, it is because of the way 
they symptomise a disquiet that could never be separated from, or 
relieved within, a process which trades on distortions. In accouting for 
such issues, it is not a question of finding for one position over 
another; for Britain against a Franco-German complex. It is, for 
instance, clear that both Hayek and Derrida have common sympathies. 
Derrida's insistance on the excitement or the diversions of the economic 
field are everywhere tinged with the idea that insurrectionary fervour 
was not only misplaced but, simply, redundant. Likewise, Hayek regards 
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the revolutionary enthusiasms of Europe as a kind of impotence. He 
quotes Hume to the effect that where Reason might claim a revolutionary 
edge, there "reason of itself is utterly impotent" [Hayek p. 343], This 
might be compared with Derrida's detection of 'autism'. This impotence, 
however, is said to have obliterated a British tradition; how could a 
trend become both dominant and impotent? Here, there is less an 
opposition between Hayek and Derrida as the heightening of a disquiet to 
which Hayek also attests; as he communicates in disquiet with Derria. 
Hayek argued that something British is obliterated in Europe. It 
will be seen that the way a repressed interest returns as an issue is 
more disquieting than a simple recovery of a lost object, or a promiSing 
reserve: a simple recovery of an alien or "older tradition which 
ultimately was preserved only in Britain" [Hayek p. 336]. In effect, 
'Britain', or the mood of suspicious reserve associated with Britain, is 
a symptom articulated by virtue of global economic processes. This 
amounts to a final sense of the Post-revolutionary. If the variety of 
issues which formally regulate or articulate an economy are not simply 
indifferent or analogous, if the British character is peculiarly 
distressing and unnatural, then Britain's tradition could not yet be 
identified with Britain. Which is to say, it must also be un-British, as 
it cannot be determined according to a recognised Political entity 
termed 'Britain'. Being other to POlitics, it must be economic; Le. 
'something' articulated by virtue of economic relations. It is this 
anticipated 'something' that attracts Derridaj and to which his forensic 
regard attaches as to a symptom. 
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If, in the wake of supposedly seismic and revolutionary decisions, 
post-revolutionary modernity fails to offer any respite from this 
'deviating topology' (not even the respite of indifference), what can be 
said of the 'form' of anticipation? for instance, the anticipation of an 
inhibited British presence? How might a political region like 'Britain' 
be anticipated in its 'Form', rather than in its restrained or inhibited 
content? It will be seen that this form of anticipation could not refer 
directly to a nebulous political entity but, instead, to a movement of 
'depoliticisation' which, in its 'form', could no longer be regarded with 
indifference. For instance, Derrida approaches Jewishness by reference to 
the form of Law, as judaic law distinguishes the jewsj but only insofar 
as this 'law' articulates a distinction in an intra-national economy, not 
as it represents a determined Political set. 
No doubt, Derrida represents modernity as 'post-revolutionary' 
because France, alongside Continental Europe, has a history of 
Revolution. It is also, however, because the revolutionary aim - a form 
of enfranchisement, which would be nothing other than the form of 
democracy - represents no post-revolutionary respite. No single event 
finally settles the question of political liberty, or the taking of 
liberties. The last section of this introduction will deal with the ways 
in which a revolution remains an object of appeal, the way in which this 
appeal might lapse into indifference, and finally with the symptoms 
which distract Derrida's analyses in a way that confounds any 
revolutionary fervour. 
• • • • 
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On two kinds of indifference <Bakunin and Heidegger) and 
the law which anticipates each with suspicion 
~ ~ 01 ~ and ~ democratie ajournee look back to the revolutions 
of 1798 and 1968, as they analyse the form of democracYi a 'form' which 
allows for the 'right of response' [DA 121], After drawing attention to 
the rights of the colloquial voice, Ihe. E.D.d.s. c1 !an. speaks of 'anonymous 
necessity; a communication without, even, colloquial status. l&. 
democratie ajournee looks at the minority appeal of 'samizdats'. If, in 
principle, democracy already anticipates such voices, is it necessary to 
speak of revolution at all? let alone credit it with a preeminent role in 
the foundation of democracy? The problem, of course, lies in the way 
such responses might be marginalised, even ignored. Here, at least, 
Revolution might represent both democracy's failures and a sense of 
legitimate suspicion of democracy. 
The idea that democracy arrives with a revolution might have 
distinguished Derrida from Hayek. In fact, Derrida's suspicion of 
revolution brings him closer to Hayek. Derrida and Hayek communicate, in 
suspicion, even when Hayek believes the poli tical forms sanctioned 
through Franco-German relations are impotent. Where the revolution is 
believed to be instantiated, there a kind of illusion is in farce. But 
where, exactly? Derrida and Hayek communicate in an intra-national 
space. If their suspicions are everywhere, so are the illusions against 
which suspicion cautions; so, equally, are all the forms of impotence and 
indifference broached by their caution. Rather than remain fixated upon 
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the Political, Derrida concentrates on this 'non-space' where the 
relation between nationalities are articulated. Ill.e. Ell.d.s. Ill. Man. looks at 
the space of an international colloquium, where the colloquial is 
respected insofar as the form of debate entails the "raising and 
respecting of differences' [EX 132]. La. democratie ajqurnge is similarly 
directed at a milieu living outside of Government or its representative 
forms. An international space, but also an economic medium: The West. in 
its economy. Here. the revolution will never. originally or ever, have 
provided a concrete advantage to a specific faction. Neither to a 
specific country, nor to a determined sympathy. Revolution could never 
provide a respite from distraction or from coercion. Thoroughly invested 
with suspicion. revolution remains a kind of distracting disquietj 
unrelieved in the public milieu. Where, other than in a Public forum. 
could the concept of an 'advantage' or a 'respite' become an issue? 
Hayek is known as a neo-classicist. If classicis. constructs a 
communications forum where - in principle. or under some 'form' of law 
- new responses can begin to articulate different risks, Derrida is also 
a neo-classicist. If a law c,/Jn be presented as an advantage (to the 
public, to the ruling party, or as a weapon wielded by a specific 
vanguard) it is because the law, or the rule of law, is open to bids. It 
has not proscribed in favour of any interest, nor has it determined or 
dominated any specific site. The law, in its uneasy variety, anticipates 
variety before it is enforced; i.e. the law conveys the excitement of an 
imperative through its diversity rather than its directives. Thus, if it 
is asked, what are the conditions for the possibility of the milieu of 
Public Opinion (given that, in its deconstruct ions , it remains a manifold 
of competing possibilities: or an ',/JgOlJ') no single revolution could be 
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ventured as its unifying condition. The law is a negative advantagei it 
promises no security, nor any clear advantage. 
A traditionally enlightened position holds that the rule of law is 
the liberation from over-ruling enthusiasms. Derrida simply reformulates 
this tradition but does so incessantlYi continually recasting Democracy. 
Hence, his extraordinary emphasis upon the possibility of the anonymous 
or the alien. 'Whilst his interests, always, are reminiscent of the 
'classical' philosophy of the Enlightenment, they emerge - always -
out of a sense of confused insecuri ty. As has been seen, Derrida never 
waivers from a commitment to what remains formally rigorous in a 
question, which remains a Classical motif. lor, does he waiver in his 
suspicion of the grounding and the formation of this form: "Everyday. At 
least. And democracy with it." 
Derrida holds that the concept of public opinion as a "modern 
artaflJct' (DA 107) could not be taken seriously without the 
parliamentary model of democracy but also, and more especially, without 
the concept of representative opinion outside of political 
represen ta tion. 
art ic Ie IX of 
In La. democratie a 10uree , this effect is ascribed to 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man: the 
representation of free speech in the freedom of the press CDA 108], It 
is this 'outside of' that captivates Derrida. He treats the classical 
arena as an effect of revolution but places his emphasis upon the 
moment when such an arena is moved or swayed in non-obvious ways: in 
SOlDe Wily, outside of the model of government promising direct 
representation under a rational fOT7Il. The focus, here, is upon the milieu 
of Public Opinion as the mileu of relations between differences. If this 
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milieu originates with a revolution, such a 'revolution' could only 
chimerically or obliquely be attributed to a specific political 
formations. The milieu of differences, represented as a 'Public' outside 
of any rational structure, confounds even as it ventures a unifying 
event, a common cause, a popular will, or any other revolutionary motH, 
We, in the sense of 'we the public', are 'post-revolutionary'j the pronoun 
had no meaning before the vague recollection of 'our' arrival as a 
representative body23 , Derrida's pOint, here, is that a 'recollection' that 
resists, ever, being traced back onto a 'formal' structure holds out the 
possibility of utterly reformulating the classical conditions of the 
Enlightenmenti i.e. that which is offered as its determining condition or 
'law'. This sense of the law, one produced obliquely as it communicates 
outside of any definite structure, is apparent in Ih.e. ~ c1 Ka,n. There 
it is found that anything ventured as an issue - even a revolutionary 
issue - in a particular regional discourse (in for instance, the 
philosophy of France or of Germany) is both confounded and represented 
anew in the alchemy of the intra-nationa24 , Here, to evoke a 'law' would 
be to refer to a law which enables international communication, Which is 
to say, a law that enables rather than determines discourse. 
Before conSidering Derrida's concept of the law and the enablement 
of the various discrete voices likened to samlzdats, this thesis will 
consider the worst possibilities of a milieu or non-space that elides 
any Political form, Although the possibility exists for reformulating 
Democracy I Hayek and Derrida converge upon the fear of Democracy's 
eclipse. In Derrida's instance, upon the fear that the reification of 
public freedom as the 'freedom of the press' has become a 'techno-
economic mutation' threatening liberty. In Hayek's case, that liberty is 
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threatened through 'totalitarian democracy'. Both effects can be 
associated with the European Democratic tradition and its tradition of 
violence and indifference. The rhetoric of Democracy is comfortable with 
violence, despite the near universal approval Democracy now enjoys. 
Below, the revolutionary aspirations of Xikhail Bakunin will be compared 
with the very different aspirations of Xartin Heidegger. It will be seen 
that whilst Bakunin exemplifies one kind of indifference - a reckless 
disregard for any issue - Heidegger exemplifies another. Heidegger's 
insistance upon national differences includes an impotent inability to 
question the variety of differential relations. 
• • • • 
Mikhail Bakunin 's ~ Reaction 1Il. Germany: .4 irapeJlt in:ml. .4 Frenchman 
casually exploits mindless indifference. This work, which apparently 
details the oppositions facing nascent Democrats, was published in the 
left-hegelian Deutsche lahrbticher between October 17 and 21, 1842. 
Bakunin signed it Jules Elysard and, for a time, it was taken as the 
work of a Frenchman. From the first sentence it resonates with the 
evocations of the 'day' highlighted in Derrida's text: "Freedom, the 
realisation of freedom: who c~n deny that this fiord today stands at the 
head of the agenda [Tagesordnung: day's order] of history?'2a. Bakunin's 
paper is both a genuine Samizdat, and a disingenuous elaboration of 
Franco-German relations. There are, however, other vague similarities 
between lli Reaction ill Germany and Derrida's evocation of Revolution's 
day. Firstly, Bakunin insists that no recognised position could now 
inspire commitment. Secondly, he states that whilst the day of Democracy 
is everywhere expressed. no position could ever be equal to it. Unlike 
Derrida. he does not come to affirm the uncertainties of such 
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expressions or the communications they might imply, he simply pursues 
uncertainty with abandon. Bakunin's Democratic enthusiasm is 
characterised by a contempt for any current position. This would extend 
even to 'Democratic' positions. However, Bakunin does not see Democracy 
as one position amongst others but the current appearance of a 
revolutionary spirit. He notes that the demands of the most poverty-
stricken have been recognised in theory, but also that no theoretical or 
legal redress is possl ble. In consequence, he urges the "restless and 
ruthless annihilation of every positively existing thing." This, he holds, 
is necessary. The pleasure of destruction is something no formal 
position could hope to recognise, or frame. His evocation of violent 
pleasures, is presented as a surrender to the alien currents of 
revolution which: 
"derive froJ11 new sources quite unknown to us and develop and 
diffuse theJ11selves in silence ". All peoples and all J11en are 
filled with a kind of preJ11onition, and everyone whose vital 
organs are not paralysed faces with shuddering expectation 
the approaching future "'hlch ",111 speak out the redeeJ1Jing 
Word. " 
-Let us therefore trust the eternal Spirit which destroys 
and annihilates only because it is the unfathomable and 
eternally creative source of all life. The passion for 
destruction Is a creative passion, too." [Bakunin p. 406] 
This seems a pure statement of Nihilism. Where Bakunin still 
commands a reputation it is as Europe's worst philosopher. His 
contemporary reputation, although far greater, tended to the opinion that 
he overcame his natural disingenuity only through his commitment to 
terrorism26 • It will be seen that Bakunin does not simply fulfill 
Derrida's remarks on the 'god' nihilism ventures only through "a certain 
medium. ". something like a daily paper". He revels in something exactly 
like a daily paper. The paper runs: 
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"Freedom, the realisation of freedom: who Can deny tbat this 
Word todlJY stands IJt the helJd of the agenda of history? 
Friend and foe must IJdmit it: indeed, no one dares openly and 
fearlessly to profess that he is an enemy of freedom. But the 
expression, the profession, does not make the reality, as the 
Gospel well knows. Unfortunately. there is still a multitude of 
people who in fact, in tbeir innermost bearts, do not believe 
in freedom ... 
There is no profit in speaking with these people: they 
were never serious about freedoID and freedom was never for 
them a religion which offers the greatest pleasures lJnd the 
highest bliss only by means of the most extreme conflict, of 
the bitterest griefs, and of complete, unconditional self-
denial~ [Bakunin p. 385] 
The way Bakunin exploits both this medium, and the 'redeeming word' 
which seems so much like a theistic day of judgement, remains 
compelling. What is clear is that Bakunin recognises the relations 
between commitment and expression (necessity and possibility>, and 
between Duty and Freedom (responsibility and enfranchisement). He, 
however, abandons this relation. To be sure, he insists freedom will only 
be won through grief. This echoes his earlier suggestion, drawn from the 
Gospel, that the expression and the commitment must be thought together; 
an imperative or responsibility that frames the exigencies behind any 
attempt to voice the liberating word: no pain, no gain. However, if he 
holds this to be an imperative, it is one he casually ignores. Bakunin's 
point is thlJt no attempt to communicate is worthwhile. He exploits the 
distance between commitment and expression: his expressions are wild 
and deceitful, his commitment is to nothing but destruction. Bakunin 
abandons the imperatives of forensic communication. Of those who cling 
to pOSitions, in a parody of conciliation, he approves their derelict 
world ("one lives so prettily and comfortably in tbese ruins, in this 
irrational rococo world whose ldr is as healthful for our consumptive 
souls as the air of a cow b.!rn :1s for consumptive bodies" Bakunin p. 
399) whilst insisting, of these people, one cannot speak with them. 
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This refusal to communicate is precisely what Derrida resists. 
However, as has been seen, Bakunin's attitude is less a refusal to 
communicate than a contempt for communication; a contempt he casually 
exploits. The only French term to appear in the paper 1s 'Juste-milieu' 
[Bakunin p. 393], which is cast as the language of conciliation: a 
language he makes no effort to understand. The lies slip easily from 
Bakunin's pen. A remark in lli ~ c1. ID..U.. would suggest Derrida, too, 
is oblivious to the line between truth and 11es. In summarising his 
project in that paper he states: "it will not be a question of 
falsificatiort' [EX 1481. Like Bakunin he apparently revels in promoting 
the diseased babble of the West. Where Bakunin sees Rococo ruins, 
Derr1da suggests Xetaphysics, the language of the West, is a house of 
mourning; plaintively speculating upon its end and the end of man. 
However, Derrida only resists passing judgements that falSify. His 
apparent indifference to truth and falsity occurs as part of a project 
to anticipate discontinuous lines of communication in the breaks and 
spaces that interrupt texts. That Derrida refuses to falsify positions 1s 
not a contempt for truth, but a way of maintaining formal criteria 
laws - positively without ever passing judgement. la-one is banished on 
the grounds they lie, rather their indifference is scanned for any 
possibility that the law might have been anticipated in a new way. This 
can be seen in his relations with Heidegger. 
• f f f 
In I.he. End.Q. elf. m Derrida refuses to falsify the startlingly bad 
rendering of Heidegger's term 'dlJsein' as 'human TelJlity' in France. This 
mistranslation was used to justify a humanism that nowhere appeared in 
Heidegger's work. It might be suggested the French thus failed to 
67 
chapter one econoIics of depression 
approach the real issue in Heidegger's work. However, this begs the 
question of the peculiar benefits Heidegger's work presents, or what a 
faithful translation might represent. If, in the milieu of communicative 
relations, there is no assured advantage, it is difficult to see what 
effects a mistranslation might have. Derrida rehearses this whole scene; 
not to pass judgement but, again, to promote a practical awareness of 
the issues anticipated in the whole problematic. The propensity of 
France to mistranslate, emphasised by Hayek, might also - as Derrida 
suggests come to stress the peculiarities of an intra-national 
discussion. As regards the possibility of such discussions, there is the 
question of Heidegger's involvement in the 'revolution' of the ISDAP and, 
thus, his sympathy with an irredeemably nationalistic position. 
There are two aspects of Heidegger's involvement in this revolution: 
his open support for the party, and his espousal of a philosophy that 
apparently provides a basis for National Socialism. On the one hand, 
Heidegger campaigned for Hitler in the plebiscite of 1933 i itself a 
democratic expression of what Heidegger saw as 'revolutionary will'27. On 
the other, in such papers as !he Self-assumption c1 ~ German 
University [1933] <known as 'The Rectoral Address') he attempted to 
express the idea of a German vocation rooted in a sense of struggle. 
Heidegger's involvement with the party could, perhaps, be distinguished 
to the extent he reworks current rhetoric. However, such a reworking 
makes it difficult to avoid the assumption, echoed by his son, that he 
was more than a 'fellow-traveller' of the ISDAP: he was personally active 
in the 'revolution', if not always personally in line with party 
doctrine28 • As lli Rectoral Address openly recommends the forces of 
order to the university, such forces were both the more or less ignored 
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possibilities of philosophy and the <impossible to ignore) condition of 
National Socialism; as if any distinction between philosophy and the 
NSDAP were no longer pertinent. The moment of fidelity would be the 
structure, or order, that both represented and exacerbated a sense of 
community. Heidegger spoke of a revolution as the production of a formal 
expression or representation, a 'Bildung', that brings the 'Vill' to a 
sense of difficulty, as to a vocation29 • Like Bakunin, Heidegger 
exploits the distance between commitment and expression. Unlike Bakunin, 
he does not do so in order to promote dispersion. Heidegger sees the 
issues at stake as ones that come to be concentrated, even represented, 
by a pressing or difficult problem. In effect, he sees the distance 
between expression and commitment as a taut one; a question of tension 
and proximity. Through terms like Bildung (meaning both, education 
establishment and picture) or Lehre <lesson and warning) he attempted 
to reach for the sense of difficulty he anticipate in any form of 
communication. In effect, the difficulties of communication are, here, 
formally reified; as a revolution, as a lesson and as a terrible warning. 
lli Ellda ci. ~ looks at another 'revolution' associated with 
Heidegger's work, one central to Heideggerian studies which has come to 
have political significance outside such studies. Heidegger's early 
projects, such as his Be.1llg. and.. 'I.1ma, were termed 'fundlUl1ental ontology: 
i.e. an account of the truth of 'Being' under a necessary form. At some 
time in the late 1930's or early 40's an event occurred which has been 
termed the 'l"ebre': the 'turn'. Briefly, this signifies that the attempt to 
understand the ways 'Being' might exercise thought is more intractable 
and more open to mischance than B.eing. and. lille. had yet been equal; or 
could ever be equal. The kehre signifies a turning away [rom the concept 
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of the 'fundamental', but also a turning away of 'Being'. In this regard, 
when writers such as Sartre, under the guise of pbenomenological-
ontology, used Heidegger to justify a farm of humanism there is the 
unhappy implication that ~ and lima had itself ventured terms open 
to misinterpretation. Works seen as being 'post-kehre' attempt, anew and 
in the face of such possible wayward motifs, to continue to discover 
positive traces in this peculiar exacerbation or turn in the advent of 
'Being'. In his Letter em. Humanism (1946] Heidegger indicates that his 
early work should nat be scanned for references to 'man' in order to 
affirm a humanist doctrine. Rather, he suggests, the thought of man as 
'human' fails to account for the ways in which 'Being' is obliterated by 
such terms. In his Letter Qll. Humanism Heidegger suggests that the 
'hulDane' is something peculiar to Roman thought and emerged as a virtue 
in distinction to the culture of non-Raman barbarians, as an attempt to 
emulate the Greek nation of 'paideia' <education)30. 
There is a firm decisions, herej translation suggest nothing of 
interest. The translations ventured around the term 'hulDan' detail a 
sort of history without bearing the experience of history in the form of 
a 'lesson', the imperatives Heidegger readily promoted during his Nazi 
period. In 1946 Heidegger still believes a peculiarly forthright sense of 
'man' was risked through the Greek understanding of education, an 
understanding the Raman term obliterates. Thus, any attempt to further a 
sense of, say, a 'pressing issue' will always take priority over any 
attempt to communicate through translation, or even a refusal to 
communicate (as, for instance, between the Romans and their others). 
However, as ~ Enda llf. In notes, in either case the thought of the 'we' 
amounts to a 'magnetic attraction' [aimantationl j as regards either the 
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sense of communicated risk (lesson) or the sort of indifference promoted 
through intra-national attempts at translation or emulation. When 
Derrida turns his attention to this marked interest in the 'we' he 
states: "the distinction between this or thtAt period of Heidegger's 
thought. between the texts before tAnd tAfter the so-called Kahre, has less 
pertinence than ever." [EX 148]31 
There are a series of implications, here. Firstly, that Heidegger's 
decision to emphasise a sense of exacerbation over mere translation 
becomes eqUivocal at this point. Secondly, that this eqUivocality 
surrounds a sense of community, and one that fails to become an issue in 
the way either Heidegger had originally imagined (as the promotion of 
the 'Kehre' represents a fundamental fidel1 ty to Heidegger's thought) or 
as he came to imagine (as the 'Kehre', itself, seems a non-issue) . 
Finally, that a distinctive moment, a 'revolution' as that which comes to 
frame a community, is most equivocal here. These multiple implications 
all centre upon the concept of an analogy, as this term includes: 
translated terms, exchanged terms, similar terms etc. The invidiousness 
of analogies is especially apparent when, by virtue of an analogy, a 
smooth or equitable exchange an apparent lack of distinction -
becomes an issue. Ihe ~ c1 X4n especially concentrates upon the terms 
Heidegger uses that imply either 'openess', 'sight' or 'light'j in all 
cases carrying metaphoriC weight and often derived, literally or by 
analogy, from Greek terms32 • Similar terms mobilised the thought of the 
Enlightenment, a movement away from darkness and its anonymity, a 
movement into a space of light and communication, a liberation of sight 
and of whatever might be vouchsafed as intelligible in sight. Such terms 
maintain Derrida's interest in the Enlightenment and the community it 
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comes to promote. As regards translation and analogies, He1degger 
recognised the dependancy of his writing upon both translations and 
poetic terms (always reminiscent of metaphors) but refused to exploit 
this dependancy. As a later text by Derrida makes clear, Heidegger 
always treats analogies as an embarrassment, an effect requiring 
justification as it suggests no possibility of justification in itself33. 
This fear of translation, evident before, after and during the kehre, 
centres upon an apparent lapse, a moment of indifference. Heidegger 1s 
aware that the translation of a philosophical text might conspire to 
communicate certain lapses in the original; for instance, as a 
translation impugns a general significance to such terms as 'man' it 
might be read as a broadening of Heidegger's original work, as though it 
were enriched by the combination of issues it had yet to come to terms 
with. Such apparent 'lapses' might, even and insolently, be approached as 
a series of indictments or recommendations. What Heidegger is most 
decided upon is that nothing positive comes of this effect. In his Letter 
Qn Humanism he suggests the poverty of language provides the lesson for 
thought, not the way it produces riches from nowhere34 . As always he 
urges a sense of exaction that is not evident in translation. In effect, 
a sense of the pressing that could only be indifferently dissipated by 
the elliptical movement of translations. Heidegger never came to enjoy 
the effects which misdirected his work, as France was to, perhaps 
unknowingly and certainly only briefly. What escapes Heidegger, although 
not his translated texts, is the strange reciprocity between a community 
exerCised by a single issue and, as in France, a community exacerbated 
by the translation - and hence multiplicity - of any issue. Which is to 
say, a community exercised by the thought of Political integrity and an 
economy where this integrity is open to translation and dissemination. 
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The obvious criticism of Heidegger is that his suspicion of 
translation, so much like a fear of contamination through dissipation, 
amounts to a morbid xenophobia justified by a rampant Nationalism, 
Derrida point is that he is not nationalist enough, In Heidegger's work, 
at the points Derrida emphasises, it is almost unimportant that his 
texts are German, Al though Heidegger frequently lauded Germanic 
qualities, it is as though such qualities could, in principle, be 
neutralised in an intra-national forum, the only sort of forum that 
could highlight the colloquiual or national voice, If, as Heidegger 
argues, communication becomes troublesome as commitment and expression 
are brought together, his arguments would lead to the conclusion that 
certain difficulties are to be preferred over the difficulties apparent 
in an international forum, When Den-ida reaffirms that communication 
should be difficult, and should be in order to be 'democratic', he 
introduces the term '!¢neT': to worry. 
• As a declaration of opposition to official Politics is 
authorised, authorised by the authorities, this 111elJnS also, 
that it precisely does not go so far as to trouble the order. 
It does not worry them. This final expression, 'it does not 
worry them I, can be taken in all its sense." [El( 134)3& 
The term 'worry' translates something of the imperatives of 
Heidegger's term Lehre but is derived from the Hebraic name for a valley 
in Palestine: 'sehenna', a place of suffering. In the lesson offered by 
Heidegger, this insinuated term would cause problems he could never have 
imagined nor ever come to desire. 'Gehenna' anticipates an imperative 
that could only become an issue in intra-national communication. As such 
a term might become an issue in a 'post-revolutionary' milieu, it would 
be symptomatic of Heidegger's revolution only to the extent it 
confounded any thought of a concentrated or localised revolutionary 
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event. Which is to say, the worriesome nature of 'gehenna' only becomes 
an issue as the notion of a definite site is disseminated across the 
economy of world relations. It does not triumph over indifference, but 
articulates an apparently 'indifferent' realm in a new way. 
• • • • 
Both La. democratie ajournee and ill End.s. 01. !4n. attempt to mark issues 
elided in the completion of a revolution. For instance, in IJl.e. ~ 01 
!.a.n., Judaism; a clearly political issue in any consideration of the 
NSDAP. Heidegger's appeal to a formal lesson is found to reverberate to 
laws it had neither overturned, nor fully excluded nor, ever, broached as 
a matter for the Will; as the 'Law' is that which distinguishes Judaism. 
However, Derrida - who was born Jewish and Algerian - emphasises that: 
"I often feel that the questions I attempt to formulate on the 
outskirts of the Greek philosophical tradition have as their 
'other' the model of the jew, that is, the Jew-as-Other. And 
yet the ~radox is that I have never actually invoked the 
Jewish tradition in any 'rooted' or direct manner . ... In short, 
the ultimate site of my questioning discourse would be neither 
Hellenic nor Hebraic if such were possi ble. It would be a 
non-site beyond both the Jewish influence of my youth and the 
Greek philosophical heritage which I recieved during my 
academic education in the French universites."36 
If Judaism seems the central issue in his use of 'gener, Derrida 
insists his primary interest is the projection of a 'non-site', a space 
open to negotiation and committed to the most unusual of expressions. 
Which is to say, a forum that projects a form of enfranchisement 
alongside diverting or unexpected currents. Above all, Derrida is 
committed to the prOjection of democracy. It is, however, a concern 
exclusively articulated by virtue of external relations. Which is to say, 
relations immanent only to an al1en- or 'non-site' where Democracy is 
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anticipated, not determined. In effect, relations immanent only to the 
milieux of the intra-national in Ih.e. E..nd.s. o.f. .I.a.Il or the media of public 
opinion in ~ democratie ajourn8e. Derrida's continued attachment to this 
forensic and enlightened space is distinguished by a continuing attempt 
to emphasise the issues that make an attachment to (for instance) 
Franco-german Enlightenment 'revolutionary'; in the sense that the 
imperatives of such a situation have not been predetermined but, rather, 
are enabled in a more or less unexpected fashion. Derrida, then, has 
found that the term 'revolutionary' must be more diverse than could be 
happily elaborated. It could not represent the contours of a political 
event. If a revolution could open or close the awareness of any political 
issue, it is not the elaboration of a political formation equivalent to 
modern France or Nazi Germany that is of interest. If such motifs 
command attention, they do so as effects of international communication 
and according to the kind of law which enables such communication. 
To speak of the 'law' would seem to emphasise a Political forum over 
the forum of economics. However, because the 'law' does not determine a 
definite or agreed position but, rather, enables the articulation of 
differences, it is always a question of anticipation and speculation 
before it is one of the proper site of political commitment. Which is to 
say, the 'law', as it is detailed above, is too economical to be Political. 
It seems strange, then, that ~ dwl.ocratie a10urnee speaks of 
depoliticisation. Economics, as it articulates a move away from a 
determined political site, would seem always to be depolitic1sing. 
This question will be detailed 1n much of the rest of this thesis. 
However, Derrida's diagnoses of both 'autism' and I brutality' provide 
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instances of what a depoliticisation might entail. When Derrida detects 
a tendency towards autism, this diagnosis is directed at Heidegger. His 
diagnosis of a 'blind and brutal' addiction to novel ties - reiterated in 
La democratie ajournee as 'passive consumeriS111 , - could be directed at 
Bakunin. In both instances, the way either Heidegger or Bakunin invest 
in the notion of revolution is seen to all but obliterate the law. Each 
forsakes a law which enables difference in favour of their respective 
tendencies towards indifference. Heidegger is compelled to silence, at a 
certain point (the point of the intra-national). Bakunin remains wholly 
undiscerning at every pOint. However, in each instance, Derrida's 
symptomology is articulated by virtue of economic relations, not 
political considerations. Heidegger's apparent xenophobia is interesting 
not as regards National Socialism but, rather, as regards the play of 
intra-national exchanges, borrowings and loans; what Derrida terms 
'credit' [usure]. Bakunin's violent flight could, also, be read as a matter 
of economics. His work does not differentiate its desires, in all matters 
but that of utter destruction he maintains an attitude of pure 
indifference. As though he were tainted by something so monstrously 
addictive that without it ever becoming an immediate factor, without 
ever appearing in the rococo slums of political negotiation, it has fully 
claimed his passions. Such an addiction promotes a disinterested 
contempt in anything current whilst binding its adherents to the 
possibility of a lasting and final consummation. An addiction that would 
see the whole world burn before 10s1ng the possibility of a final fix. In 
many works, of which lli E.nd.a c1 Ia.n. would only be a more obvious 
example, Derrida plays upon the notion of a final end; for instance, the 
idea of an apocalyptical end and that of a desired end. Insofar as these 
'ends' might be both differentiated and eXChanged, the belief that the 
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one is equivalent to the other remains open to renegotiation. Bakunin's 
indifference abandons all attempts at negotiation. 
~ democratie ajournge considers only Franco-German relations, 
amounting to a single pass through the intra-national market. As has 
been seen, Derrida's suspicions might entrain more diverse passages and 
a more global movement. If France is articulated by virtue of an intra-
national economy, the French revolution is not simply or finally French. 
When Derrida considers what is given to be understood through such a 
movement, he turns to the production and promotion of 'sa111izdats' (a 
more or less clandestine communication). It might be thought a sami:zdat 
is produced in conflict with the law. However, as Derrida considers what 
is enabled by virtue of a samizdat, the form of the law is again evoked 
as the enablement of more or less discrete possibilities. The samizdat 
remains a disquieting reminder of the way in which something that is 
given to be understood projects the risks and the uncertainties of 
communication. The samizdat could not be simply depo1iticising insofar 
as it, at least, begins to trace the problems that beset communication 
as it raises the possibility of its reception. Which 1s to say, the 
samizdat makes reciprocity into an issue. Derrida's interests in the 
risks of reciprocity can be differentiated from the kinds of 
indifference underwriting the works of either Heidegger or Bakunin: as 
Heidegger's concentration of revolutionary themes into an exemplary 
Lesson could be compared with Bakunin's total dispersal of all themes 
and all objects of commitment. Derrida states: 
• The sale choice is not then: concentration or dispersion. 
Rather, the alternative will be between the unilateral and the 
.ultllateral in the relations of the media to the public, 
through the 'publics'. The responsibility, of recognising the 
freedom of the press IJnd before the press, will always depend 
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upon the efficacy of a 'right of response' wbich allows for 
the citizen to be more than a fraction (in effect, to be 
priva tised: and to a greater and greater extent) of a 'public' 
both passive and consuming, and necessarily injured through 
that. Can there be democracy without reciprocity?' lOA 121137 
It is not a question of the forms promoted by a Heidegger or those 
exploited by a Bakunin. Derrida's work is marked by a suspicion of any 
dominant position (a unilateral position), whether concentrated or 
dispersed. Where an indifference to a variety of similar issues reigns, 
as in Heidegger's ignorance of translation or Bakunin's indifference to 
any attempt at conciliatory exchanges, Derrida highlights another effect; 
the risks preceding any sense of reciprocity. If, in a discontinuous 
fashion, such a risk emphasises the law it does so through economics; 
i.e. through the processes which articulate every autistic, marginal or 
colloquial voice. What remains 'new' in Derrida's classicism is that the 
imperatives at work in an international forum are not yet determined 
and, certainly, will not be determined as the same in every instance. The 
'law', here, has enabled the articulation of difference. It is the way in 
which, everyday, Derrida seeks to communicate the multivariety of issues 
in a 'general' forum, rather than resting on an established position, 
that makes his neo-classicism both more suspicious and more alert than 
that of Hayek. The arena is not established as such, neither in its 
principle characteristics nor in its characteristic inhibitions but 
continues to be disposed otherwise, everyday. 
The chief question, then, to bring to Derr1da's analyses is the 
continuing role of Political motifs in an attempt to address economic 
problems. It will be found that the way in which Derrida hovers over any 
question of the Political is predicated on a decision that everywhere 
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afflicts his analyses; whatever promises an economic respite is a 
(political> reserve and, thus, an issue for a more suspicious, yet more 
attuned, negotiation. This means that some economic effects have 
abdicated economic reciprocity in a way that, compared to the 
refinements Derrida proposes, could only be described as stupid. 
The question of stupidity will be considered in the conclusion. If 
Bakunin's antipathy to negotiation is, finally, an example of stupidity, 
it is so because his work is indifferently suspiCiOUS, without a trace of 
the negotiable. Bakunin's position must, then, become the subject of 
negotiation. even at the expense of dragging it into a forum. As was 
seen, Derrida did not seek to condemn or to change Heidegger, as such. 
He maintains a kind of respect for Heidegger, or for what might be given 
to be understood through Heidegger's works. Derrida sought only to 
insinuate a new twist into themes that. whilst the subject of negotiation 
in Heidegger's work, had yet been approached with indifference. In short, 
Bakunin is always an opponent of Derrida, whilst other philosophers are 
not. This calls for some comment. 
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Effects taken, generically, as symptoms of indifference have been cast 
as depoliticising tendencies. Derrida describes such tendencies as 
'techno-economic mutations'. Where such mutations gain ground, Derrida 
insists upon a form of reciprocity, a form characterised by its 'rigour: 
"It is necessary to maintain a formal rigour ... more finite 
tools, a legislation more differentiated, better adjusted to the 
techno-economic mutations of the 'free-market '." (DA 115] 
An "infinite task", as Derrida later says. A task committed to the 
projection of socia-political rights alongside the free market in ways 
that tend towards the social rather than the anti-social; as Derrida 
asks: "Can there be democracy without reciprocity?' fDA 121], Derrida's 
'formal rigour' is apparently intended to counter the power of the 
market to depoliticise; in effect, to represent a form of political 
commitment. His formalism is, however, thoroughly engaged with 
economics; it follows the free-market, an arena in which the Political is 
by no means assured. The next two chapters argue there is no purely 
Political realm in the antique sense of a definite SOCia-political group. 
There is no cherishable equivalent of the 'Polis'. 
The claim, now I is that no sign of indifference can be directly 
related to a political object, nor valorised as a revolutionary issue. 
Neither Heidegger's tendency towards autism nor Bakunin's casual 
exploitation of communication are chiefly political, or symptomatic 'of' 
anything political. Beither autism nor naive brutality are attributable 
to a current lack of politics, nor do they represent a kind of political 
edge. Derrida, then, wishes to interpret indifference otherwisej neither 
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as inhibited, nor as dominated by a Political dream. Derrida aims to 
uncover a variety of discrete issues in apparent indifference. Here, the 
'issue' could never be a sense of alienation from the 'Political', but 
only the multiplicitous character of currents whose force or inhibitions 
could no longer coded by reference to the Political. 
This is comparable to the classical formulation of 'Political-
economics'. Derrida is on classical ground. What is elaborated under 
this rubric is nothing other than a socia-political formation but one in 
which the impossibility of treating the Political as an object of study 
has become evident. In effect, 'political-economics' is the oblique 
simulacrum of a politicsi through this term the space of social 
interaction is elaborated, en passant, as an Economics. If this 
represents an epochal decision, a specifically Classical or Enlightenment 
realisation, it could not simply be termed a revolution. It follows, 
rather, from the logics of 'disjunction'. Political-economics is nothing 
other than the sort of socio-political space represented by the archaic 
concept of the 'Political' but is, nevertheless, not identical to such a 
concept'. In its elaboration of another, older site, political-economics 
weaves the ground of a wider market. The disjunctive relation might be 
represented through the copula; a movement from the one through the 
other, the elaboration of the Political as an economics. However, through 
deconstruction, the SOCia-political problem will be seen to be different 
than had claSSically been thoughti if political-economics is represented 
as nothing other than a political formation, deconstruction will stress 
the ways it remains otherwise to any politics. 
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The symptoms Derrida publicises through economics are symptoms of 
Depressive inhibitions. This chapter details Derrida's abiding interest 
in depressive statesj finally, why it is this question, above all, that 
provides an entry into Derrida's understanding of economics. It has 
three sections. 
i) An account of the problem of depression in any general formulation 
of the Social. As the possibilities ventured through political-economics 
might end in depression, this section stresses the 'social' significance 
of both economic speculation and its failure. 
ii) A study of Heidegger's mistrust of speculation. It will be seen that 
an interest in symptoms of speculative failure is common to both 
Heidegger's anti-speculative philosophy and the speculative dialectics of 
Hegel; or, rather, a symptomology of speculative fears might provide a 
discrete link between the :Modernist philosophy of Heidegger and the 
classical philosophy he mistrusts. 
11i) An account of the different ways in which philosophy becomes 
interested in economic failurej or, how philosophy comes to highlight 
every lapse in the smooth functioning of an economy, and to claims these 
lapses as symptomatic of major social issues. This chapter ends by 
arguing that the attempt to determine depression as a problem for 
society, will have failed to appreciate the ways in which an interest in 
depression also destabilises any predetermined notion of the 'social' 
<1.e. a notion equivalent to the Political). 
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On the formulation of depression as a social problem 
Freud's Mourning Wld. Melancholia confuses two accounts of Depression: 
one providing an aetiology of depreSSion, of its history and its 
possible relief, the other both promoting and confounding any sense of 
eventual relief. In the first instance, Depression is understood as a 
failure of the process of self reflection or self representation termed 
larcissism. That the self would wish to continually represent itself, or 
have itself represented, even when the 'self' is in utter doubt (as 
occurs in Depression), highlights the importance assigned to the concept 
of representation. Freud's aetiology implies Depression has fallen foul 
of the process of representation and its alleviation depends upon the 
correction of this shortfall. It could be argued that Freud understands 
the 'self' in terms of the desire for presence, where presence denotes 
the object aspired to in any attempt at re-present",tion. If so, 
Depression would mark both the loss of this object and the end of all 
aspiration. The use made of Freud, in this thesiS, could be seen as a 
critique of political representation, insofar as his work betrays a 
discourse fixated on the Presence of the Politicalj betrays it utterly 
once depression becomes apparent. This thesis will, however, re-cast the 
positive elements of Freud's logic, a logic that is not Freud's creation, 
as Depression is not simply Freud's worry. Freud does highlights a 
public obsession with self-representation but only insofar as Depression 
shadows this obsession. Depression is, then, understood from within a 
discourse upon self-representation but a discourse it only obscurely 
approximates. Depression, rather, suggests something other to a logic of 
representationj it is this 'other' form that concerns this chapter. 
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Freud's other account of Depression is, seemingly, trite; Depressive 
states are always more like each other than a disposition they markedly 
fail to resemble. This other account of Depression, as Freud's title 
suggests, is that mourning has seemed analogous to melancholia; they 
are, however, to be differentiated. The significance of this fact cannot 
be overstressed. Within Depressive dispositions a history failsi l.e. an 
aetiology derived from a formally coherent accout of Narcissism suggests 
the failure both of liarcissism and, in consequence, the recommended 
aetiology itself. No obvious history or relief programme may be 
associated with Depression. Further, Depression could not thereby be 
conceived of, or represented as, a single dispositioni where similarities 
apparently persist, there a series of differences are in force. 
This 'other form' is pertinent to political-economics insofar as the 
hope that economics will return to a sense of the Political might end in 
indifference. Heidegger's fall into silence or Bakunin's mindlessness are 
not to be associated with the failure of political paradigms nor could 
their own similarity be straightforwardly read as a reaction to 
political exigencies. Through a discussion of Freud the following points 
will be detailed: Firstly, the social sphere elaborated as an economics 
is not what 'we' - meaning 'the voices of a socio-political discourse' -
have grown to become accustomed. Thus, secondly, the public space in 
which depressive symptoms are arraigned promotes another view of the 
'public' than is suggested by the habit of taking such symptoms as 
ineffective or indifferent political responses. 
Kournini ~ Kelancholia describes the hopeless indifference of 
depression as a life lived under the shadow of a lost object. The shadow 
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of a lost object is a Ghost. La.. democratie a10urnee talks of Democracy 
and its ghost: 
" - Vhat, today, is public opinion? 
- Today? The silhoette of a phanto111, the haunting of the 
democratic cDnscience. " CDA 1031 
Derrida's analysis of the public and its relation to democracy has a 
mournful air; binding Derrida's analyses, in 1&. democratie ajourn13e and 
elsewhere, with the problem of Depression. The question of the Public is 
to the fore in Freud's account of melancholia; the gravest form of 
depression2 • In Kourning ~ Kelancholia Freud begins by speaking of the 
object lost to the mourner as a laved one, suggesting a personal or 
private abject. As he passes from mourning to melancholia it becomes 
clear he is using the term 'abject' in a highly conceptual sense and, 
alongside this conceptual turn, is placing his emphasis more firmly an 
the public rather than the private arena. When Freud moves from a loss 
as personal as that of a lover to such objects as "one's country, 
liberty, an ideal, and so on"3 his 'objects' are clearly conceptual; they 
are 'objects' in the sense of an end or goal. His economical 'and so on' 
elliptically reenforces the fact that such 'objects' have deserted the 
private in order to maintain their conceptual appeal. His, earlier, Q.n. 
Narcissism designated such objects by reference to the term 'Ego Ideal'. 
The view of objects found in llourning ~ Kelanchol1a is, in part, a 
repetition of his previous remarks on the public face of narcissism: 
.. In addition to its individual side, this IdelJl has a social 
side; it is also the common idelJl of a family, a class or a 
nation."'" 
If 'Ego' is Freud's term for the distinctive component of the self, 
the Ega Ideal is its mark of distinction. Freud finds narcissistic 
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identification to be beneficial, it is discovered as the "li bidinal 
c011Jple11Jent to the egois11J of the instinct towards self preservation." s . 
Without the categorical representation offered by the Ego Ideal the urge 
towards self-preservation would remain anonymous. However, to treat 
every conceptual object as representative of the self would be less 
explicable if the relation between the self and an objectified ideal were 
as direct as in narcissistic identification. Clearly, another form of 
relation underlies the extension of the term Ego Ideal into the public 
realm. The variety of objects which might be represented by the Ego 
Ideal are general objects with the emphasis upon General, they exist 
only in a general arena. The logic here has been termed a 'disjunctive' 
relation. The Ego stands in opposition to the way it is cast 'in general' 
but, at the same time, is to be thought together with its general concept 
as current, significant or discursive. When Kant speaks of the 
disjunctive relation he insists the logical connection is not of: 
"logical sequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the 
spbere of tbe one excludes the sphere of tbe otber, and yet at 
the SIllIe tae ~U1Jjty. in so far as the propositions taken 
together occupy the whole sphere of the knowledge in 
question."6 
Once the emphasiS is upon 'community', the status of Freud's various 
'objects' can be marked. He is treating concepts as general insofar as 
they have a General dimensionj i.e. are of interest to the general public. 
Which is to say, objects have meaning only wi thin the community of a 
commonwealth. This is far from being an abrupt move from logical to 
social community? Only insofar as certain concepts exclude general 
intelligibility could it be held that some 'objects' are possible without 
being necessary; i.e. they may be taken as recurrent ideals whilst 
escaping the community I in General. The community articulated by virtue 
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of a disjunctive relation is not wholly logical, it might include pockets 
that remain in the dark as regards the community's logical formulation. 
The community itself might, even, have become wholly deluded, in general, 
as regards it logical formulation. Which is as much to say, the objects 
of a community's logic may symptomise dementiaj a logic diseased of its 
own account. In Kourning a.D.d. Xelacholia, when Freud goes on to speak of 
'conscience', it is clear he is speaking both of a general conscience in 
the logical sense, and a general conscience in the social sense. The end 
or the lesson of his analysis of melancholic depression is that 
consciousness might have fallen foul of what is generally conscienablej 
i.e. that more or less foul currents can be seen to excite the community 
without being deemed, in general, conscienable. 
"What we are becoming acquainted with is the agency commonly 
called 'conscience'; we shall count it .. , among the major 
institutions of the ego, and we shall come upon evidence that 
it can become diseased of its own account,"e 
Freud's objects should be approached via the public nature of 
conscience; an object always bids for general approval. If an object 
fails to meet with approval, if it is cast aside, excluded or seen as 
redundant, it fails the test of conscience. However, the hypostasisation 
of the conscience as an institution, or its imminent crowning as a Super 
Ego standing over and above the self, only raises the issue of approval 
without deciding it. Insofar as redundant objects continue to express a 
sense of community - through the disjunctive relation - even as they 
fail the test of conscience, the community cannot be based upon or 
around an identification with its institutions. Which is to say, even as 
an object fails the test of conscience, or fails to be recognised in 
relation to settled insti tutions, it is redundant only within the 
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community. It is entirely possible for an object to be suffered in 
abjection. This suggests that underpinning the judgement discounting 
some objects whilst favouring others is an entirely ambiguous sense of a 
community. Here, there is no question of either a healthy or a diseased 
conscience - a conscience with integrity, or one lacking all integrity -
but, rather, only a hopeless community; the community elaborated in 
}Wurning and. M.elancholia, a diffuse community <including segments of 
mourning as, also, instances of melancholia) but, above all, a community 
which only fails to be represented by a single, apparently integral, 
motif. In consequence, depression could only ever offer the appearance of 
a healthy facade, it could never finally be subsumed under such an 
image. Is this not, however, exactly what Kant avers in his account of 
the disjunctive relation? The opposition between the whole sphere of 
knowledge and the specific objects standing against it all the while 
manifests Community, and does so even if a manifold of various objects 
only ever fail to excite general approval. 
Democracy, as the political concept of the many, as a general idea, 
or as a concept directed at general approval, is entirely folded into the 
milieu of public opinion. Could Democracy survive if public opinion was 
unable to valorise anything, even its own concept? If Democracy as an 
object (an end or goal) never became an issue of general approval. If, 
with the closure of the political ideal, all that is left is the shadow 
of redundancy. Depression would be the end of an unhappy situation. A 
community fully besotted by redundancy could never maintain an object of 
general approval. Not even a term promoted as the term for a community. 
A Political concept in the sense of a whole and unified community; one 
living not under a disjoint but having, rather, a categorical appeal. As 
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Depression abandons the thought of political approval, only the shadow 
of public opinion remains. Democracy, an hellenic term, is assumed to 
excite general approval because it represents the 'many', the cohesion of 
the Body Politick. In antiquity Democracy was said to be a paradigm and 
a lesson of political efficacy9, With Depression the paradigm is 
obliterated, the lesson forgotten, whilst public opinion remains 
enthralled by redundancy, To question public opinion at such a time is 
not to reify the political body but the moments when it ceases to 
represent, when its structure seems most arbitrary; to ask about the 
shadow as the gallow which the body swings upon. 
"A deviating topology. How, now, to identify public opinion? 
How does it take place? Where does it offer itself to view, and 
as such? The errancy of its proper body is also the ubiquity 
of a spectre. It is not present as sucb in any of these 
spaces." CDA 105)10 
Derrida writes about certain philosophers, such as Georges Bataille, 
with apparent approval when they affirm the absolute expenditure of the 
political bodyll , If there is no idea of a unitary Political object, a 
single political conscience, nor any sense of the Pol! tical preserving 
itself after the fashion of a narcissistic self, why treat the shadow 
with fear? Why not affirm the headlong rush into abandonment as a 
luxury rather than a fatal eXigency? Why not enjoy the consumption of 
the Body Politick, rather than enquire after its demands? Here, the 
question would be: Why is depression so depressing? Could it not be 
pleasurable? Whilst Derrida understands the affirmation of expenditure 
as a legitimate possibility he remains enchanted by the issue of 
representation, even as it fails or falls into redundancy, For instance, 
so long as the end or closure of the Political continues to exert an 
insistant effect as an object (end) in the community, the 'end' is an 
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issue that remains both equivocal and, yet, insistant. In making such an 
issue worriesome (i.e. as something more than a sign, or representation, 
of redundancy> the possibility remains that representation can become an 
insistant or worrying issue. Which means political or democratic 
representation. If it could be tentatively put so: Derrida wants to make 
Democracy work harder. The problem with this formulation being that the 
value of work is itself in question as the issue of representation is 
perpetually deferred or 'adjourned' in the constant sounding of public 
opinion. Despite the space of twenty years seperating I.b.e. E.nd.s. 01 !all 
from La.. democratie ajournee, the two papers are agreed upon the fact 
that the issue of representation, and the failure of representation, are 
the issues of philosophy. Which here means Classical philosophy. 
The issue of representation and its failure is the abiding mark of 
Classical philosophy. Certainly, for instance, in Kantian critique where 
- by virtue of the fact that a mooted ideal remains contestable -
representation is in question12. This may, also, be seen in the work of 
Adam Smith who, when he speaks of the 'inVisible hand', is precisely not 
hypostasising a single representation of the PoU tical but showing how 
society continues to function in the absence of a single unifying model. 
Through the invisible hand and despite private egoism, a measure of 
social cohesion continues ell passallt13 • For Derrida, in La.. democratie 
ajournge, the issue of representation is both a Rousseauesque idea and a 
democratic issuej even or especially when Democracy causes the most 
worries. In sum, Derrida 1s for Democracy insofar as Democracy refers to 
the concept of general representation. His interest in representation is 
an abiding interest in the pOSSibility of Enlightenment as it was 
promoted in Classical philosophy. 
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Democracy cannot be maintained as a general concept except through 
the vagaries of public opinion it erstwhile represents. Derrida's 
insight, already apparent in Classical thought, is that for an issue to 
be seen as a political issue - to be treated liS such or ill General -
it is, in the first instance, Economical. For Classical philosophy the 
Political could not be treated as an object preextant in situ. The 
Political has neither the constancy nor the universality to be treated 
as an object of study. This is clear in the work of Smith; the ethos of 
the cohesive commonwealth is neither pregiven nor a conscienable goal 
but develops according to an oblique economy. In the case of Kant, 
whatever is described as economical is so because it does not 
instantiate a system - whether pOlitical, rational or legal - but is a 
development in which certain issues 
moral) become of general concern'·. 
(whether political, rational or 
In short, the path from the 
Polt tical to the economical is one in which governing principles are 
only assured to the extent that they are issues, not certainties. The 
classical science of political-economics, more than any other Classical 
motif, describes this move. For this reason Derrida's work can be 
sloganised as a formal account of the detours and deviations effected in 
the move from the political through the economical. 
For anything to become an issue it would seem to be a question of 
general excitement, of general confidence, of democratic involvement. 
Could it be that in every econo11JY the possibility of the Gellerll1 is 
mistook, 11Jistaken, over-shadowed? Bakunin or Bataille exacerbate this 
problem. Other writers have exploited this possibility by identifying 
what remains vague about the Political with the power of Public Opinion, 
the arena in which all sense of community could be mistook or dispersed. 
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Finally, some writers have exploited this possibility to reject the idea 
of Democracy completely. It is possible, and has been possible, to throw 
Democracy's ineffectuality open to Democratic deliberation. Under 
conditions of savage depression, Germany elected to overthrow Democracy 
for the seemingly firmer or surer commitment to total1 tar ian ism . This 
was represented as a triumph of will, and a triumph over indifference 
lHeidegger: "Noone can remain away from the polls on the day when this 
will is manifested. Heil Hitler!,161. Depressive conditions also produced 
Keynes' General Theory 01 Employment, Interest and.~. In the preface 
to the 1936 German edition Keynes offered his work as something 
essentially in keeping with the rigours of National Socialism: 
.. the theory of output as a whole, which is what the following 
book purports to provide, is much more easily adapted to the 
conditions of a totalitarian state, than is the theory of the 
production and distribution of a given output produced under 
conditions of free competition and a large measure of laissez-
faire." 16 
Depression is the state of public opinion when the objects to which 
it is wedded appear as inessential or redundant. Both Heidegger's 
philosophy and Keynes' economics present themselves as attempts to deal 
wih such listlessness. For Heidegger (at some point prior to his kehre) , 
as for Keynes (at least in 1936) , as theories that recommend 
totalitarianism. If their attacks upon current lassitude are the least 
remarkable element of either's work it is so, in each instance, because 
such lassitude is seen to be only apparent. There are forces at work 
either in an economy or in a SOCiety that have been overlookedi it is 
this failure to fathom the true exigencies of a time, rather than any 
essential attribute of current thought, which contributes to a 
presentiment of listlessness [Keynes: .. This is a nightmare, which will 
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pass away with the morning. For the resources of Nature and 11Jen's 
devices are just as fertile Bnd productive as they were." 17 1. The real 
work of either Heidegger or Keynes only departs from the current mood. 
the most pressing objectives of either's work are only provisionally 
motioned towards by a symptomatic listlessness. For (early) Heidegger 
public lassitude is termed 'idle tal~. suggesting a misplaced or 
misdirected sense of confidence in public opinion. For Keynes, public 
lassitude is the result of an utterly misplaced confidence in the 
classical economics of laissez-faire. The most outrageous claim open to 
any Classicist would, perhaps, be that a society might safely deliver 
itself into the hands of market forces. Such a faith could not eaily 
claim Smith as its high priest. However. insofar as Smith's project is to 
elaborate a discrete sense of an ethos his work maintains a measure of 
confidence in the persistance of social ties. despite the empirical 
incoherence of a given societYi the critical point being that Smith's 
invisible hand is an epistemological c'J priori and not the reification of 
a social mechanism. A project like Smith's might, however. be confused 
with what it aspired to critique <1.e. a transcendent ethos), especially 
if it were to depart from an overweaning confidence in the virtues of a 
momentarily bullish market. It might be assumed that something akin to 
an 'invisible hand' protects desirable features of an economy. Keynes 
attack on classical economics centres on the insupportable character of 
this kind of confidence. Keynes states: 
II Let us clear frOID the ground the metapbysical or general 
principles UPOD wbicb, frOID time tille, la1ssez-fam blJS been 
founded. It is not true tbat individuals possess a prescriptive 
'naturc'Jl liberty' i1J their economic activities. There is DO 
'compact' conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or on 
tbose wbo Acquire. The privc'Jte world is not so governed from 
above that privlJte and socilJl interest lJlways coincide. It is 
not so managed here below tbat in practice they coincide. It is 
not a correct deduction from tbe Principles of Economics that 
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enlightened self-interest always operates in the public 
interest."JS 
Where Keynes' and Heidegger's interests coincide is in their 
denigration of the confidence associated with the public realm and its 
elaboration through public opinion. Such confidence has no objective 
basis and the illusions thus promoted result in a sense of laxity 0 
Keynes, in a remark that seems directly reminiscent of Plato's attack on 
artists in the Republic, claimed that the markets were thoroughly 
removed from the realities of productive capital . 
., We have reached the third degree where we devote our 
intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects the 
average opinion to be." 19 
He later suggests the disease of speculation could be remedied only 
through a firm and real commitment to investment: 
II The spectacle of the modern investment market has sometimes 
moved me to the conclusion that to make the purchase of an 
investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage, except by 
reason of death or other grave cause, might be a useful remedy 
for our contemporary evils."20 
This attack on average opinion is echoed in Heidegger's ~ and. 
~: both in the vapidity of opinion and its transitory, licenti tious 
aspects. 
"The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its becoming 
publiCi instead it encourages this. Idle talk is the possibility 
of understanding everything without previously making the 
thing one's own. ... <it) develops an undifferentiated kind of 
in telligibl1ity, for which nothing is closed off any longer. 
(however) The fact that something has been said 
groundlessly, and then gets passed along in further retelling, 
amounts to perverting the act of disclosing into an act of 
closing off."21 
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In this last quotation, Heidegger can be seen to be motioning 
towards the struggle he casts as the central one for 'Being', the sense 
of difficulty surrounding the task of bringing an image of Being's 
essence to light. The movement of disclosing and of closing presents a 
sense of exigency unanticipated in idle talk. However, both his idle talk 
and Keyne's average opinion are the arenas where a real sense of 
commitment might be broached, as no sense of commitment is currently 
enjoyed; nor any measure of confidence either justified or apparent. 
Keynes hopes simply for a renewed commitment to productive capacity, 
and a financial structure that would justify such commitment. Heidegger's 
more extreme hope is that current lassitude, once realised as a crisis, 
might promote a Will equal to the severity of the crisis. In both cases, 
the failure of confidence is given, is symptomatic. Derrida looks at 
these symptoms anew. It is not a matter of creating a new sense of 
confidence, or a life-affirming struggle around the issue of confidence. 
Nor is it to aver that totalitarianism is a diseased conscience standing 
in opposition to a Democratic ideal that ought to continue to enjoy 
confidence. In so far as all issues are, in the first place, 
symptomatic, Public Opinion could valorise totalitarianisms, or 
anarchisms, in the same way as other, even vaguer or more idle issues. 
In short, Derrida does not take totalitarianism seriously. However, he 
takes the shadow that might also have proposed totalitarianism as it 
haunts the democratic conscience very seriously. Public opinion might 
not be wedded to such political ideals but, as social effects, public 
opinion is never very far from enjoying their influence. 
• • • • 
95 
chapter two economics of depression 
On symptoms of depression in Heidegger and Hegel 
In his pol! tical essays, Ezra Pound attacks a spreading laxity, an 
indifference he directly attributed to the failure to place a commitment 
to politics at the heart of economics, Pound urges a commitment to the 
deeper structure of the State and its most dynamic possibilities; the 
possibilities most threatened by economic laxity, One such essay, Em:. Ii 
li..e.li Paideuma [1937], begins with a definition of the 'Paideuma': 
• The term Paideuma has been resurrected in our time because of 
a need, The term Zeitgeist or Time Spirit might be taken to 
include passive attitudes and aptitudes of an era. The term 
Paideuma as used in a dozen German volumes has been given the 
sense of tbe active element in tbe era, tbe complex of ideas 
wbicb is in a given time germinal, reaching into the next 
epoch, but conditioning actively all the thought and action of 
its own time."22 
This section asks how the need for the Paideuma is sensed, a 
presentiment discovered only through passivity or indifference. It will 
be seen that, insofar as it is a question of sense, the symptoms of the 
necessity of the Paideuma must, in some way, be related to the symptoms 
of the laxity obliterating the paideuma's necessity <and justifying its 
resurrection), Even as the one sustains the promise or the necessity of 
a revolution, the other bespeaks a growing catastrophe, a fatal 
indifference, This relation will be highlighted through Heidegger's 
work, Heidegger, against the backdrop of depression, was one of those 
German's who sensed the need for a new Paideuma, The term 'Paideia' 
appears not only in his Letter ~ Humanism [1946], but also his Plato's 
Doctrine [Lehrel c.f. InI.th, a lecture series of 1935. Chapter One of the 
present work touched upon the significance of Heidegger's work in the 
96 
chapter two economics of depression 
NSDAP revolution. However, as Derrida argued, where Heidegger would wish 
to force a specific sense of necessity (human, political etc), there his 
work sinks into autism. There are, then, a whole variety of symptoms in 
play: autism and laxity, a feel for the revolution and a fear for the 
state, the fear of indifference and the presentiment of currents which 
might shake off indifference. The question, here, i ,....· 0, why, when the 
significance of these symptoms are considered, is it always primarily a 
question of Politics, of the political form, and of the political form as 
the forum in which, alone, such symptoms have relevance? 
For Derrida, Heidegger's distinction lies in his formal rigour. ill 
~ c1 Ian states: 
"The attention given to system and structure in its most 
provocative and strongest aspects is a question of 
determining the possibility of .9lUJ11J8 (sens) on the basis of 
a 'formal' organisation which in itself hLJS no meaning (sens)." 
[EX 161)23 
Derrida warns this 'form' should neither compromise nor destroy 
meaning. As has been noted, he wishes to open an understanding of a 
problem - a socia-political problem - without compounding iti either 
in concentration or dispersal. Derrida hopes a formal expression of a 
problem might ensure the possibility of response, without prejudice. In 
~ dempcratie ajournge this is termed the Right of response, designating 
the right to freely express social exigencies. In every instance, the 
formal organisation neither obstructs nor suggests the proper response. 
To that extent 'form' is libertarian, liberating the possibility of 
responsiveness; i.e. 'responsiveness' is the issue wherever 'form' is 
prioritised. J(oreover, it would be liberal in the economic sensei the 
formal framing of a general right of response would allow discrete or 
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provocative responses to become general issues even (or especially) if 
the 'needs' they instantiated were previously unregarded; i.e. sustained 
no market. Such a form, then, must allow for innovations in order to be 
attuned to the needs or demands found under liberal conditions. However, 
this thesis has already noted Derrida's suspicion of novelties; without 
the idea of a general form there is no real conception of need, only of 
casual acquiescence or indifferent ignorance. Although Derrida states 
formal rigour should not 'have' a meaning, it 1s nevertheless a way of 
distinguishing demand in such a way as to convey a sense of necessity. 
It seems, then, that freedom depends in the first instance upon a formal 
framing in order to have the character of necessity. As Pound says of 
the term 'Paideu.ma', its form (as a complex of ideas) arises out of need. 
Derrida praises Heidegger's framing of the conjunction of the 
possible and necessary; even when this OCcurs through such concepts as 
Paideia or Lehre, with their fascistic connotations. He does so because 
Heldegger's rigour militates against the vague response; as Ihe. ~ ci 
!.an. has it, against 'cultural gossip'~ Anything representing a possible 
response has to broach a real sense of eXigency if it is not to be 
meaningless. lli Ends. c1!an reasserts this view; the formal rigour 
Derrida imagines would not be: 
"eitber tbe non-sense Dr anguishing absurdity which lurks 
about metapbysical humanism." [EX 161)26 
A formal expression must manifest a sense of need. For both Derrida 
and Heidegger this necessity is broached through the formal framing of 
a problem; i.e. a question. A question frames demand in an open, attuned 
way. In the 1930's, Heidegger sees his questions as reVOlutionary. ill 
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linda ci Kan, however, focuses on 'the formal structure of the question of 
Being' in Heidegger's earlier Be.iIl.g. an.d. IilIl.e. [1928] in order to elucidate 
the later Letter on Humanism (1946)26. In the later work Heidegger 
states "language is the house of Being"; referring to ontology as the 
formal discourse framing Being ('antos-logos'). Derrida's use of 
'economics I J.e reiterates this dictum, insofar as 'Oikonom ia' refers to 
the law-af-the-house or law-of-the-proper. The term 'proper' translates 
Heidegger's 'eigentlich' [authentic], the foremost attribute of Being in 
Be.1.ng. and. I.1.m.e, the term 'house' hints at problems raised in his later 
work; that thinking must learn to dwe1l27 • Thus, Derrida's use of 
economics encompasses the whole spread of Heidegger's work. He praises 
Heidegger only as 'Economics' names Heideggger's most worrying problem; 
response and need, supply and demand. It becomes impossible, here, to 
ignore the forensic dimension of this 'form'. If, at every instant, it is 
a question of the proper response at different periods only the form of 
response remains constant. If the 'proper' form of response is Political, 
it is so only insofar as the proper (authentic) distinguishes itself 
from the idle or casual response. For Derrlda, such differentiations 
occur through economics rather than, immediately, as a Politics. 
The problem denoted by 'economics' - as it refers to Heidegger's 
work - is that any possible response should not further idle conditions 
but actively broach the demands of the time. It should be Authentic, 
al though this term is under question, especially in Derrida's re-casting 
of Heidegger's question. That a form should frame a situation in a 
questioning way 1s a Kant1an concern28 • In France, the dominant neo-
Kantlan tradition 1s Positivism; a doctrine based upon the question of 
the 'conditions for the possibility of any concept. For instance, one -
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unheideggerian - way of understanding Heidegger's dictum, "Language is 
the house of Being', would be to insist that language provides the 
framework through which the concept of 'Being' becomes meaningful. Here, 
a history of Being would be a history of the language determining its 
possible meanings23 • For Heidegger, language is nothing if it is not 
cast in such a way that the possibilty of Being becomes a demand, a 
necessity. He views a Question as an original expression that liberates 
the possible in a committed manner. Hence his antipathy to 'idle-talk', a 
history of Being only suggests possible contexts of the concept of 
'Being I. It does not frame this transcendental concept as an immanent 
force with its own peculiar character, the character expressing the 
demanding nature of Being or ensuring this demand is etched onto 
experience as fate30 • The form expressing this demand (either the 
Question or the Paideia, insofar as Derrida focusses primarily on Form) 
stands in contrast to a loose or uncommitted discussion of Being. 
Heidegger constantly re-reads Kant, his aim however is to cast Kantian 
concepts, and their possibilities, in a way that approaches this 
'demand'i i.e. qualifies Being's immanence in a committed manner. That 
gives, even, a sense of natural forces broached through relentless 
inquiry. His point being that any possible concept must be conditioned; 
for this to be more than a merely vacuous qualification it will have to 
sustain a real, even fatal, sense of necessity. In the context of 1933-
1936, of Being within the demands of a specifically German fate. 
Heidegger's pre-revolutionary Be1D.g. ansi llm.e. gestured towards this 
theme through the meanings attached to authentic possibilities and 
necessary conditions (respectively: 'eigentl:1ch-' and 'Notwendig-ke:it'). 
The authentic qualifies a posslblli ty only if the possibilities ventured 
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already bear witness to necessary conditions. Here, 'necessity' is an 
experience; a distressing necessity. Far from being simply desirable as 
an attribute, necessity is an insistant backbeat, even if it lies 
forgotten or ignored. As a 'possibility' Being clearly is not a 
specifiable 'thing'. Thinking is authentic, however, when it is committed 
to this apparent failure; that is, when it experiences Being's remoteness 
in language and commits itself to this distressing experience. Thought 
is authentic when it overcomes the indifference of idle language to 
discover a sense of destiny in current conditions31 • Notwendigkeit, more 
than the English 'necessity', suggests a sense of distress in a need or 
demand. This was clear in ~ and lima where the question about Being 
was a commitment to the experience of Being's fate. It was also clear in 
Heidegger's Rectqral Address, where fundamental ontology apparently 
carries the mandate of the NSDAP; 
"The will to the essence of the German university is the will 
to science as will to the historical mission of the German 
people as a people that knows itself in its state .... they will 
do so if, and only if, we - this body of teachers and students 
on the one hand expose science to its innermost necessity 
(Notwendigkeit) and, on the other hand, are equal to the German 
fate in its most extreme distress (lot) ."32 
Heidegger's project attempts to wrest the positive from a hopeless 
situation, a situation promising nothing. His project could be summarised 
as the overcoming of nihilistic indifference, or 'oblivion'33. However, in 
its commitment to the overcoming of oblivion, it 1s also a commitment to 
the utmost exigencies of oblivion. Here, the forensic context of 
Heidegger's work cannot be ignored. From the 1930's onwards, his 
philosophy is couched in a language that, if incredibly tortuous, is not 
especially opaque. lor does his political work stylistically differ from 
his more specialist work; unlike Keynes, for instance, he does not 
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reserve one language for the public and another for professionals. His 
attempt to counter indifference (in philosophy or in politics) is, in 
every essential, democratic; his work is addressed to the 'General' and 
the expressions he invests with an urgent 'distress' are open to the 
'General'. For some French thinkers, nihilism means a proliferating 
variety of interpretations are possible, whilst no fact could ever be 
sustained34 • For Heidegger this would be a side-effect of 'oblivion', an 
effect current in public opinion. His own brand of public address forces 
a general consideration of the difficulties of language. In the above 
quotation, a general commitment to the same experience; on the one hand, 
a presentiment of the awfulness of the pass to which Germany has sunk, 
on the other a general presentiment that this slump has already been 
broached by the forbidding character of his lesson. Thus, it could not 
be argued that Heidegger's 'ontology' (the discourse upon Being. or the 
language that frames Being) is distinguishable from his Fascism, insofar 
as the character of both remains open to the public. It could not be 
argued that the 'proper' form of heideggerianis/Il (if this term is taken 
to refer to the ontological project of giving an open and questioning 
response to the demands of Being) was mutilated for the sake of a 
political project. It could not, finally, be a question of effecting a 
return to a 'proper' project (l1ke the overcoming of nihilism). but only 
a return to a form of inquiry; or, a forensic form. As Derrida shows, the 
central issue is not the 'necessary' qualification of 'Being'. Rather, as 
the previous chapter suggested, when Heidegger homes in on a single 
socia-political issue, designated as the most urgent, the ontological 
aspects of his inquiry ends and only the GOcio-politica1 'end' - both in 
tbe senGe of an objective and a closure - could be emphasised. Further. 
as these ends continue to reverberate on a Wider scene, this scene would 
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not be ontology 'in general' but the General in the sense of a publiCi 
even, as an interest in Heidegger spreads, an international public. That 
there are no peculiarly great issues for a Public to suffer or to face 
might be taken as a sign of general indifference. For Derrida, it rather 
suggests a new form of necessity or another kind of urgency. This could 
not be deSignated as the overcoming Nihilism (as the mast urgent, 
distinctive or 'proper' project). Better to say, Derrida recasts 
positivism. If Heidegger detects a certain vacuity in positivism, a 
vacuity threatening to overwhelm the proper urgency of any issue, this 
threat to the public need not return to a Political forum. Oblivion, as a 
current phenomena, need not be rooted, as depressive indifference is not 
a purely local phenomena. 
A consequence of this reading of Heidegger is there could never be a 
single most urgent fate. In 1946 Heidegger asked what it would mean to 
think a single term for Being, and suggested a term from Anaximander 'to 
khreon': fate. Here, Being is qualified and is so 'necessarily' by the 
experience of this qualification. 1946 is certainly post-kehre. However, 
as the significance of the term 'kebre' recedes because it cannot be 
attributed to a single revolution but only to a public appraisal, so the 
singu lar necessity of' to kbreon' cannot be fixed: not to 'Being I nor, 
retrospectively, to the character of Being prior to the kebre, nor to 
Germany at the time of the ISDAP revolution. Which is not to say that no 
experience attaches to the effort to think what is necessary in the 
qualification of an event, merely that this necessity cannot be 
maintained as a Singular experience, a question of commitment or 'Fate'. 
Heidegger translates this term, in fact, as 'Braucb': usage, referring to 
a sense of enduring and of wearing down. Derrida, in his commentary, 
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translates the term as 'Kaintien'; bearing;:'us. The term, however, has the 
same root as 'lrhrematilros'; usury. This theme resurfaces in Den ida's 
:thlle.. Mythology where the experience of venturing concepts in 
philosophical usage is described as wearying, but also as usuristic. If 
this residual sense of 'to lrhreon' 1s ascribed to Heidegger's musing upon 
Anaximander, there would be a certain insolence; the discovery of 
possible meanings to which Heldegger's work had never aspired as though 
this was to the credit of Heidegger's text, a usuristic effect insofar as 
an appraisal of Heidegger profits from nuances his work had never 
commanded. However, so long as Heidegger insists upon a singularly 
pressing issue, or a most urgent issue, the question becomes one of how, 
in re-reading his work, the most pressing issue could be differentiated 
from these less pressing, or supplementary, concerns. Even, in fact, how 
those symptoms marking the qualification of the most pressing 1n its 
more or less suppressed state (pure Being, or pure Fate: 'to khreon') 
could be differentiated from every other subsidiary or speciously 
associated symptom of this suppression. Finally, how could the public 
dimension of the Fate that, before the kehre, Heidegger publicly detected 
in Fascism be differentiated from the fate of loans and debts in an 
arena of international interpretation. 
This is not a sophistical way of suggesting that Heidegger 'forgot' 
usury when he translated 'to khreon'; l.e. that he suppressed the wider 
connotations in order to highlight Fate. Perhaps he did, but as the 
attribution of massive debts to Germany ensured it suffered the earliest 
and deepest effects of the Great Depression so Germany seems, in fact or 
in retrospect, to express the most urgent character of depression. Thus, 
to highlight Heidegger's 'forgetting' of usury as the central issue would 
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only be to again rationalise Heidegger's political project as the 
'overcoming of oblivion'. This is not what Derrida does. His disingenuous 
refusal to specify any singular qualification of fate (either the 
'original' one of Be.1ng. D.lld ~, or that denoted by the lrehre, or even 
that accredited to the NSDAP) is expressed through a preferrence for 
reading across such qualifications ('either before or after the kehre' EM 
148) i as though indifferent to any peculiar nuance in his desperate 
search for a 'proper' formi i.e. the forensic or public form. Derrida's 
indifference to Heiegger's style, a style which depends upon framing 
distinctions, conspires to highlight this other symptom of indifference: 
every nuance is similar to every other nuance, there is no central or 
primary demand. This is not 'oblivion' as the most urgent problem but 
only oblivion as such, in general and through the General. Here, nothing 
attains the distinction of the 'most' urgent, whilst an inability to 
distinguish urgency is itself distinguished. Which is to say, this other 
inability becomes the worriesome quantity in Derrida's re-reading of 
Heideggeri symtomatic only of the disquieing way forensic issues, in 
general, become indiscernible. Depression is used here as a generic term 
for symptoms of public indifference. Depression does not express a 
singularly effective sense of vertiginous terror either demanding or 
defeating identification. It is, simply, a name for a common, or publiC, 
symptom of indifference. 
The greatest insolence in Derrida's relation to Heidegger is his use 
of Economics. For Heidegger, the idle remains idle when it is understood 
in terms of values rather than in terms (like 'to lrhreon') which strive, 
once more, to broach necessity3cs. However, through an economic 
accredit1ng of themes to Heidegger's work which could never, originlJlly, 
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have been intended, the symptoms Heidegger detects in idle talk are once 
more positively broached and symptomatised. This insolent attribution of 
tags to Heidegger's work does not erase Heidegger's 'lesson' but suggests 
the multiplicity of ways such problems become effective; l.e. against the 
public's interest. Derrida's strategy can be seen in Heidegger's and his 
own treatment of Kant and Hegel. 
Kant's disjunctive relation, a form understood as Problematic, 
suggests that before any judgement settles the issue between the 
conceptually viable and the redundant, there is an entirely hopeless 
sense of community. Hopeless in that no judgement is ever assured. 
However, Kant's formal framing of 'community' in the teeth of a hopeless 
commercium of discursive relations antiCipates both indifference and a 
possible form standing over and against this indifference. Thus, Kant's 
formulation of the disjunctive relation could already be cast as a 
response to the terrors of communal life. This is Heidegger's position. 
In his lecture series of 1935-36, published as ~ i.Q. ~ Thing? I 
Heidegger applauds Kant's formal rigour when he speaks of the 
Archi tectonic of Kant's work: 
"Architectonic, the blueprint projected as the essential 
structure of pure understlJnding, is as little a mere 'ornament' 
as the critique is a mere 'censor',"37 
That is, just as critical judgement does not merely distinguish the 
viable from the inutile, so the formal expression of a work is not 
simply placed on top of the matter under consideration. Heidegger's 
project in Whll. ia ll. Ihi.ug. is to highlight the form of Revolution which 
distinguishes the epoch of 'man' termed 'the Enlightenment '38. This 
thesis has taken the Enlightenment and the Classical age as synomymous. 
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Oddly, this does not wholly stand in contradiction to Heidegger's thesis 
on history. For Heidegger, Kant's formal questioning did not provoke a 
revolution in its form, but in what remains intractable by virtue of 
this form. Which is to say, Kant's work became revolutionary through the 
dark nature of the problem to which it was formally committed. 
Heidegger's ~ is 11 Thing? is at pains to point out that anything 
classically entailed by Kant's logic could be worked out by his 
followers; as indeed, Kant's own logical development could be traced back 
to his predecessors. However, such a project fails to account for Kant's 
original or revolutionary aspect. Heidegger is insistant that any such 
working out amounts to a failure of commitment as regards Kant's formal 
lesson. Thus, the epoch termed 'Enlightened' was not, yet, enlightened. 
"Contemporaries stood helpless before the work. It went beyond 
any thing customary by the elevation of its question-posing, 
by the rigour of its concept-formlJtion, by the flJr-seeing 
organisation of its questioning, lJnd by the novelty of the 
llJnguage lJnd its decisive goal . ... Although not understood in 
its essential purpose, but always apprebended only from an 
accidental exterior, the work was provDClJtive. An eager tug-of-
war developed in writings opposing lJnd defending it. Up to the 
year of Kant's death, 1804, the number of these had reached two 
thousand. ... Kant's work remained llke lJn unconquered fortress 
behind a new front, which, in spite of (or perhlJp5 because of) 
its vehemence, was already thrust into emptiness a generation 
later, i.e., it was not capable of generating a truly creative 
opposi tion. "39 
Here, what is crucial is the thought that Kant's work projected an 
emptiness without it ever being understood to what extent and with what 
commitment Kant opposed this emptiness. Heidegger goes on to say that 
future writers either skirted around the problem Kant had brought 
forward, or leapt over him without ever being exercised by Kant's 
achievement. That is, his followers perpetuated or symptomatised the 
sense of abandonment provoked by Kant's questioning without ever 
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gleaning its essential, and essentially intractable, aspects. It was not 
seen to what extent logic had been "newly founded and transforme~', 
indeed Kant himself had only a "presentiJ11ent of tbis revolution": 
"Kant has clearly arrived at tbis insigbt, but be has not 
developed it. . .. such lJ task exceeds even the capacity of a 
grea t thinker. It demands nothing less than to jump over one's 
own shadow. No one can do this. However, tbe greatest effort in 
attempting this impossibility that is the decisive ground-
moveJ11ent of the action of thought. ... Hegel alone apparently 
succeeded in jumping over this shadow, but only in such a way 
that he elil11inated the sbadow, i.e., the finiteness of man, and 
jumped into the sun itself. Hegel skipped over the shadow, but 
he did not, because of that, surpass the shadow. Nevertheless, 
every philosopber Jlust want to do this. This "must" is his 
vocation. The longer tbe shadow, tbe wider the jump. This bas 
nothing to do with a psychology of the creative personality. It 
concerns only the form of motion belonging to the work itself 
as it works itself out in him."40 
That is, the Kantian insight appears only in the fierce opposition 
to the shadow it casts. This earth shattering catastrophe did not, 
however, arrive with Kant but with a later collapse in post-Kantian 
thought. In fact <in 1935-36), a twentieth century COllapse. Heidegger's 
historical thesis might utilise the term 'aufklarung' (Enlightenment) but 
more clearly breaks down into a division between Classicism and 
~odernity. This division is uncommon enough in philosophy but recognised 
in economics (and, coincidentally, in music), ~odernity meaning, roughly, 
the Twentieth century. Heidegger's point is that the force of 
enlightenment lies in its opposition to the shadow its genesis propels. 
Without this opposition whatever is termed 'enlightened' is merely vapid. 
As regards the vacuity of classical philosophy, Hegel is symptomatic 
only of philosophy's dimmest aspirations. This is in line with 
Heidegger's earlier and later treatment of Hegel. In 1le.1ng. IUld.. I1m.e. 
Hegel's 'logic' (always denoted by quotation marks) 1s treated with 
contempt. Heidegger states: 
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"The 'dialectic', which has been a genuine philosophical 
embarrassment, becomes superfluous.""" 
That is, Hegel's work becomes superfluous with the working out of 
the rea 1 farm of the modern Catastrophe. However, Hegel's work a Iso 
becomes e111barrassing; it is a sign of the general distress or insecurity 
that discrete and revolutionary currents have engendered under the 
smooth facade of the Classical age. Here, Heidegger's treatment of Hegel 
could seem paradoxical; at times he apparently approves of Hegel's work, 
at others to detest it. There is, in fact, no paradox; because Hegel is 
philosophically unsteady, he is symptomologically interesting. If there 
is a considered development appropriate to Classicism, it is one Hegel 
formally exemplifies. Behind this, Heidegger avers, there are symptoms of 
a distressing and abrupt catastrophe that threatens to break with the 
Classical world. Hegel would exhibit these symptoms in addition to 
anything especially Classical. Heidegger's intercession into this 
nihilistic pass is effected, at odd if not numerous times, by a certain 
reading Hegel. However, it is not to read Hegel in a classical spirit but 
in abjection; as an embarrassment, as symptomatic of the new currents 
that reach their head when the shadow of the Enlightenment becomes 
unbearable. However, if the embarrassment engendered by speculative 
philosophy is symptomatic of a barely suppressed and always imminent 
catastrophe, how is the presentiment of utter catastrophe to be 
differentiated from mere embarrassment? How is the feeling that man is 
finite, and hence Fatal, to be distinguished from the sense of 
embarrassment accompanying the reading of Hegel? 
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Derrida's reading of Heidegger departs from this point; from the 
smooth face of Classicism carrying perhaps minute but always excessive 
symptoms of discomfiture, troubling as one might be troubled by any 
excessive outlay in the business of speculation. Hegel symptomises a 
crash. Where Heidegger takes this effect to be a sign of finitude or of 
fatality, it cannot be distinguished from a fear of poverty. It is Freud 
who insists that Depression, which at its worst is a 'pure culture of 
the death instinct' is also a fear of poverty·2. Heidegger's antipathy to 
idle talk, or to 'groundless' speculation is as much a presentiment of 
imminent bankruptcy as an experience of fate resolutely or 
revolutionarily recast. Derrida's Q1 Grammatology begins with this double 
sense of indifferencej an indifference to the greater 'problems' of 
philosophy and an indifference that comes with the philosophical and 
economical ability to speculate on different matters with the same coins 
or conceptual schema: 
"However the topic is conSidered, the problBll of lalJlfUlJ88 hl2s 
never been simply one problem l2mong others. ... The devl2luation 
of the word 'language' itself, and how, in the very hold it has 
upon us, it betrays a loose vocabulary, the temptl2tion of a 
cheap seduction, the passive abandonment to fashion, the 
consciousness of the avant-garde, in other words ignorance, are 
evidence of this effect. This inflation of the sign 'language' 
is the inflation of the sign itself, absolute inflation, 
inflation itself. Yet, by one of its aspects or shlJdows, it is 
itself a sign: this crisis is also a s,-.ptmJ.M" 3 
If these symptoms of the imminence of a crash are strange 
disfigurements in Hegel's work they are also excessive in the crude 
catastrophe Heidegger sketches between Classicism to )(odernl ty. It is 
not a question of the 'absolute', whether this is finitude or inflation, 
but of symptoms current both in Classical thought as in its Modern, and 
'revolutionary', recasting. In Heidegger's account, Hegel antiCipates a 
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revolution, a revolution delayed until affairs reach their utmost trough. 
As Derrida treats these symptoms positively, as signs rather than 
dogmatically determined signs of the absolute (the greatest, the worst 
etc.), so the revolution is perpetually deferred. In the break between 
Hegel and Heidegger, and in the differences that are to be accentuated 
between their work, the revolution is motioned towards, insisted upon, 
but also it is suggested - somewhat astray, possibly already 
settled; as though the Classical face could not be distinguished from its 
obverse. Then again, the settlement of the argument between Hegel and 
Heidegger remains as credible as the irrevocability of their opposition. 
For this reason, for over ten years, Derrida promoted Hegel as though 
his texts were the exemplary texts of deconstruction. So much more 
discussion was given to Hegel than either Heidegger or Kant because, 
despite the incoherency attaching to the massiveness of their themes, 
Hegel's work is so much the more symptomatic of philosophy than any of 
his others. As those symptoms suggesting ei ther a measure of 
discomfi ture or an absolute and vertiginous terror are to the fore in 
Hegel's work, so Derrida re-reads Hegel's texts for the variety of ways 
in which these symptoms remain unconscionable, uneven, reminiscent of a 
revolution, and always deCoDstructive: to be read otherwise, both to the 
logic of the dialectic and to the fall into hopelessness detailed by 
Heidegger. 
• • • • 
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On the value of redundancy for political discourses, 
or the economics of discutient fluidity 
Is Depression the end of Politics? The final possibility of Kant's 
disjunctive relation would place every element of a society in opposition 
to its concept. The concept expressing either the constitution of a 
political realm or a projected form of government might be less than an 
object of contentioni it might have sunk entirely into indifference. 
Kant's last word, then, would be a hopeless community, its every element 
redundant or dead to the world. This possibility was broached in 
Ecclesiastes: "what can the man do that C0111es after the king? even that 
which hath alrady been done." 
There are other, Modern, ways to speak of a hopeless society. Kant's 
disjunctive relation enables the thought of an excremental community, to 
use Freud's calculus of 11fe and death, gold and excrement. Depression, a 
culture of death and a fear of poverty. brings these two obsessions 
together"''''. It is, however, less a question of the proper form of 
Politics, of its sovereign institutions or its scatological inversion, 
than a question of the relation between the one and the other. That is, a 
question of the relations promoting this analogYi revelling in, even as 
they promise to dissipate, such morbidity. The last section looked at 
Heidegger's reading of Kant and his project to wrest the positive from 
an entirely hopeless situation. nA:t. 1.5. Q.. Thing associates Kant with a 
deep, intractable shadow, the effects of which are exacerbated the longer 
they remain obscure. Heidegger's discovery of these dark farces proceeds 
from his re-reading of Kant, a reading that casts these forces in the 
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form of a lesson or Paideuma i i.e. a framework that puts such forces 
into question. This framework could be a democratic forum but only as 
democracy is overtaken by a revolution. In other instances, this form is 
the disjunctive relation itself, as it becomes the means by which the 
Will becomes committed to its distress. Here, the disjunctive relation is 
a mark of distinction for the SOCiety willing to bear its lesson4 &. 
Heidegger's account of the 'form I of society has intersected with 
every theme of this chapter: the question of how a society is habitually 
given to be understood; the question of how social discourse might be 
swayed in non-obvious ways; finally, how an understanding of SOCiety 
depends upon wholly intractable elements. In Kant's work, the realm of 
the Understanding is given only to the extent it confronts the 
'Dou111enal'; the unknowable. Heidegger's modernism exacerbates this 
confrontation. From this moment on, unconscienable currents will have 
flowed through every society. Now, a SOCiety will be distinguished only 
to the extent it faces upto unfathomable currents. The concluding section 
to this chapter looks, firstly, at the way one might elect to study 
effects which bypass the Understanding; or how a discourse might mark 
its failures as the most urgent issues. Finally, it looks at the way 
Derrida characterises such a discourse: its dreams, its secret effects 
and the failure of the Understanding to have presided over the effects 
in which it remains most interested. 
For Heidegger the revolution, as a form or a lesson, is a singularly 
original way of qualifying necessity; or, as Heidegger has it, Fate. The 
previous section stressed Heldegger's view that Hegel ignores the darker 
side of a SOCiety, 'jumping the shadow' without confronting its depths. 
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This aspect of Hegel is alluded to in Derrida's translation of Hegel's 
term 'aufheben' as 'to relieve' [releve]46, What 1s emphasised here, a 
propos Heidegger, is that every speculative synthesis is understood from 
within a process of alleviation and, in consequence, conspires to 
minimise all sense of distress, If the possibility of alleviation is 
always on the horizon, why worry? This is motioned towards, also, in the 
other meaning attached to the verb 'relever; that every synthesis has 
replaced, or stood in for, the element that was originally disturbing, 
The emphasis upon 'relief' also intimates a criticism of Freud; at least, 
of Freud as he is reminiscent of Hegel. If the value of a cure 1s 
assured, is there any reason to listen to the ravings of a client? any 
other reason than to confirm the thoughts of the analyst? Derrida's use 
of 'relever' has one final significance; as Heidegger insists upon the 
mark distinguishing a society, so he has brought a certain Issue into 
'relief', The last section deflated Heidegger's presumption in electing 
only certain effects as the most urgent, Derrida continues to read texts 
which betray other, more various, symptoms than those stressed by 
Heidegger, In short, Derr ida's translation of the 'lJufhebung' is intended 
to negotiate a way between the moments of interest in a work by (for 
instance) Hegel, and its others (such as those of He1degger), 
The Hegelian system, in brief, suggests the concept of a rational, 
coherent society is only an issue for those discourses exercised by such 
a concept, qUlJ an object of dispute. If it happens that the subject 
discourse - here, a social 'we' - fails to agree upon 1 ts proper 
political object, the whole of a society might be alienated. Hegel speaks 
of such a community as an 'unhappy consciousness', However, every 
speculative attempt to broach an issue is already a process of relief. In 
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consequence. the community which remains unhappy in every attempt to 
understand its concept. might. through a process of re-evaluation. come 
to identify with the Form of disputation; i.e. discourse itself may 
become an object. an end, a groundplan. The unhappy community. in 
general. comes to comprehend a proper Political position~7. From this 
sketch, it can be seen that relief is always the first issue; Hegel's 
complacency 1s ripe for embarrassment. The similarity with Freud would 
be that. insofar as the depressed ego does not have an ideal object, an 
ideal self Dr Ego Ideal. it remains absorbed (or overshadowed) by a 
sense of the hopeless. However, there is a subject discourse - at least 
the one promoted by the analyst - that could re-present this loss to 
the depressed patient, if only the depressive could reach out as though 
it were retrieving a true self or lifting itself out of dereliction4B • The 
criticism of Hegel and of Freud would be that, in continually offering a 
'healthy' form to an indifferent host. they are complacent as regards the 
real terrors which beset Depression and blind to the evIdence that 
nothing sanctions their forensic practices. 
Derrida's forensic discourse negotiates between Hegel and Heidegger. 
These. opposed, thinkers are at their closest as they emphasise moments 
of discomfiture. Derrida emphasises 'excessive' traces in the works of 
Hegel and Heldegger, moments that are excessive to the extent that, even 
as they are brought into relief by both Hegel and Heidegger, do not have 
the same Significance in their respective works; l.e. points at which 
neither begins to communicate, as such pOints mark their differences and 
their different interests. To use the language of textual exegesis 
exploited by Derrida, there are moments in the text that signal the 
closure of the book'''. Here, 'text' would denote a broad discourse in 
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which the projected closure of a tract (the expression of an important 
difference) could be ventured only to the extent that elements having no 
place in such a project are also risked. To suggest such moments are 
still objects of disputation would mean a sense of commerce persists 
beyond the differences drawn between thinkers. Derrida, then, reads 
across the break Heidegger marks between his work and Hegel's and, in 
negotiating this breach, continues to remark upon the ways this 
difference exercises a strange, and strangely discursive, effect. 
Whilst Heidegger expresses a distaste for Hegel's habit of passing 
over the most shadowy depths of depression, Derrida's reappraisal 
suggests Hegel's speculati ve jaunts stress numerous senses of 
discomfiture, not one alone; as will be seen. For Derrida, these various 
dispositions cannot be discounted simply because of the character of 
Hegel's dialectic (the dialectic itself is a symptom of discomfiture once 
Hegel's self-assurity is lost). Something other than relief continues to 
occur outside of the Hegelian book. Certainly, Hegel ventures the 
speculative object par excellence, wringing pure profit from disputation 
in utter indifference to what remains hauntingly unfathomable. However, 
his work is rich in peculiarly diffuse ways, ways that are not reducible 
to his own system, or systematic account of what profit looks like50 • It 
might be argued that. as the process of relief is always the first issue, 
Hegel manifests a certain indifference. However, insofar as Derrida's 
work begins to negotiate different effects in Hegel, this air of 
speculative indifference will be distinguished in other ways. 
In sum, the dialectic can be read as the possibility of many objects 
but to indulge this reading would be neiter dialectical nor Heideggerian. 
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If Hegel's dialectic constructs the conditions for the possibility of a 
cohesive Politics, each time a symptom is found to be both possible lJnd 
discomforting as regards Hegel projected end, his speculations begin to 
weave other, discontinuous desires; for instance, Heidegger's fear of 
speculation but also other symptoms which continue to confound the 
sense of a singularly urgent issue. Which is to say, far from 
constructing the conditions for a Politics, any negotiation with Hegel 
finds his work de-constructs such conditions. For Derrida, the peculiar 
term, the unwonted turn of phrase, signals the multiplicity of desire. As 
regards any disposition the question is not 'how is this desire 
determined?' but, rather; how has desire been differentiated? When he 
asks "rrhat differS' [D 15), he produces the answer 'differance', a 
concept - an object - that differentiates desire, rather than having 
already been determined by reference to a desire for presence61 • With 
this concept, which "one clJnnot tilink ... on the basis of the present, or 
of the presence of tile present" (On ne peut penser ... Ii partir du 
presen t, au de la presence du presen t D 22] , he pas its a text or a 
terrain 'woven of differences' [D 21l. Here, Derrida's concepts take the 
form of a judgement; desire has been differentiated. There is, however, 
no longer a realm whose magisterial dignity remains assured by virtue 
of its Presence. For Derrida, the object primarily differentiates, it: 
"governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and nowhere exercises 
any authority . ... Not only is there no kingdom of d1fferance, 
but differance excites the subversion of every kingdom. Which 
makes it obviously threatening and infallibly dreaded by 
everything wihin us that desires a kingdom, the past or 
future presence of LJ kingdom" [D 22)62 
With this judgement, then, it is not a matter of settling on one 
side or the other of a differentiation, to be either for or against, for 
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concentration over dispersal. The judgement cannot settle. Rather, it is 
a question of allowing the differences in this decision to continue to 
communicate. These matters will be broached in the Conclusion, here we 
will detail the political-economic form of this judgement. 
The difference between Hegel and Heidegger continues to have a 
forensic significance. That is, either the embarrassment attaching to 
Hegel's work or the vertiginous distress associated with Heidegger's are 
discursive and social effects. As symptoms, they maintain a forensic 
significance before they are symptoms 'of' a Political catastrophe, a 
crash or imminent revolution. However, as symtoms they have been 
associated with Depression insofar as this significance resists 
representation <under a determined Political form) and insofar as their 
significance is to have made an issue of indifference. It was seen, 
above, that Freud suggested depressive states are the volteface of 
Narcissismj l.e. of the kind of representation offered in Narcissistic 
identification. It seems that the image of health, on the one side, is 
ever opposed to its symmetrical opposite: the shadow of health. This was 
not, however, Freud's final thought on depression. The fall from 
Narcissistic identification would mean the Depressive lay in shadows as 
though dead to the world. The evidence is that Depression continues to 
make itself felt, the shadow has a power. This was seen at the pOints 
where Hegel and Heidegger part company. If the diagnOSiS of depression 
cannot be identified with any pOSition, what is Depression? Freud states 
that, at its gravest or most intractable, it remains similar to )(ourning. 
Which is to say, an analogy persists between Xelancholia and another 
dispositionj an analogy that must be negotiated and rearticulated in 
order for Freud to refine his symptomology. In short. where a relation 
118 
chapter two economics of depression 
of similarity persists, Freud begins to differentiate desire. Here, the 
distinction between absolute depression and mourning is that after a 
period of time the work of mourning ends and life begins over: 
"although mourning involves grave departures frOID the normal 
attitude to life, it never occurs to us to regard it as a 
pathological condition and to refer it to mediclJl treatment. 
Ve rely on its being overcome after a period of tilDe and we 
look upon any interference as useless or even barmful."63 
Freud would not interfere in the work of mourning. It is, however, 
unclear how mourning works. If the mourner has lost a uniquely personal 
object of affection, it cannot be suggested that a replicant object is of 
the same order. Only, perhaps, that the mourner begins again to 
appreciate the privacy of a personal object. However, such an object 
could not simply be private but only, as it were, private amongst the 
public; a public secret. The replicant object must, after all, have been 
an object 'out there'; an object of communication and exchange. Freud's 
argument, although not spelt out, appears to be that the mourner 
indulges in a measure of narcissism in choosing, anew, to relate to 
objects. If so, the mourner becomes socialised narcissistically. As was 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, the personal object must have 
undergone some form of change to be considered, now, as an object in 
General. What would it mean to become privately and discretely 
socialised into an arena of commerce and communication? In Depression 
this commercial aspect is emphasised, at the expense of any unified 
representation of the General. In L4. democratie ajournee Derrida states 
that alternatives cannot be coded either 'for' or 'against', either for a 
unified form of the social or not. lor taken to be for this 
representation of the social (say. the right) or not <i ts pol! tical 
oppos1 te). lor even represented as percentages of pos1 tions arraigned 
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around determined issues: 'for', 'against' or some fraction of each£'4. 
When he speaks of a 'Right of response' he intends something which: 
"allows for the citizen to be more than a fraction (in effect, 
to be privatised, and to a greater and greater extent)."6 6 
Derrida suggests the way the self is related to a chosen object 
results in an increasing sense of privacy, and social communication 
suffers by this. In reading Freud, it seems to be 'cured' of mourning is 
to be pushed into a new shadow; away from the public glare but within 
the public domain. The work of mourning lies, on the one hand, outside 
of the more or less totalitarian decisions demanded in analysis as in 
poE tics and, on the other, mourning's ends or aims maintain a 
discretion below the level of political representation. All those who 
engage in commerce outside of the clearly delineated areas represented 
by government are to be privatised, as they are taken to pursue 
objectives with a private, even secretive, appeal. 
This, in embryo, is the argument between Keynesians and neo-
classicists. The neo-classicist argues that Keynesians, of whatever 
political shade, have mistook the role and scope of government. Derrida 
is on the side of the neo-classiCist. He shows that Government neither 
works in the way it is assumed, nor governs through the kind of 
representation that suits a logic of identification. He, even, detects 
totali tarianism in the attempt to determine what befits the commerce of 
the 'publics' by reference to Government. His work shows, for instance, 
that where Heidegger attempts to forge a firm decision in the face of 
distressing symptoms, his resoluteness towards such symptoms cannot 
discount the fact that his embarrassment at idle speculation is also a 
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symptom. In either instance, Heidegger remains distressed by effects 
which discomfort the social fabric. Where he promotes a rigour in the 
face of terror (as an affirmation of the 'public') he also displays 
discomfiture at the idleness of speculationi as though the work of the 
markets tended away from a proper political resolve. His attempt to weld 
the resolute in the teeth of distress is, then, never very far from the 
NSDAP's exploitation of economic xenophobia for political ends (as in 
their promotion of the jew as stateless usurer). In both instances, it is 
as though the private were also anti-social, anti-government or 
unpatriotic. Heidegger's work, as much as NSDAP propaganda, profits from 
autism at a certain pointi i.e. the habit of discounting an analogy 
between the fear for the state and the fear of the market, whilst 
politically profiting from their similarity. 
The neo-classical argument is that commerce is an effect 
misrepresented by government; to be 'privatised' is not to end all 
socially valued forms of communication. Communication remains effective 
at a more or less discrete level and Governmental attempts to interfere 
in commerce fail to appreciate the kinds of negotiations entrained in 
private transactions. Freud is right not to interfere in the work of 
mourning, but is so because no form of communication will have followed 
the logic of self-assertion on a massively public scale. However, while 
obscure currents or objectives play a part in the commercium despite 
being insusceptible to political framing, the question remains what 
being 'pri vatised I or becoming private in the public domain means. If it 
is simply anti-Government as anti-totalitarian, neo-classicism will have 
failed to account for the ways the public might come to depend upon the 
secretive nature of commercial affairs. Derrida's distinction is to 
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remain with this problem, to think a form in which such processes 
remain communicative in their obscurity, as they differentiate 
themselves in obscurity. It would be disastrous to simply release great 
commercial passions into the public realm in such a way as to command 
all of the commercium in secret. Here. the privatisation of utility and 
communication monopolies can be compared with prohibition in narcoticsj 
the privacy with which such deals are effected continues to excite a 
society, on increasingly broader scales and in ways that enforce 
unreflected, determined responses. In ways that ensure either passive 
consumption or passive acquiescence to an official judgement. Derrida is 
far fom being anti-government. He does not wish to sink into privacy as 
into autism, nor to allow discrete responses to be entrenched in a way 
that ensure the same responses are replicated on wider and wider scales. 
He applauds a form attuned to different sorts of issues. alongside the 
recogni tion that such issues might remain obscure even as they are 
publicised in a variety of ways. 
Symptoms are ever brought into social relief and are so discretely, 
what remains intractable in the symptom is its communicative effectj as 
their effect seems so much like an indifference to communication. or a 
failure of communication. Vhat is significant in mourning is not that it 
is self-curing. this would simply mean that as it slipped into semi-
privacy it ceased to be significant. Nor is it supremely significant that 
Depressive indifference is deathlYi an utter disregard for the self does 
not imply self-extirpation, so long as Depression remains insistant. 
Depressive dispositions are distinguished through indifference and are 
further differentiated despite this indifference. In Freud's analogy from 
Mourning to Melancholia it can be seen that Narcissism is not an issue. 
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As both Xourning and Melancholia display an indifference to the self 
this is to be interpreted, on the one hand, by the fact that Narcissism 
cannot represent depression and, on the other, that the symptom of 
indifference cannot be associated with an indifference to a speculative 
or arbitrarily imposed Ideal object. It is, then, the other form of 
depression that is of interest. Freud's analogy between mourning and 
melancholia suggests that forensic distinctions are communicated through 
similarities. However, the difference between the one disposition and the 
other becomes an issue - an object for forensics - in ways that defer 
any absolute similarity. 
The virtue of Economies is to deal in similar objects, only by 
virtue this fact could economic transactions be effected. It has become 
a truism of economics that cash is like any other commodity, its basis 
being that, in general, commodities are becoming like any other form of 
cash. Here, Keynes's critique gathers force. Firstly, as he notes that 
cash is all anyone could desire, at the expense of other commodities: 
• Unemployment develops ... because people want the moonj - men 
cannot be employed when the object of desire U.e. money) is 
something which cannot be produced and the deml1nd for which 
cannot be readny choked off. There is no remedy but to 
persul1de the public that green cheese is practicl111y the same 
thing and to have 11 green cheese factory (i.e. a centr111 bank> 
under public control."66 
As money is all anyone might deSire, so money might be anything. As 
can be detected from the tone of the above quotation, Keynes has come to 
despise an ethos which wallows in the indifferent similarity of cash. 
Like Heidegger, with his discounting of all analogies, Keynes regards the 
easy trl1nslatabnity of any form of currency with disqUiet. Elsewhere 
Keynes states the desire for money is a desire for liquidity, the desire 
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to be abruptly and freely mobile in all commercial decisions67 • He 
argues money might promote a sense of free-floating liquidity but does 
not deliver it. The above quotation comes from a section on interest-
rates. Keynes's analysis is designed to show how expectations 
surrounding demand for money incline to set high rates of interests. As 
money is the general commodity of exchange, its interest rate dominates 
any other form of interest, and - as Keynes argues - 1s always higher 
than any other form of interestSe . The demand for money, and the 
extortionate interest rates determined through this demand, cripples an 
economy and produces the liability of unemployment. Amidst this general 
and indifferent property of money, then, Keynes detects pernicious 
effects. The surprise of his thesis lies in his detecting other forms of 
interest in addition to those applying to money. 
Thus, secondly, Keynes insists that different commodities be 
distinguished in their economic action, an action articulated around the 
different rates of interest applying to every commodity ('Interest' 
meaning the quantity of any commOdity that, on a futural date, would 
have to be produced to be credited as equal with a given commodity at 
the present time: in effect, a calculus of delivery schedules). Keynes 
answer, as in the above quotation, is to control money so, as its 
distinctive interest rate comes to dominate an economy, it does not 
exert an impossibly upward pressure on other interest rates, to the 
detriment of investment in production. What is distinctive in Keynes's 
analysis is the way a variety of demands are distinguished through the 
single desire for flUidity. This ends with him acknowledging that, in 
desperate times, there will be ways in which the desire for fluidity will 
have no positive economic effect but, in a way that remains intractable 
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to analysis, will continue to sway an economy. Which is to say, desire 
will not cash out simply as a demand for money, ending with the 
discounting of other demand schedules. Rather, the ways in which money 
flows after the redundant will never reflect upon the possibility of 
financing a productive enterprise. Here Keynes economy gets dark, even 
blacJr69. What is of interest, as in other Xodernists, is his rea11sa tion 
that deathly effects, dead-money, inertia, continue to have a social if 
secret effect, to the detriment of the idea of a stable social sphere. 
The great similarity between Keynes and Heidegger is the way they 
place the whole of their mistrust, although not the weight of their 
respective analyses, upon speculation and the blind faith that economic 
relief is the first issue. They both argue that speculation has somehow 
conspired in a general mood of indifference. Further, that the 
uncommited or free-floating must finally be overtaken by a greater sense 
of commitment. For Heidegger, by a public commitment to the imperatives 
of Fate. For Keynes, by an utter commitment to the espousal of any 
stock, until death. Insofar as the interest of their respective works 
hinges upon the 'deeper' issues they differentiate, issues which 
undermine 'classical' farms of exchange, there remains the question of 
how these issues are elided in speculation and, even, how these issues 
are negotiated in such a way as to maintain their essential difference 
from 'mere' speculation. These, apparently, secondary concerns remain 
disquieting when it is realised that the call of Being might, sometimes, 
be similar to the call for economic protectionism, or that a commitment 
unto death might be mare or less like the purchase of a stock, as green 
cheese might be similar to money. Keynes and Heidegger can only 
communicate and differentiate the issues they hold to be the mast 
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pressing through indifferently exploiting the effects of analogies, a 
logic they have affected to despise, or regarded as an embarrassment. 
It has been noted, above, that Derrida reads speculative dialectics 
positively, as a discourse in which positive effects become current. 
Derrida is not following speculation but. rather. treating speculation as 
a discDurse entraining positive effects (effects brought into relief). 
Derrida reads the way that such effects interfere in an economy no;. as 
unsocial effects. which Heidegger and Keynes are wont to. but as effects 
which suggest another form to the social sphere and the kind of 
communication at work there. He is, then. taking the modern element of 
other philosophers their attention intractable elements - but 
recasting it as symptomatic of social discourse rather than the 
presentiment of a final crisis. As he states: 
"differance maintains our relationshlp with that which we 
necessarily misconstrue' CD 21 )60 
The distinction of such writers as Keynes. Freud and Heidegger is to 
analyse effects that upset an economy. Their analyses falter when they 
consider the realm they believe differs from such effects. Often. both 
Keynes and Freud treat the redundant or unconscienable as a reservoir of 
unregarded matter: as a pool from which unsocial effects are drawn. Even 
as intractable matter that could be reclaimed. set to work differently. 
cured. Keynes in fact, treats the whole economy as though it had a 
margin of such matterj a margin it CQuld, possibly, occupy. In this 
regard leo-keynesians are more consistent, if less ambitious. As they 
treat an economy as a manifold of industries they regard margins as 
appropriate to seperate industries. It is certain that seperate 
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industries work at less than full-capacity61. Keynes's mistake lies in 
his attributing a margin of potential to a country. A country does not 
'have' an unproductive margin. If productivity increases it has not drawn 
upon a reservoir, nor turned inutile matter into utile. A similar mistake 
is evident in Freud. When the 'ego' is apprised of new objects, it has 
not drawn these objects from a reserve at 'its' disposal. It could not, 
then, depend upon an ability to such objects to goad effect62. 
A postulated margin of utilisation clearly will be conflated with 
the redundant. If a modern virtue is to treat the intractable as 
intractable, even as it works to upset the economy, this silent effect 
will be confused with the merely unutilised from which an economy draws 
its next breath. These different margins will be conflated because they 
are not oppositional. If the economy is never the same, it works as it 
is upset and works anew as it is upset. Heidegger learnt to live with 
this problem. His post-kehre work insists whatever is unfathomable 
should remain so, for the sake of an economy or a way of dwelling which 
was never the same through this effectS3 • This, if not to the extent it 
is stressed. remains a Kantian problem. In his lli.5..t Critique Kant, 
suggests the framework which gives the conditions for the possibility of 
experience is always under duress. In effect, the realm of the 
Understanding is exercised in a way which escapes or remains 'excessive' 
to its proper economy. Here, Kant speaks of an island of the 
Understanding surrounded by an unfathomable ocean. Speaking of 'the 
territory of pure understanding' he says: 
"This domlJin 1s lJn island, enclosed by nlJture itself within 
unalterable limits. It is the land of truth - enchanting 
DaIDe! - surrounded by 4 wide lJDd stormy OC8lJn, the nlJtive 
bome of illusion, where 1I1lJny lJ fog lMnlr and many lJ swiftly 
melting iceberg give the deceptive appelJrance of farther 
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shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever llnew with 
empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises he can never 
abandon and yet is unable to carry to c0111pletion. Before we 
venture on this sea, to explore it in all directions and to 
obtain llssurance whether there be any ground for such hopes, 
it will be well to begin by casting a glance upon the map of 
the land which we are about to leave, and to enquire, first, 
whether we cannot in lJny case be satisfied with what it 
contains - are not, indeed, under c0111pulsion to be satisfied, 
inasmuch as there may be no other territory upon which we 
can settle; and secondly, by what title we possess even this 
domain, and can consider ourselves as secured against all 
opposing clai111s."6. 
Heidegger's distinction lies in his realisation that philosophy is 
riven to the core by effects it only fails to appreciate. Whatever 
remains secure, fails to approach the strange currents that impress upon 
its 'fate'. Where 'we' are, or understand ourselves to be, continues to 
be troubled by such effects. What Heidegger understands as 'dwelling', 
emerges from this confrontation with the sea. However, what Heidegger 
fails to appreciate (and Kant only hints at in his last clause>, is that 
the home is articulated by virtue of the sea. Heidegger's problem, as 
ever, is his failure to communicate this difference: on the one hand, his 
home and that other home, 'the native home of illusion'j on the other, 
the currents which exercise 'his' home and the currents which, through 
their fluidity, elaborate other and differing homes. What he continues to 
resist is the possibility that every issue is immanent only to the sea, 
in its economy or in the fluidity of economics. In fact, that his 
homeland is articulated by virtue of an economy, in its every inflexion, 
rather than 'of' the home or the desire to maintain its habitual status. 
Here, it is not a question of determining a common desire (or demand) 
as a proper or final position, to the exclusion of another. It is not 
that desire distinguishes certain objects as representative of a mooted 
ideal; rather, the variety of issues within an economy differentiate 
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demand. The form of desire is the free-market. The question is, how to 
maintain this freedom in a way that tends to differentiate, rather than 
reenforce the same, repetitive habits? 
• • • • 
Hegel's work attempts to rationalise the unknownj it might be read as an 
attempt to negotiate a path through an economy. On the one hand, Hegel 
constantly identifies the experience of the unknown with the occupation 
of the unknownj his unhappy consciousness is both symptomatic of 
effects disfiguring an economy and an agent capable of changing the face 
of an economy. Both the Phenomenology 01 Spirit and Philosophy of Riih1 
recognise, even enfranchise, unhappiness as it fills a useful rolej i.e. 
misery becomes a mark of self-sacrifice in favour of the State. However, 
on the other hand, what is unusual in Hegel is not that he conflates the 
potentially utile and the redundant but that he also distinguishes such 
motifs in increasingly distinctive ways. Certainly, the Phenomenology 
provides a rationale for the Statist prejudice through the motH of the 
dead. However, if Hegel describes a community absorbed by dead or 
redundant elements, such elements do not become productive. The dead 
represent a margin of inutility, but a margin that could never be 
occupied. Hegel's thesis suggests an economy is maintained only through 
a massive investment in dereliction6 &. The dead or the derelict are 
adopted as objects of carej as dead sons, consigned to death as to a 
destiny. In the Phenomenology the relations between women and men are 
given as both effects of inutility and of inhibited communication. Women, 
excluded from the work of an economy, lend that economy an air of lost 
yet, possible cohesion through the influence they exert in mourning the 
dead or highlighting the familYj a possibility that again suggests 
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dialectical relief. Similarly, men are useless in the home but the 
resentment they feel in leaving their homes for work continues to be 
symptomatic of an economies forsaken orderGG • Hegel highlights motifs of 
redundacy, insisting these motifs exert an effect in excess of their 
determination as inutile, forgotten or decrepit. Derrida attempts to 
think a more elliptical or wandering form around these Signs, the 
symptoms HeBel's dialectic promotes, and exploits as sign-posts on the 
way to a fully stable and coherent society. 
Derrida's other form is termed an Ellipse. The immediate 
connotation, drawn from writing, is the mark of punctuationi the sign 
that a sentence has skipped a beat. If the sentence continues to make 
sense, it does so 'economically' through its brevity. The other 
connotation is geometrical. An ellipse has two focal points feeding their 
respective arcs into the other's trajectory but, also, eliding the 
completeness of their own arc as well as that of their other. The first 
focal point might be termed Hegelian or Heideggerian, insofar as they 
have begun to communicate or have seemed to share similar concerns; at 
least, that Politics is the primary issue in economics. If this first 
position promotes a society absorbed by dereliction, its opposite would 
be a wholly dissolute economy; a sea of indifference. ill ~ 01 ~ 
speaks, on the one hand, of the Moccidental orb of metaphYSiCS' and the 
sense of political closure found there whilst, on the other, speculating 
upon an alien place this 'orb' is aware as though of a II miragf!'. The 
detour through this mirage, as the connection between the near and the 
far focal pOints, would Mas mucb as perceiving philosophy ... consist in 
perceiving the desert. For this other space is neither philosopical nor 
desert-like, tbat is, uDcultivt!2ted."67 
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In ~h.11e. Mytholo~ Derrida forms an ellipse between the speculative 
work of Hegel or Plato, on the near side, and the work of Bataille or 
Nietzsche, on the other6s • This passage looks back to Er.om. a. Restricted 
to a.. General Economy which negotiates between Hegel and Bataillei a 
closed economy reliant upon excessive symptoms of redundancy, versus, a 
General economy where any excess has ceased to bear the weight of this 
closure. This movement from a sense of absorbed closure to indifferent 
fluidity is described, in textual terms, in the short paper Ellipsis: 
n Here or there we have discerned writing: a non-symmetrical 
division deSignated on the one hand the closure of the book, 
and on the other the opening of the text. On the one hand the 
theological encyclopaedia and, modelled upon it, the book of 
man. On the other a fabric of traces marking the disappearance 
of an exceeded God or of an erased man. The question of 
writing could only be opened if the book was clOSed. The joyous 
wandering of the gTaphein then became wandering without 
return. The opening into the text was adventure, expenditure 
without reserve. And yet did we not know that the closure of 
the book was not a simple limit among others? And that only in 
the book, coming back to it unceasingly, drawing all our 
resources from it, could we indefinitely deSignate the writing 
beyond the book."69 
Here 'writing' carries those traces which communicate, elliptically, 
between a form of Political closure (1.e. social coheSion, in every 
discourse) and non-Political indifference. Ellipse insists the difference 
between the book and the text is a difference in the text. Thus, that the 
difference between a sense of closure and the opening of fluidity is a 
difference in that opening; l.e. in an open and fluid economy. Every 
differentiation is immanent only to the fluid relations between terms 
which Derrida, here, describes as 'text'. 
Ilut ~ c1 !An. compares He1degger's homely obsessions with the 
kinds of indifference it associates with lietzsche's Zarathustra: 
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It He burns his texts and erases the traces of his steps. His 
laugh will then burst towards a return which will no longer 
have the form of a repetition of metaphysical humanism, nor no 
more, of a 'beyond' of metaphysics, that of a memorial or of 
the guard of the meaning of being, that of the house and of 
the truth of being. He will dance, outside the house, that 
aCtive Vergeszlicbkeit, that 'active forgetting' and that cruel 
(grausam) feast of which the Genea1agy cl Narals speaks. No 
doubt that Nietzsche called for an active forgetting of Being: 
it would not have the metaphysical form imputed to it by 
Heidesger.llfi8 ~o 
This passage resembles those verses of Ecclesiastes where the house 
of mourning is opposed to the house of feasting, or the 'long home' to 
the agon. The Nietzschean dances outside the home, indifferent to its 
shadow. However, from Derrida's passage, it is impossible to tell if this 
dance occurs 'in' active forgetting, or outside of active forgetting (as 
active forgetting is within the feast). The point is that a sense of 
closure - of the inside and outside - remains open but only elliptically. 
A sense of closure does not determine a definite region or locale but 
continues to be insistant in the economy which opens in indifference. 
Which is to say, in a pure and fluid economy where every object 1s 
similar (or similarly like cash). The passage, above, ends with the 
question 'who, we', a question this ellipse is intended to frame as an 
"economy of the evE/''''. Here, the discourse of a society is found to 
circulate around, rather than be contained by, definite national or local 
boundries. The symptoms bearing the uncertainties of the Political, like 
a sense of civic mourning, are communicated through an economy which 
escapes all sense of closure. This sense of text, in its economy. is 
referred to in ~ D1fferance: 
·So the text of metaphYSics is COIIprehended. Still readable, 
and to be read. It is Dot surrounded but traversed by its 
limit, its insides marked by the multiple furrows of its 
margin. At once promoting the monument and the mirage of the 
trace, the trace silllultlJneously traced and effaced, 
simultaneously living and dead, as always living also through 
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the si11lulation of life in its guarded inscriptions. A pyramid. 
Not a boundary-stone to be vaulted, but stone-like, upon a 
wall, to be deciphered otherwise, a text without a voice . .,7" 
This passage is markedly similar to Kant's account of the island of 
understanding and its other. It is reminiscent, also, of Heidegger as the 
pyramid represents both a home and a tomb; i.e. it refers both to 
dwelling, and dwelling upon man's finitude. It is, finally, reminiscent of 
Hegel as the pyramid reflects the hierarchy of the dialectic, or the 
elevation of the Political over the economic. The difference between the 
state and its dereliction, between the Pit and the Pyramid, is to be read 
otherwise. The law of the land will be found to open with the experience 
of fluidity, which by virtue of its elliptical form is less absolutely 
fluid or utterly dissipated than always differentially compelling. 
Kant~ image of the land and the sea teaches the difference between 
understanding and experience; a shifting, mirage-like experience. The 
stability of the understanding will always be threatened by the vagaries 
of experience. Here, Derrida is asserting that the difference between the 
understanding and experience is itself an elliptical effect; which is to 
say, an experience. The difference between the intelligible and the 
legible is a difference in the legible; legibility being an almost pure 
experience of the unintelligible~ Finally, as the next cbapter will show, 
the difference between nations and commerce is a difference in commerce. 
A difference saturating every opening into commerce. 
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"FasciD: a thDusand candles tDgether blaze with intense 
brigbtness. ND Dne candle's ligbt damages anDther's. SD is 
the liberty of the individual in the ideal and fascist 
sta te." Ezra Pound: Visiting Wd (HII42) 1 
Ezra Pound wrote his Visiting ~ in Italian to his adopted countrymen. 
As a greeting, or an introduction, it remains obscure. The Itsit~ ~ 
contains thirty-three short sections with no obvious or intended order. 
Pound's earlier ~ of EQQnomics (1933) contained this aside: 
"1 am not proceeding according tD AristDtelian lDgic but 
accDrding tD tbe ideogramic method of first heaping together 
the necessary cDmpDnents of tbDUgbt."2 
The Visiting ~, in conformity with the 'ideogramic method', is a 
more or less derelict variety. Nevertheless, certain things remain clear. 
Firstly, through a visiting card, Pound wishes to communicate. Secondly, 
this aim is to be opposed to usury. Pound quotes Berlin wartime radio: 
II The revolution, or tbe revolutiDns Df the nineteentb century, 
defined the idea Df liberty liS tbe right to dD llnything tbllt 
does not injure others. But with the decadence of tbe 
democratic - or republiclln - stllte this definitiDn hllS been 
betrayed in tbe interests of usurers and speculators.";:' 
The Visiting C401 promotes a framework that remains with the 
unknown (" Ir"e think because we do not know."4) as it resists imposing 
pre-ordained solutions.The Fascio remains faithful to the idea of liberty 
by standing out against an ethos which exploits and betrays openess and 
liberty. Pound suggests the conflict between liberty and usuristic 
exploitation reflects upon a deeper structure: 
II [(e find tWD forces in history: Dne that diVides, shatters, 
and kills and one that contemplates the unity of the 
mystery"· 
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The Fascia maintains this mystery, in its unity; as though it were 
an imperative. The Fascio discovers unity, as it resembles the 
dereliction of an ideogram rather than division and death per se. Usury 
merely exploits division. Pound's treatment of usury never varied, even 
after he ceased identifying its enjoyment solely with English bankers or 
a • judaeocracy' (" The war in which brave men are being killed and 
wounded ... began - or rather the phase we are now fighting began - in 
1694, with the foundation of the Bank of England ."6). He later stated: 
" Usury, a charge for the use of purchasing power, levied 
without regard to productioD, sometimes without regard even 
to the possibility of production." 7 
When it comes to production, usury is nowhere. The conditions for 
the possibility of production could only be a social form; like the 
Fascia. The Fascia determines the possibility of production openly, 
without distorting its 'true' nature. The Fascia, in its variety, 
maintains both production and what Pound terms the 'increments of 
association '8. The justice of the Fascia does not simply refer to a 
socially equitable distribution; it is an image of various, distinct 
components maintained in a working form. The term 'Fascia' refers to the 
sceptre - a bundle of twigs wrapped around an axe - which signalled 
the opening of a roman court. 
In La differance Derrida slips from this image into economics. 
Deconstruction has been understood through this move; from a political 
form to its other. Here, Derrida exploits a French term derived from the 
same root as 'fascid; 'faisceau' [sheaf]. Derrida depends less upon this 
image than upon its wider elaboration in writing. as writing: provides 
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the trace of any image; becomes inhibited in its fluidity as it ventures 
such a tracej finally. promotes secret effects around a specific image. 
across its other pages or in-and-out of its multiple folds. Here. 
'writing' is an example of a deconstructive effect. It is when Derrida 
accounts for the term 'oikesis' that the distinctiveness of this move is 
elaborated. as an economy of Xourning: 
.. tbe difference is not beard, it dwells in silence, as 
secret and discrete as a tomb: ofresis. Let us then mark, in 
a.nticipa.tion, the place, the familial residence and familiar 
tomb where the econamy of death is produced through 
differance." CD 4)9 
The silent difference is the one Derrida omits to makej there is no 
connection between the Greek term for the home (oikas) and the tomb. 
Derrida, however. speculates upon this connection only through an 
analogy. he says 'as a tom btl O. La.. dUferance exploits the analogy. and 
the silence of the analogy. This silence would be like the one between 
the Fascio and the economy of death. The silence of an impossible 
representation of the perfect forum is likened to the silence associated 
wi th death or redundancy. Or, the disequilibriums which might silently 
undermine the just distribution of the Fascia is likened to another 
order where secret disequilibriums are always already in effect. It is 
the secret of the movement from the one to the ather that interests 
Derrida; not the obscure effects lacked within either the Fascia or the 
tomb. Derrida is writing of the economy of silence rather than the 
silence 'of' the forum or its end. An economy wherediscrete effects 
become insistant but cannot be placed. 
These effects, as economic effects, disturb Pound. He remains anxious 
that production be maintained in such a way that its providence is 
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evident. its intensity never dimmed. Like Keynes. Pound does not believe 
production ends when it ceases to be evident, only that if it is not 
maintained in such away. it will tend towards pure dereliction <Keynes: 
n This is a nightmare which will pass away with the IIlorningll 1 ). Pound 
worries, like Keynes or Heidegger, that unregulated speculation, promoted 
without regard to the form of a social need or demand, allows production 
to slip out of the light. Neither Pound, nor Keynes nor Heldegger 
consider any form of association other than the one represented as a 
social forum. Pound, above all, worries that as the seperate components 
of such an association become dimmed these components - in short, 
people - lose the benefits of the collective advantage. He is anxious 
that countrymen, and even whole countries, could be forced into 
redundancy as though they were disenfranchised. lihich is to say, he is 
exercised by an economic probleIIl but represent this problem under a 
Political form. He is not simply anxious that one person's light might 
suffer privation within a forum but, also, that whole forums might be 
passed over in a usuristic attitude which only fails to be impressed by 
the imperatives of the Fascia, 
Pound wrote his Visting CMs1 as an alien; it is already an intra-
national communication. He intends, however, that the relations it offers 
should be dissociated from usury, as usury is an anti-SOCial or alien 
affection. He insists his Card is less a communication than an 
unexpected servicei stating he could perform no "more useful serviCf!' 
than to lay an ideogram before his hosts12, The quality of the ideogram 
has been given as a loose connection of components; Pound's surprise 
missive similarly inhibits easy interpretation. He forces his audience to 
abjure anything smacking of usury, As the form of an ideogram is not 
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pregiven, no speculative solution could be equal to it. The ideogram only 
demands silent consideration. Pound, then, exploits a breakdown in 
communication in order to spring a surprise. Despite comparing the 
Fascio to an ideogram, he insists the form of neither resembles anything 
borrowed from another source. He does so as he appeals to a forum 
without hope of profit, whilst hoping that the analogy between the 
Fascia and the ideogram should strike a chordi on the one hand, the 
'heap' of the ideogram, on the other, the perfection of the Fascia. Here, 
there are a whole series of strange analogies and dissociations. Whilst 
the Fascia is dwelt upon in silence, usury spreads its poison in near 
secrecy. To understand the Fascia, it must be distinguished from usury. 
It should also, however, be compared <in its perfection) with a sense of 
dereliction, even though usury also symptomises division and death. The 
Fascio, finally, is an international possibility, elaborated through 
analogies and comparisionsj but chiefly through the inhibition of such 
relations, through division and through a commitment to division. Here, 
international possibilities mean nothing I convey nothing, neither borrow 
nor lend anything. The FaSCia is an economic problem, concerning 
economic relations and their failures, but is represented as Political 
problemi a question of political justice within an association of loose, 
but bound, peoples. 
The outline to a contemporary problem will be seen, here: are we to 
valorise a New World Order modelled upon an open forum, either an open 
market or the United Nations? Are we to cure economic problems through 
the political ideal of an international forum? Would a New World Order 
excuse or perpetuate economic's secret genius for distributing profit 
almost arbitrarily? A great genius, possibly an evil geniusi a genius 
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known, in parts of the world, as The Great Satan and identified either 
with the socio-political grouping termed 'America'. or that other, less 
tangible set. called the West. This problem has a history. The idea of a 
world order does not predate Christianity. It will be argued that the 
spread of the church has depended upon a kind of economic logic. 
Further, that the church promotes an analogy between politics and 
economics but approves only those conclusions which resemble the 
Political. These claims will be broached in the following three sections: 
i) An account of the relation between credit and faith in the growth of 
the ecumenical church and the spread of economic markets. The argument 
being that faith is sanctioned as it resembles credit. and credit is 
attacked as it is associated with infidelity and usury. 
11) A study of the benefits associated with a Political order in the 
economy of world relations. It will be argued that the providence of a 
State is articulated by virtue of external trading relations; i.e. 
economic relations. Further, such benefits are neither 'ot' the State. nor 
are they sustained by economic relations. Rather. the Economic is the 
site of the dispersal of providence. distributing certain benefits as it 
witholds others; promoting suspicion as easily as any sense of assurity. 
111) A brief study of the conditions informing the origin of anti-trust 
laws. It will be argued that, now, it is generally taken to be a virtue 
of economics to communicate a sense of disruption and suspicion 
alongside every economic trend. 
• • f • 
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On the virtues of credit in the economy of world relations 
Derrida's account of deconstruction often focuses on writing. An 
account of the spread of ecumenical society. in step with Derrida's work. 
could begin with incunabula. The Franciscan, Luca Pacioli. published the 
first 'Western account of an Arabic innovation in bookkeeping: double-
entry. Fra Pacioli owes a great debt to the infidel. The sections quoted. 
below. concern credit. Pacioli will be seen to bind the ideal form of the 
'uni versal' - represented by the catholic Church - with the sphere of 
usury. in general. It might be thought the championing of credit 
relations, through an analogy with catholic Faith, would have been 
recieved with shock. The enjoyment of usury. forbidden to the faithful, 
remained restricted to the infidel. This restriction, although it did not 
survi ve the spread of banking technology in the fifteenth century 13, 
remains a tendentious problem. Keynes cites the Schoolmen's attempts to 
distinguish a form of credit which reflects and bears the needs of a 
community from other types of interest. After admitting he had once seen 
such distinctions as "jesuitical attempts to escape from a foolish 
tbeory'll A, Keynes argues the distinction is sound. This is Pound's 
positioni for him, the Fascio represents the attempt to provide for a 
form of social credit over anti-social usury. Pound, whilst applauding 
the wisdom by which II sodomy and usury were seen coupled togetber" and 
hoping that any rebirth of the Church, both II one and Catholic", would 
once more abjure these two, Similar, crimes against naturell~, held banks 
modelled after the Xedici Xonte del Paschi provide the conditions for 
the possibility of civilisation, as they provide for a form of social 
credit16 • Pacioli's introduction to accountancy begins: 
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"As is known, three things are necessary to one who wishes 
diligently to carryon business. Of these the most important 
is cash, or any other substantial power, without which the 
carrying on of business is very difficult. 
It has happened that many, entering business with 
nothing but good faith have yet carried on big business; and 
through their credit, faithfully served, they have attained to 
greater wealth. In our conversations with persons throughout 
Italy, we have C0111e across 111any of these; and in the great 
republiCS the word of a good 111erchant is considered 
sufficient, and oaths are taken on it saying: 'it is the word 
of a real merchan t'. Th is cannot be ad111ira tion, as 
catholically everybody is saved by faith, without which it is 
impossible to please God. 
The second thing looked for in business is to be a good 
accountant and sharp book-keeper and to arrive at this, as we 
have seen above, we have regular rules and canons necessary 
to each operation, so that any diligent reader can understand 
all by himself. If one does not understand this well, the 
following would serve him in vain. 
The third and last thing necessary is tha t all one's 
affairs be arranged in good order so that one may get, 
without loss of time, all particulars as to the Debit and also 
the Credit of all of them, as business does not deal with 
anything else. This is very useful, because it would be 
impossible to conduct business without due order of recording; 
for without rest, 111erchants would always be in great mental 
trouble." Paciol1 (1494) 17 
Before turning to the necessity of cash, the foundation of the 
system, it is as well to note Pacioli's lesser two necessities. He 
claims certain, generally intelligible, rules enable any reader to conduct 
business in an acceptable way; in fact, that the rules and canons of 
accountancy enable all kinds of business to be approached in a similar 
fashion. At one level, Pacioli's enthUSiasm for geometriC rules only 
promotes the contemporary view that geometry, in its divine proportion, 
provides a universal framework for vastly different ventures: painting, 
architecture, music, philosophy and, now, business. This faith in the 
universality of geometry informs a kind of emancipation; geometriC 
paradigms free, rather than restrict, thought. They enable the promotion 
of different abilities in a generally intelligible way; they are catholic 
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in the secular sense. A Platonist holds geometry is already known to all 
peoples. Instruction in its paradigms only makes this property of the 
human intellect self-evident. At this level, Pacioli elaborates a 
community of the diligent insofar as everyone is diligently schooled. 
However twa ather paints might be emphasised. Firstly, Pacioli addresses 
a literate, secular society through a printed book. Writing is not itself 
geometrical, nor do geometrical patterns dominate the kinds of 
communication made possible through writing. The Platonist argues 
geometry is universal, literacy patently is not. When Plato revealed a 
slaves innate knowledge of geometry, this pathic had first to become 
impressed by a graphic representation standing in flat contradiction to 
the universality of geometry; geometric figures are eternally present, 
their traces in the sand are lost in an instant 1 8. Secondly, with the 
inclusion of Arabic numerals into Hellenic geometry the idea of the 
geometric paradigm is transmuted. In double-entry, sums are balanced as 
they are cancelled at zero. The zero is not a figure in the Hellenic 
sense, it is not a material quantity as compound integers are; it is, 
decidely, nat susceptible to squaring and cubing as a physical component 
of space. Both these paints raise questions upon the translatibllity of 
geometric paradigms into other, differing ventures. If translation does 
occur, rather than geometry itself being the sole true basis of every 
venture, it would seem the currency of geometry lies in its being 
applicable in analogous ways in differing situations. In short, that the 
translation of geometry takes priority over its paradigmatic virtues. 
Further, that translation, or tranSliteration, is the currency of 
uni versali ty, not geometry 1 tself, in its immediacy. Is Pacial! 's lesson, 
then, primarily on writing and translation? W1th the infiltration of the 
zero into his systems this line of thought becomes ineluctablej the zero 
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marks and fills a space that would not otherwise be apparent and 
signals an equalisation that would not have occurred without the 
adoption of Arabic double-entry. The metaphorisation of geometry becomes 
clearer as it is realised the stability reached with zero - with the 
cancelling of equal quantities - 1s not geometric stability in the Greek 
sense. It is a speculative stability given literal credence through the 
zero but entailing change; growth: 'greater wealth', Debit and Credit. 
Pacioli third necess i ty lies in 'good. order', necessitated through 
the premium placed on time. Pacioli believes credit enables capable but 
financially disadvantaged members of a community to become valued 
participants in commerce; in effect, to be enfranchised. As Pacioli talks 
of the substance and chiefest power of business he also speaks of the 
necessity of rest and the possibility of anxiety, as though these were 
accidental or supplementary symptoms. Interest on credit is calculable 
on the basis of time. A usurer grows richer with every period a debt 
remains outstanding. Pacioli's suggestion that organisation and rest help 
business is far from platitudinous, there exists a real source of 
anxiety. Pacioli's argues that so long as business is conducted in a 
time-conscious manner then any interest due will reflect the 'real'. 
rather than accidental or unhappy, aspects of any enterprise; he 
promotes a sense of freedom. a freedom enjoyed with the diligent 
observation of business mores. If business is both sound and capably 
run, there is no need to fear credit, far from inhibiting business the 
extension of credit reflects its soundness and the acumen of its 
operator. There is. clearly, an obverse side. Alongside the liberation 
promised in a time of open, incrementally increasing but essentially 
Just business there remains the spectre of a time when anxiety reigns. 
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Which is to say, when time is smothered in shadows and the freedom from 
self-incurred debts would be a freedom from the cares of business. The 
dream of liquidity like the dream of inertial death. 
The lesser two necessities for business, as has been, concern rules 
and reckoning. In each instance, something akin to cash might be 
emphasised; i.e. something with the property of universal translatability 
that may, also, articulate the time of business. Thus, of the three 
things necessary in business the foremost is Cash: the language of the 
community Pacioli describes. If the language is, univocally, fiscal, it is 
so because it is expressed as a single, substantial power; as credit-
cash, and any other commodity could be substituted so long as it carries 
the virtues of credit. Pacioli speaks of the catholic sphere as one in 
which everyone is redeemed through Faith, but also of a similar 
community; wider than Italy. encompassing other republics and. presumbly. 
the known world. This conflation of the one Ecumenic faith with the 
Economic use of credit, vouchsafes the propriety of credit. World 
integrity arrives with the extension of credit relations. Whilst one 
might express admiration for a merchant. believe in their abilities as 
in a virtue or deal with others in an air of mistrust, such concerns 
remain accidental so long as the power of credit lies in its 
universality. Credit is a principle of universality. Through this, it can 
be seen that the conflation of Faith and Credit is far from specious, it 
carries a sense of legitimacy. This legitimacy depends upon identifying 
the real work of credit, or of faith, in distinction to its apparent 
objectives. It is a question of distinguishing between expression and 
commitment. Faith is understood to express commitment but, crucially, a 
commitment to an unknown object: otherwise it would be knowledge rather 
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than faith. Thus, faith will have been articulated through the 
representations it ventures of an object; not, immediately, by that 
object. It is only in the variety of its expressions that faith works; 
i.e. elaborates a community of the faithful as those who give credence to 
expressions of faith, and to other credit-users. 
Whilst the one, true, objective of faith imparts an aura of univocity 
to the language of the faithful, the community that lives through such a 
language is various and disjointed. The language of faith proIDotes a 
sense of communal inter-change, whilst differentiating this community, 
in its life or work, from the commitment maintained by the church or its 
peculiar rites. Schleiermacher later exploits the difference between 
commitment and expression: 
"The religious self-consciousness, like every essential element 
in human nature, leads necessarily in its development to 
fellowships or communion; a communion which, an the ane hand, 
is variable and fluid, IUld on the ather band, has definite 
limits, i.e. 1s a cburch.·19 
Schleiermacher juxtaposes the fluidity of the life enjoyed through 
communal relations with the rigid limits represented by the Church. The 
Church expresses the transcendent form standing over and against the 
immanent and fluid passions of an erstwhile community. The language of 
faith works through this kind of difference, a difference that could 
legi timately see the church as just another expression, to be exchanged 
for other or multiple objects of commitment as the variety of ways in 
which city life might be enjoyed are differentiatedi or represented by 
different institutional forms: through the town hall, the legislature, the 
city bank. The difference between the transcendent object and the 
immanent life of a community stands at the basis of christianitYi an 
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"economy of the flesh": Cyril of Alexandria's term for the communion20 • 
Through this economy the commitment to christ's corpse is expressed in 
the continuing life of a communi tYi the 'meaning' of communion lies in 
the recovery from death, but also in the community's failure to fully 
comprehend the death to which it remains committed. For Schleiermacher 
this economy is one of "regenerate individuals" which he sees as an 
immanent system of "mutual inter-action and co-operation"21 and also as 
the transcendental "justification of man"22. There is, again, a tension 
between a time in which the universal is enjoyed in equanimity, and a 
time disrupted through insistant presentiments of deathi a time when 
noone knows where the body or the treasury reserves are buried. 
Schleiermacher, like Pacioli, attempts to establish a form 
enfranchising the individual into the general enjoyment of corporate 
life. That the language representing this Body is, pimarily, univocal is 
guaranteed through the singular commitment to the same kind of society, 
represented through the Church <whatever churchi Cyril, Paciol1 and 
Schleiermacher are not of the same Faith). Those who enjoy such a 
language are gathered together in their Faith, as faith articulates a 
forum open to all believersi i.e. everyone who recognises the meaning 
instantiated by the Church or the Host. Through the sort of eqUivalences 
exploited by Pacioli and Schleiermacher that which is represented as 
meaningful (a society), and that which is enjoyed <communicative 
relations) are held to be the same. They are, nevertheless, differenti or, 
at least, only disjunctively related. This relation is, moreover, one of 
deferral. It is held as credible, even as the sole source of credit, that 
the idea of a community and the commerce through which the community is 
elaborated are seen as identical but this relation is always already to 
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be deferred. Derrida terms this action a 'detour'. He recognises that the 
object of commitment is not carried but defused through the way its 
representation is elaborated, the meaning attributed to any 
representation is to be thought of as imminent if, momentarily, 
misplaced. In a passage from ~ Kythology he speaks of philosophy as 
the apologist for a metaphysics of presence, a way of thought which 
views the value of identity from within an economy of metaphoric or 
analogic translations: an "economy of the proper without irreperable 
damage, a certainly inevitable detour but also a history with its sights 
set on, and within the horizon of, the circular reappropriation of 
literal, proper meaning':;Z3. An economy, Derrida insists, that never 
becomes comfortable with its elliptical manouevres. As will be seen, 
below, Derrida analyses credit through distinguishing between analogies 
and metaphors. In antiCipation of this positive account of economics, it 
can already be seen that Pacioli intimates an economy is articulated by 
virtue of analogies (cash, or any other analogising power), but that the 
distinction of any economy is to be regarded as though it were Catholic; 
l.e. metaphorically, the same as the church. 
Pacioli suggests a potentially capable member of a community might 
enjoy a role in SOCiety through the extension of credit relations. These 
economic relations are read as though they referred to the ecumenical or 
Catholic church. Pacioli promotes the assurance that an identity between 
the commerCial community and the community welcoming the speculator is 
imminent. As a speculator borrows from a given community (or its bank), 
that society twice receives increments from the borrower's effo.t; both 
through the interest levied and an increase in trade. In securing credit 
the speculator enjoys a benefit akin to enfranchisementj becoming 
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assured of a community that, in principle, is attuned to the work of 
speculation. Whilst no-one possesses a crystal ball and no-one can be 
wholly sure their efforts will be profitable, it is entirely possible 
(i.e. legitimate) to speculate on the expectation that business ventures 
will be recognised through the opening of credit-relations. The imminent 
identity between the debited and the credited community exists only to 
recognise the possibility that a security (the speculator's abilities or, 
in bankruptcy, his shirt) can find a market. 
The communal enjoyment of business, through the increments of 
association, will come to be read as a political possibility. Political in 
the sense that a community, similar to an Antique city (the Polis or 
Fascia), frees a speculator from poverty as it secures a people in its 
folds. However, if this is represented as a political possibility it 
suggests no political commitment. Boone is bound to an investment house 
through eternal ties but, only, through speculation. In consequence, the 
possibi1i ties ventured may return home or even have as their object the 
speculator's home. There is no reason to finally depend upon the identity 
between a community enjoying the benefit of its own bank and the 
community supporting the interest schedules of that bank. The 
universality of credit relations might link different communities within 
the same country, or entirely different communities across a manifold of 
countries. From London to Lisbon (the EEC>, Taiwan to Detroit (the car 
industry) I Rotterdam to Baghdad (oil) or Xanhattan to Barbados 
(banking) I communities of debtor and creditor need not occupy the same 
space nor the same benefits from communication. Bar I crucially I need 
credit be identified with any space to excite speculation or acquiescence 
across the surface of the world. A lender exploits a marked disymmetry 
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in the legitimacy of speculation by discounting speculative failure in 
their favour. As speculation might fail, a community might be submerged, 
rather than assured, through credit; a community securing only its 
bankruptcy as it admits the possibility of credit relations. 
Pacioli states: 'catholically everybody is saved by faith'. What 
happens when salvation is deferred? The intuition of elements whose 
salvation remains remote may be represented as margins to be closed or 
widened. Such margins might be relied upon as they represent either a 
sense of openess or the intuition that competing elements have been 
farced into privation. Such feelings might, in wild xenophobia, be taken 
to represent the fact that alien elements have passed through the 
openings of a society. stitching up every god-fearing member. The work 
of a credit economy is heavy with anxietYi either the hope of respite, or 
the continued and obsessive pressure of a time warped through credit 
relations. When economic margins seem wholly remote or perpetually 
deferred, symptoms of anxiety are assigned to the presentiment of ghosts 
or corpses. As this happens, an economy comes to seem either like an 
economy of mourning, hoping for a sense of respite from its impossible 
devotion, or a depressive economy drawing ever closer to its end. Or, 
will seem so, if symptoms expressing the intractable are taken to have a 
significance only as they represent a sense of community: the community 
'of' the mournful, the community 'of' the depressed. 
The difference between the familiar and the unfathomable is a 
difference within economics. In consequence, the pOssibility exists for 
an economy no longer exercised by the familiarity or foreigness of its 
investments; in effect, for an economy indifferent rather than wearied 
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by the distribution of the elements it articulates. This possibility 
would resemble the time of rest or of peace promoted by the Christian 
church but would be catholic in a secular - which is to say. economic -
sense. An economy that has ceased to be exercised by the significance of 
the distance between an expression and a commitment. or between the 
boundaries of a home and the elaboration of the ecumenical sphere. Such 
an economy. indifferent even to its own distinctions, would be purely 
fluid. If indifference were a final end (akin to the end promoted by the 
church), it could be taken to represent the 'desire for fluidity' Keynes 
ascribes to the desire for money, or the groundless desires Heidegger 
associates with the idle. However, it makes little sense to represent 
'fluidity' as the aim of a desire; the contention is simply that the 
quality of fluidity is to be associated with those discourses immanent 
to business or commerce, fluidity is not itself a transcendent aim. If 
commercial desires are fluid, desire does not achieve significance with 
the possibility of satiation (in fluidity, desire remains indifferent to 
satiation). For Keynes and Heidegger, desire becomes significant only as 
it is inhibited; l.e. when its object, like an object of faith, remains 
remote2 •• What is significant about economic fluidity is not 'its' desire, 
but the way in which desire is articulated, riven, or weakened. As has 
been seen, Heidegger and Keynes depend (at least prDvisiDn~11y) upon the 
fluid in order to draw a significance from elements that are elided or 
submerged through its otherwise indifferent flows (a significance they 
immediately attribute to Political concerns). In fact, the dynamics of 
fluid are inseperable from economics. Hume's critique of mercantilist 
Rationalism used hydraulics as a model when he insisted that money 
could not artifiCially be protected within borders; it would flow until 
it found its own level, its current equilibrium26 • Here, economic 
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equilibrium is not a respite but already a kind of dynamism: new 
resources erupt or spring from wells, mines or colonies as other 
reserves evaporate. If economics are entirely fluid, so the way fluidity 
is changed or inhibited is economic. The logic of Economics is 
alchemical in its condensations or rarefactions, in the way money 
vanishes or is spirited away, in the way it forms solidified reserves 
and does so in the ephemeral flickers of a VDU. 
Derrida, as has been seen, suggests the move from a political ideal 
to the spaces where such ideals are opened out as though into a fluid 
space of exchange can be formalised. 'fIith terms like 'Ellipse', Derrida 
ventures ways of casting the shadow of political concerns; of opening 
out their logiC. His ~ !ythology does this through an analysis of 
Ketaphor. Here, Xetaphor is taken to act on behalf of a process termed 
'interiorisation '; i.e. metaphor is -elaborated in order to assure 
harbours of truth and propriety"26. In brief, the attempt to 
reappropriate the fluid within proper borders. Insofar as metaphor 
stands in for this process, whatever is ventured metaphorically is read 
as being similar to that which is instantiated by definitive limits; e.g. 
as Schleiermacher read the 'variable and fluid' community as tbougb it 
were a definite set of communicants. For Derrida the work of metaphor 
lies in its standing in for (relieving) the process of interiorisation. 
Derrida's account of metaphor, as will be seen, confounds as it 
resembles the process of interiorisation. Which is to say, he 
acknowledges that metaphor invites suspicion. Derrida g1 ves two 
defini tions of 'Metaphor'. Firstly, metaphor is a movement of dialectical 
idealisation27 • Which is to say, metaphoric 'idealisation' replaces those 
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desire associated with the interior, it dissembles a process of 
reappropriation as it 'relieves' the desire for a foundation: 
"rrh~t is fundamental corresponds to the desire for a firm and 
ultimate ground, a terrain to build on, the earth ~s the 
support of an artificial structure."28 
Secondly, Derrida says, this movement allows "to be called sense 
that which should be foreign to the senses."29. Intuitions like: the light 
of Reason, the body of christ, the taste of the soil (or their alien 
obverses); possibilities that remain meaningless without metaphoric 
representation. However, as such ideas are real contentions, the struggle 
to interpret them as legitimate or illegitimate will be played out 
through the economy promoting their possibility. As has been seen, it is 
the distinction of economics to exploit the difference between the 
seemly and the unseemly, the habitual and the outlandish. In fact, the 
distinctiveness of such intuitions is maintained by exacerbating the 
sense of the unknown or alien as an economic effect. This means the 
'foreign' is no less legitimate than the familiar; economics brings 
either into 'relief', even as it becomes indifferent to the difference 
between the foreign and the familiar. In sum, economics is a secret in 
every breach of the law. Economics elaborates, even as it breaks, the 
law-of-the-home. Economics betrays any sense of rootedness. 
Derrida's account of metaphor differentiates metaphor from other 
figures of speech; for instance, from analogies. Yi'hich is to say, he 
provides a positivistic account of a dHference3o • This section has 
repeatedly stressed that economics work by virtue of analogies (for 
instance. through cash or any other commodity provided it replicates the 
virtues of cash). It now seems this formula should be tightened: 
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economics works by virtue of analogies, but what remains distinctive in 
economics is metaphoric. Further, metaphor owes its distinctiveness to 
the way it resembles another process: the desire to appropriate a firm 
support in order to establish the propriety of the interior. However, 
what is found to be finally distinctive in this process of 'relief' is 
the similarity between the homely and the outlandish. Derrida account of 
metaphor manages to stress the ways in which that which 1s elaborated 
by virtue of economics is taken to owe its distictiveness to a 
transcendent form (the Ecumenic), but also to take this 
distinctiveness as another economic effect, another analogy. That is, 
again, whilst it might have been Schleiermacher's distinction to 
emphasise a Metaphor, Derrida brings this kind of distinction into 
relief as simply another analogy (the business community is like a set 
of communicants). ~ !ythology states that, wlthin philosophy, 
"analogy is metaphor par excellence'31. Which would seem to say; 
analogy is brought into relief only if it is read as metaphor; or, 
economic processes are interesting insofar as they seem to refer to a 
definite community. Derrida, however, also stresses the reverse: he makes 
analogies distinctive where other philosophers profit by having already 
pronounced upon the metaphoric qual1 ty of this significance. Derrida 
brings this judgement into relief as a new analogy, an unregarded 
analogy, and still an economic effect. Or, where he makes a distinction 
between two figures (the homely and the foreign), he elliptically 
(economically) mates a difference: a difference to speculation, and a 
difference to any apologism for the Political. He produces another 
difference where the significant difference has been settled, via 
metaphor, in favour of the form of interiority (or, in Heidegger's case, 
where metaphor has been discounted as too wayward to voice an exacting 
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difference32 ). The distinction of Yll..ile. M.ythology lies not in claiming 
that economics work metaphorically, but that metaphor in use ('usure') is 
entirely economic. It remains the case that any hope relieved through 
metaphors, becomes distinctive through the fluidity of an economy that 
is not metaphorical. Fluidity is not metaphorical, metaphors have become 
fluid; fluent in the shadowy language that promotes apparently Political 
effects, or purely fluid in the economics that shadow, surround and 
breach every attempt to instantiate the Political realm. 
Economic events are represented as political issues; why? At one 
level the answer is obvious: to believe otherwise would be to abandon 
any scope for goverment. This is to be contrasted with the view that 
economics is an immutable law of nature, an inescapable force of 
oppression or, simply, a dangerous contagion. As Derrida continues to 
affirm Democracy. so he emphasises the ways in which one might 'make a 
difference' within a speculative discoursej this apparently 'political' 
response to economic problems will be dealt with in the conclusion. The 
remaining sections of this chapter continue to look at the history of 
economics. a history in which economic problems are always represented 
as Political. It will focus on two symptomologies: firstly, hydrophobia 
in Ancient Greece, or the attempt to determine every benefit articulated 
by sea-trade by reference to the State, whilst discounting every 
unfortunate aspect of the sea as an effect encroaching upon the land. 
Secondly, necrophilia in nineteenth century France, or the awareness of 
economic redundancy as though it were an object of political commitment, 
consigning the State to the enjoyment of death as to a vocation. 
f • • f 
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On the external character of economic relations 
and their dispersal: or Hydrophobia 
Streps1ades: This interest - what kind of animal is it? 
Creditor: Vhat else but the fact that the money one owes gets 
constantly more and more, month by month and day by 
day, by the effluxion of time. 
Strepsiades: Quite correct. Now then, do you think that the sea 
is at all bigger now than it used to be? 
Creditor: Heavens, no, its the same size; it would be against 
the laws of nature for it to be bigger. 
Stepsiades: In that case, you miserable fool, if the sea doesn't 
get any bigger with the influx of the rivers, what 
business have you trying to make your sum of money 
bigger? Vill you kindly chase yourself away from the 
house. Aristophanes: ill Clouds33 
Ihe Clouds concerns a fool's life in the big city and his attempt to 
cope with the debts a City-born wife and extravagant son have lain up. 
The following section deals, like ill Clouds, with the role of credit in 
Antique thought and the modern interpretation of this thought. In the 
first instance, in Athens at the turn of the fifth and fourth century. 
The points raised, here, will be the providence of Athens and its 
distinction in the Antique world. As will be seen, this distinction lay 
in a monopolistic advantage, an edge over its nearest competitors. The 
central texts will be the two orations on Athenian democracy ascribed by 
Thucydides to Perikles and Plato's Republic, the latter read as a 
response to Thucydides' History. It will be seen the overriding concern 
of the Republic is to set Perikles' lesson on democracy onto firm 
ground. Democracy is the form of politics most closely menaced by 
trade-routes and their flUidity. 
Aristotle argued that tragedy presents a sense of integrity; 
condensing the inexorability of fate into a Single, real-time dramatic 
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evenP4. Ih.e. Clouds enjoys this sense of integrity but only in 
abandonment. The action takes place, in an almost tragic time-scale, on 
the non-day between the new and old moon. This day, the 'old-and-new-
day', was the date upon which interest schedules were calculated. If the 
relevance of tragedy lies its presentation of fate, this distinction is 
already dissipated in Aristophanes comedy. The time of fate and the 
tragic instantiation of togetherness, are set loose in the fluid1 ty of 
night and in the shifting light of the sea; in the khrematikos. The day 
of reckoning, in credit-relations, is simultaneously a doubling and a 
condensation of time. At this moment, perhaps a full forty-eight hours, 
there is too much time, and time is all the more preSSing. From its 
subject matter, the seductions and stresses of city-life on a man born 
into a rustic small-holding, !he Clouds is clearly a political play, but 
it describes credit-relations. The idea of Politics, the representation of 
all people, or all city-dwellers, as Politicians - i.e. as Democrats -
is Athenian36 • Aristophanes follows the way this central idea is opened 
to the pressures of economics. Such a manouevre raises and confounds the 
Athenian ideal of political integrity, and the thought of the many. 
In the speech of Thucydides' History known as the 'Funeral Ortttion' 
Perikles argues Athenian Democracy is a paradigm. Which is to say, 
Athens' constitution articulates an ethos distinctive to only one city 
and seperating that city from any other. 
"We have a constitution which does not seek to copy the laws 
of our neighbours: we are an example <paradeigma) to others 
rather than imitators of them. The nttme given to this 
constitution is democracy, because it 1s based not on tt few 
but on tt lttrger number. For the settlement of private disputes 
ttll ttTe on an equal footing in accordance with the laws, while 
in public life men gain preferment becttuse of their deserts, 
wben anybody has a good reputation for anytbing: wbat matters 
is not rotation but merit."36 
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Perikles' view is modified a few stanzas later when he states 
Athens, in its distinctiveness, is a lesson (paideusis) to other cities. 
That is, whilst he would still claim that, constitutionally, Athens is 
committed to its proper (or ownmost) form, the significance of this 
model is also that it communicates a difference to other nations. 
"To sum up, I maintain that our city as a whole is an 
education (paideusis) to Greecej and I reckon that each 
individual man amongst us can keep his person ready to profit 
from the greatest variety in life and the maximum of graceful 
aptability. That this is not just a momentary verbal boast but 
actual truth is demonstrated by the very strength of our city, 
which we have built up as a result of these habits."37 
In this passage, Athens' distinction is said to lie in its variety. 
In consequence, no single desire, distinguished as an ideal object 
through its representation as a paradigm, could be associated with 
Athenian life. Rather, a multiplicity of desires are differentiated 
through the different objectives current in the city's life, and beyond. 
As an event, a pol! tical oration on the occasion of an Athenian victory, 
Perikles' funeral oration punctuates the series of Wars between Athens 
and its rivals, chiefly Sparta. However, war has not yet acquired the 
kind of significance it later has, Athenian sons may have died but the 
grace of Athenian life continues. ill Clouds, too, is set against the 
Peloponnesian Wars. However, the war is alluded to only when Strepsiades 
regrets he cannot beat his slave. Runaway slaves were not returned if 
they crossed enemy borders in wartime. On Aristophanes' account war has 
a significance only as it inhibits trade. Specifically, when the 
relations of trust are broken and the relations between states are 
opened to unusual competition, even the possibility of a slave opting for 
life in Sparta38 • If war is diplomacy by other means, it is also an 
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economic effect; a time when market conventions are subject to unusual 
stresses. From the foregoing it is difficult to see how either the form 
or the lesson of Democracy implies any sense of cohesive strength. It is 
Perikles' second speech that appeals to a sense of communal cohesion. 
Perikles' second speech comes at a time of plague and defeat. Now 
the advantages, the grace or the variety of graces, associated with 
Athens, have become Tyrannical. Perikles argues that, in the attempt to 
preserve the city, Athens commands a greater distinction; it is suffered 
as a form of extortion. Again, this is not easily attributable to War. 
"Your fathers secured this empire not by inheritance from 
others but by their own efforts ... You now possess the empire 
like a tyranny, and, though it 111ay be considered unjust to 
have acquired it, to renounce it would be dangerous. If 111en 
who thougbt like tbat persuaded tbe rest, they would very 
quickly ruin tbeir city, even if tbey lived on tbeir own 
somewbere and bad no ties with A tbens. A voiders of trouble 
are not safe unless ranked alongside men willing to act. Tha t 
is a policy fitting not for an imperial city but for a subject 
City, which through this policy is enabled to live safely in 
slavery."39 
It is not war but Athens' quality as an inheritance that makes the 
city cohere around a sense of duress, a tyrranical shadow. There are two 
points here: firstly, the providence of Athens is something to which one 
succeeds and, secondly, it is by no means clear what Athens is. As has 
been seen, if it is a paradigm. it is not by that a single and ideal 
object. The issue exploited by Perikles in this second speech is that 
Athens has begun to feel like a single object; an object exerting 
terrible pressure onto what otherwise would be held as a variety of 
different interests. A few lines earlier Perikles had more closely 
detailed this sense of oppreSSion. Athens is not succeeded to in any 
tangible waYi its providence does not lie in its site, its buildings, its 
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concrete form. Athens is not even a place. Only the currency of Athens, 
or the current forebodings always associated with it, remains tangible. 
Here Perikles is forthright, Athens is built on the sea, it lives outside 
of itself or its constitution. It continues to live through the sea and 
through the shadows its political body hangs upon. 
\I You think that you are rulers simply over the allies. I shall 
demonstrate, however, that of the two elements available for 
men's use, land and sea, you have total ma.stery of the whole 
of the second ... No one neither the [Persian] king nor any 
other race ... can prevent you from sailing with the naval 
force at your disposal. This power is not the same as the use 
of your houses and lands, the loss of which you regard as a 
great blow. It is not reasonable to take that deprivation to 
heart: you should rather think of those possessions as a 
pleasure-garden or adornment of your wealth in contrast to 
your naval power ... those who become subject to others are 
apt to lose even what they had before. '.0 
The dominance of Athens depends upon relations sketched across the 
sea and trade-routes. Athens is that which is distinctive in every 
relation across the eastern Xeditteranean. Athens was a trading city 
with a fortified dock, the Piraeus, situated six miles outside Athens but 
connected to the city by double walls along the road leading to its 
displaced commercial heart. The issue here is commerce, not war. As 
Athens dominated the sea, so it maintained an interest in every venture 
across the world. In effect, what was provident in Athens were the 
increments gained through monopoliSing the sea routes. Every venture 
bore the stamp of Athens, every passage was to the credit of Athens and 
its every 'ally' was taxed in order that each might enjoy the rights of 
commerce. Athens, then, both dominated and profited from dissymmetrical 
relations throughout Greece and the world. It maintained its distinction, 
its edge, so lang as it elided its own sitej stretched over the fluid 
space of 'Greece' and beyond. Athens, at its height, was not a place but 
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a monopolistic relation, it was maintained so long as the relations 
between it and the world were repetitive, repeatedly emphasising a kind 
of interest, a desire, known as Athens41. 
This is where the Republic opens. Not in the forum or agora where 
Philosophy is traditionally plied but in the commercial forum outside 
Athens. The Republic - as its given title <EQliteia) emphasises - is 
concerned with the Political. In the platonic style it seeks to isolate 
the Political. In the Piraeus, the Political could only be appreciated in 
its absence. The City could not, above all, be 'of' the sea. Plato is 
insistant upon this issue; the Idea of the city, of the political, has 
meaning only in and through the Political sphere. Plato's argument is 
clearly with Perikles, the Political is of the city, not of the way a 
city is repeatedly emphasised in alien situations. More than this, 
however, the Republic is also a history of post-Periklean Athens; in 
fact, of Athens' later providence. Plato's history is a sequence of five 
stages. Two of these, that of Periklean Athens and its immediate 
successor, were known as Democracies. In his History Thucydides states 
that when Athens was overseen by Perikles it was known as a democracy, 
but was in truth rule by the foremost man42 . Plato's historical sequence 
is as follows: Aristocracy, which would be the height of Periklean rule; 
Tim ocra cy, the period succeeding Periklean rule and the time at which 
the Republic is set, although only in its final days; Oligarcby, the 
period commonly known as the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, rulers the 
Republic introduces as profiteers and business men; Democracy, which is 
the democracy responsible for the death of Socrates, Plata's mentor and 
chief interlocutor in the Republic. The Republic was, itself, written at 
some later time during this penultimate period. It is disinguished, 
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however. by its apocalyptical foreboding of a final time: TyrannyA3. At 
the time the Republic was written the walls around the Piraeus had been 
dismantled on the orders of a victorious Sparta44 • In consequence. the 
opening of the Republic, at a festival in the Piraeus to an alien moon 
goddess. is underscored by premonitions of Athens' later dereliction. 
Dereliction at the hands of the sea. which Plato hates with an open 
rabidity. In the LIDla a philosopher is asked to provide a blueprint for 
an ideal community. When he is told the community is to built by the sea 
he argues the sea drives people mad, destroying ever city that enjoy its 
debauching influence45 • Sparta never attempted to build a shipping 
empire like Athens'. That the Republic opens in the Piraeus is the more 
significant as the greater part of Athens is there, enjoying a festival 
to a Thracian moon goddess; in effect, beside themselves in their 
enjoyment of foreign and lunar influences. One of Socrates' indictments. 
as given in the Apology, is that he promoted gods foreign to the state. 
The Republic shows a time when strange gods were current. 
The Republic argues the final justification of the city depends upon 
a general willingness to think the idea of the City. The whole aim of 
the Republic is to elaborate this central and constitutional idea. Plato. 
more than anyone else, is the forefather of Totalitarian Rationalism, as 
despised by Hayek. Heidegger quotes from the Republic at the close of 
his Rectoral Address, and appeals to its view of education [~ideilJ) in 
his Plato's Doctrine Q1 Truth [19353. For Heidegger the importance of the 
Republic lies in its commitment to thinkingj to dwelling. Heidegger's is 
by no means a misreading of Plato. In Plato's Doctrine Q1 ~ 
Heidegger argues the model promoted by Plato could be taken as a value, 
a form to be emulated. Heidegger insists the history of metaphysics 
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begins with the evaluation of such models. Against this view Heidegger 
insists the lasting distinction of the Republic lies in its commitment 
to the terrors of the processes of formation, even to thinking the 
currents that come to mis- or mal- form such a necessity46 This echoes 
his earlier Rectoral A.d.~ which translates a line from the Republic 
as: "All that is great stands in the stonrl'47 
It is rarely noted the Republic is not anti-democratic, as such. It 
is, rather, opposed to the time in which the role of the city is 
constantly evaluated or reevaluated; a time which, for Athens, was 
democratic and implied free and discursive exchanges. As the Republic is 
written in a democracy and looks back to the first, or Periklean, 
Democracy, it is concerned with the ways in which a city might best be 
maintained rather than with how democracy might be deplored. What Plato, 
ideally, wishes to describe is the providence of Athens, as it is enjoyed 
politically by politically-minded citizens. He identifies the suffering of 
Athens with the way this providence is transmuted at each of the times 
leading to the current Athenian democracy (i.e.the one in which the 
Republic is written, nat the one in which it is set). This is elaborated 
in the Republic through the idea of inheritance, an inheritance forcing 
the issue of Politicsj as Thucydides said: "Your fathers secured this 
empire not by inheritance from others but by their own efforts ... You 
now possess the empire like a tyranny" 
The Republic begins with two fathers: Ariston and Kephalus. These 
twa characters are representative of different Athenian fates; i.e. the 
one with the virtues of an aristocrat, the ather with the virtues of a 
self-serving oligarch4B • Ariston, although highlighted in the book's 
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first sentence, is never seen: his prOVidence, although worthy to be held 
as a paradigm, is only so as it becomes provident. The other, Kephalus, 
is treated with restrained respect; Kephalus is thoroughly entrained in 
krematisamenoi, the art of business. When Kephalus leaves the scene of 
the dialogue, and goes down to the sea to make lunar sacrifices, only 
the sons are left; left to Socrates' influence. The theme of inheritance 
gains momentum as the Republic progresses. By the stage of (the final) 
Democracy the permutations of the relations between father and sons 
have wholly loosened, degenerated. Fathers have begun to dress like their 
sons, sons have begun to idly pursue any model that promises an instant 
profit. The issue is nothing other than wealth: capital. Kephalus, when 
asked about the source of his wealth describes the passages it went 
through before he succeeded to it: the fortune amassed by his 
grandfather dwindled under the care of his own father, his bequest to 
his sons - he hopes - will be a little more than he himself received 
<and he has three sons)~'. Filial ties have become speculative, aiming at 
the replication and augmentation of an estate. Plato argues providence is 
not to be enjoyed in the vagaries of its communication but in its 
essential, virtuous order: the order standing as the fundament and end 
of the city and of the citizens who enjoy political life. There is, in 
consequence, a significance to be found in Plato's work between the 
family estate and Death, as only a death could make the estate an issue. 
In fact. only a death could make the oikas an issue. A family. in the 
sense of a continuing and distinguished family, and its estate, was 
termed an oik~o. Of greater significance. the City itself was beginning 
to be described as an Dikos. as What Was held to be provident in the 
city came to be identified with the City-fathers. Plato's innovation here 
is to note that as the estate becomes an issue, a pressing concern. it 
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is an object of thought and debate; an idea. Plato is concerned by the 
urgency of the idea of the estate in both its elaboration and the 
commitment it enjoins. It is, above all, a forensic issue. The other 
charge laid against Socrates, perhaps the weightiest, was that he 
exerted an unhealthy influence on the city's children; that is, he 
displaced their natural fathers. Plato will argue that there is nothing 
unnatural in the substitution of Socrates' affections for those of the 
natural father. In a forensic dialogue with Socrates the sons of Athens 
can begin to express the basis of their filial commitment. In Plato's 
view this basis has an eternal, rather than a shifting, form. Above all, 
it has a Political form as any expression of the provident could only 
become an issue in a social discussion and no other social framework 
than that of the City will be considered. 
Plato's idealism, in the Republic, depends upon his insistance that 
the relation between generations should not be thought of in term of 
credit; i.e. of augmentation, of filial debt and future succession. Insofar 
as such relations are provident to the City, as a whole, the 
philosophical task is to elaborate the ideal form under which providence 
is understood as an issue for the City; i.e. as a variety of ideas 
relating to the one central idea of the integral political community. 
However, as the Ideal city remains remote the community is distinguished 
as much by its willingness to devote itself to the problem of the 
derelict state as to the mooted Ideal. The providence of the father, the 
perfect father or perfect statesman, is distinguished by a willingness 
to maintain the dereliction which accompanies his remoteness or his 
passing away. Plato, in sum, elaborates a devotion to dereliction, a city 
whose concrete form is dismantled by alien influences. It is this aspect 
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that later influences Heidegger; the anxieties associated with the 
speculative project, the symptoms (of dread or of embarrassment) that 
accompany philosophy in its difference from the vapidity of market-
inspired speculation. In both Heidegger and Plato, fears for the State, 
in its dereliction or distress, remains a question of commitment. 
However, this fear of dispersal is also articulated through trading 
relations and economic speculation. In fact, the fear for the State, in 
Depression, cannot be seperated from hydrophobia. The State, as an object 
of contention, is also a symptom of open rabidity; a fear of fluids. 
• • • • 
An obsession with dereliction, at the end of the dream of eternal riches, 
is the stuff of tragedy. When Creon reads the lesson of Sophocles' 
Antigone he states: 
"For any man who acts rightly within his household 
(oikeioisin) will also be seen to do his duty in the Ci ty.ltS 1 
when to have behaved 'rightly' is to have maintained a respect for the 
dereliction of the family, as to the state in the depths of its 
depression. Hegel's Phenomenology exploits this mood. His reading of 
AniUc.Il& insists the state is maintained in devotion to its dead; that 
is, the state lives by observing mourning. As was mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Derrida has a continuing appetite for Hegel's style of 
philosophy, devoting ~ to the sections of the Phenomenolcu dealing 
with Antigone and the various presentiments accompanying the forgotten 
importance of the family in a State's public life. The already quoted 
line from his essay ~ Diff9rance, where the home is analogised with the 
tomb, appears to be drawn from the dictionary Estienne. However, and by 
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this, it is 81so a reference to Antigone. Sophocles' tragedy is cited in 
support of the dictionary's equivalence. 
II Ny h011Je the eternal vigil of the grave." 
["0 kataskapbes (rock-hewn-sepulchre) oikesis (home) 
Cleipbrouros (of eternal vigilance)"]62 
Here, the relation between the home and tomb is poetic; it fits the 
one scene - Antigone being walled into a cave - whilst referring back to 
her fatal decision to keep vigil for her brother. The line works but is, 
after all, only one line in a single play. Why should it hold such an 
interest for either Estienne or Derrida? The dictionary raises an 
analogy between the home and tomb through Citing Antigone; in turn, the 
allusion is re-enforced through other conjunctions of the two ideas. As 
the relatiom between the home and death refers to the family estate and 
as this unremarkable conjunction is found in a variety of Greek texts, 
Estienne's choice of texts is significant; only texts promising a hint of 
mysticism are given, none where the conjunction refers merely to 
property inheritance. The Estienne entry ends with a reference to 
Diodorus Siculus63 and the LXX translation of liQclesiastes. In both 
cases the wording is close; respectively: 'aionion oilresis' and 'oikas 
aianos'; eternal home. Diodorus refers to actual Egyptian burial 
practices, describing the idea behind these burials (the preservation of 
life-in-death within a home that will last for eternity). The LXX 
ci tat ion is a translation of the hebrew 'Beth 01.31110': long home. Estienne 
seems to have wished to uncover a belief in eternal transcendence in the 
preservation of a finite body in a stable home. Further, as the 'long 
home' of Ecclesiastes, or its 'house of mourning', will be associated with 
the Church and its officers, this transcendent significance is attributed 
to the ecumenical community through its representation as the body of 
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the ecumenical church; a sort of life-within-death. Despite Fra Pacioli 
view that faith becomes a form of currency (a principle of universality, 
a necessary sense of credibility), perhaps the more faithful view would 
be to maintain the death that frames the relations between believers as 
a :Mystery; that is, the economy of death should learn to dwell upon a 
sense of the intractable. 
Estienne's co- option of antique imagery is exploited only as the 
various issues in the older works become analogous to the central issue, 
or the central mystery of christianity: Christ's death. The mystery of 
Christ's death becomes an impassible issue for thought but, nevertheless, 
an impossibility which weds believers to the mystery of communion and 
the espousal of faith. However, through the Arian heresy or through 
death's variety (Antigone's or Socrates', the King of Jerusalem's or 
Christ's, the father's or any of the faithful) the whole economy of death 
could be reversed. That is, it could be that death, in its variety I 
primarily gives significance to the family estate and family ties. A 
Nineteenth century history of Civilisation, La. c1ta ui1.q~ by Fustel de 
Coulanges, takes this second view; that a community lives without the 
appearance of cohesion as eacb of its aggregate households dwell 
exclusively on their own deaths. Fustel promotes the extreme view that a 
community does not live through social ties but in the divisions that 
different families set up between themselves through death. In brief, 
Fustel's thesis exploits the idea of the universal community made 
possible by Christianity, and exploits it through its destruction. The 
community he envisages is not joined by a single and over-arching 
'house', the church, but seperated by its individual houses: 
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II Let us first take the hearth: this altar is the symbol of the 
sedentary life ... the hearth takes possession of the earth, it 
stands out from the earth, it makes the earth its own, its 
property."64 
Here, Fustel insists on the relation between the hearth and tomb: 
"For the tomb the law was the same as for the hearth: it was 
no more permitted to unite two families in the same sepulchre 
than it was to unite two domestic hearths in a single house. 
It was equally impious to inter a corps outside the tomb of 
its family as to place in its tomb the body of a stranger. 
The domestic religion, in life as in death, seperated each 
family from all the others and gravely dispersed all 
appearances of com.unity."66 
Fustel's thesis that civilisation rests on the cult of ancestal tombs 
is largely indefensisible. It, nevertheless, has two notable defenders: 
Momigliano and Korriss6 • However, Komigliano and Korris are primarily 
interested in the way burial rites articulate hierarchies, differences 
and distinctions. In fact, they are interested in the semiological 
relations underlying the arrangement of burial sites. In Morris's case, 
in order to understand the life of ancient societies. In Komigl1ano's 
case, because of the relevance such a project holds for a history of the 
socialisation of capital. Neither attach any significance to Fustel's 
central claim, only his project. In the case of Athens, Fustel's thesis 
clearly falls apart. Burial occurred in municipal cemeteries, not in the 
home. Morris studies public burial sites, not private ones, he interprets 
the distribution of family sepulchres in a public space or, to put this 
another way, he interprets the public face of private relations. Fustel's 
mistake, as Korris suggests, lies in the common practice of placing 
signs on public highways as memorials. These were not tombs but did 
relate the familial estate to its outside through a very public sign of 
commmemoration. It is, again, a matter of the semiology of town 
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planning: not its 'grave dispersal' as Fustel would claim. The most 
detailed criticism of Fustel is S C Humphreyss7. Fustel's attempt to 
trace the dispersal of a community, in pursuit of his claim that 
dispersal represents the strength of ancient civilisation, is only 
significant as regards the way a community communicates. Humphreys 
argues the general practice of familial burial only occurred with the 
advent of the Greek Polis as an imper1al power. Thus, with an increase 
in wealth throughout society a practice restricted to the wealthy became 
a common feature of Greek life. In short, Humphreys argues familial 
burial is a social institution that obliquely expresses commonality 
within city. Humphreys point may be amplified, the relative wealth of 
the average Athenian, a wealth enjoyed through the monopolisation of 
trade routes, was not only expressed in large scale public works (the 
Athenian walls, its every edifice) but more significantly in the 
institutionalisation of burial as an oblique expression of the position 
enjoyed by Athens throughout the world. Burial practices are an echo or 
a shadow of the relations expressing Athens' current prominence. 
Despite the problems associated with his thesis Fustel succeeds in 
accentuating the feature of economics that obsessed Pound, or even 
Thucydidesi the sense of duress or tyranny to be associated with 
dereliction. The shadow, the providence, of the City weighs upon its 
members. The community lives in the shadow of dereliction; that 1s, the 
social sphere 1s exercised by its grave dispersal, its presentiment of 
destruction, its depreSSion. The significance attributed to death is 
nothing other than the fact that the City is known only in the 
elaboration of credit relations and, in consequence, 1s subject to the 
vagaries of the sea or the wars that might - at any time - shatter its 
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enjoyment of the monopolies perpetuating its claim to exist. Fustel 
claims there is no analogy between the home and death. they are 
identical; that is. insofar as the law is the same for each. they are 
virtually the same. Fustel supports this suggestion through a very 
doubtful footnote. attributed to Eustathius: 
"Tbis ... belief is related by Eustatbiu5, wbo says that the 
home is the end of tbe hearth ,lise 
This footnote would better suit Derrida's deconstruction of the 
objectivity of the 'end', elaborated throughout his ill E.ll..d...s. of !an. than 
the argument that the hearth has brought the presence of death into a 
home. As Derrida might say. the 'end' is one metaphor too many. The 
double meanings (admittedly, very different meanings but, nevertheles. 
analogous meanings) attached to the single term 'end' begins to exert a 
usuristic effect and, even, to wear away at the central issue ventured by 
Fustel. However. as Fustel finds no analogy between the thought of the 
home and death, so he detects a single and imperious sense of duty. A 
sense of duty which obliquely benefits the City in its derelict state. 
Which is to say, the dispersed community lives through the enjoyment of 
death and through its autistic dedication to mourning. This theme, the 
necessity underlying a sense of fatal dispersal. finds strong echoes in 
Heidegger. The way a sense of community is exacerbated by death. or its 
silence, calls for a certain resoluteness, not speculative solutions. 
Fustel's L4. ~ antique, more clearly an economic thesis than anything 
written by Heidegger, shares other similarities with Heidegger's work. 
The first chapter to the present work noted Heidegger's mistrust of 
analogies, metaphors and translations. Fustel's thesis is an attack on 
the view that wealth is the kind of substance that can be expressed 
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analogically: i.e. in differing commodities but especially in terms of 
differing values for labour. He insists work is not a value. In fact. he 
attacks the christianity - which here would be the christianity of Fra 
Pacioli - that holds the value of a person's labours could elaborate a 
meaningful concept of wealth within the world or a community. For 
Fustel, value is nothing if it is not immovable, intransigent, deathly: 
"Vealth is immovable. like the hearth and the tomb to which 
it is attached ."" 
For Fustel, whatever is of value maintains an appearance of 
disintegration whilst, in some strange or mystical way, being equal to 
the currents that threaten civilisation. Here, Fustel's polemical work is 
intended to meet a current problem. Humphreys provides a careful account 
of this problem; the dispersal and exchange of property and the 
speculative market surrounding it60 • Humphreys emphasises the anxieties 
associated with the status of property in Nineteenth century Paris. 
Pointing to Phillipe Aries L'homme deyant l.tl. 1IUJLt, which contains a 
lengthy account of a certain Girard's recommendation of burial on 
private property, Humphreys adduces some comments of Chateaubriand. 
Conservative opinion had been outraged by the desecration of burial 
sites during the Revolution. Chateaubriand, in the midst of this outrage, 
suggests the privatisation of death, with a consequent liberation of 
municipal cemeteries. This measure would change the face of Paris by 
stabilising property and ensuring a measure of community growthi 
families would be more inclined to maintain a home containing their 
ancestor's remains, whilst the space afforded by the closure of 
municipal cemeteries would grant Paris new, workable land. The question 
i6 the value of the land, and the work to which it i6 put. The creation 
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of dead spaces (more or less private spaces) would be balanced by the 
liberalisation of previously dead spaces (spaces enclosed by municipal 
cemeteries would be opened to the municipality). Competition over the 
value of land takes many forms. Whilst c01DlDunaires desecrate their own 
(i.e. public) sites, the forces of reaction attempt to consolidate the 
privacy of every site. In each case, a mood of anxious disarray 
surrounds the hopes or values pinned upon property and its creation. 
The fight over the basilica of the Sacred Heat at Montmartre is 
remembered as a fight aver the value of land. This struggle, which had 
begun when Fustel published his 1.4 Cite Ant.1q.J.i.e., took place between the 
left and right aver the power which lay consecrated in public spaces61 • 
Montmartre became an issue with the fall of Paris to the Prussians. A 
siege may be interpreted as one national force faCing another. With 
Montmartre it becomes clear the effect of war is to break the sense of 
trust a SOCiety places in its proper land. The homeland or city-scape is 
opened to bids as its value begins to differentiate different desires 
and different interest groups. Neither the left nor the right confronted 
this final possibility, the City is indefensible an its proper site. As 
Thucydides shows, the shadow of the community and fluidity of the sea 
are indissociablei the City has no terrestrial foundations. Fustel's 
attempt to staunch what could only come to be seen as a final nihilism 
- the City reduced to nothing - is predicated on the idea of immovable 
and intractable value. Property pr1vatised for ever. 
The positivist response to Fustel's thesis would be to note the 
changing view of public spaces and to construct the conditions for the 
possibility of this view of the City. Derrida has noted, through h1s 
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study of the analogy between the home and death, that death continues to 
have a forensic significance. Which is to say, the tomb is loud; it is an 
issue in the kinds of discussion Humphreys discovers in nineteenth 
century France or an issue in the sense that the familial estate was an 
issue for Plato, a political issue insofar as the Political was the only 
forum Plata recognised. Finally, however, it is an economic issue as the 
value of ~ourning, like Depression, continues to have an economic 
significance. Economic relations apparently pertain between analogous 
terms; i.e. analogous commodities or commodities which might, 1n 
principle, be regarded as analogous. The chains of apparently analogous 
terms will not be broken by identifying one terrible limit to any 
sequence, nor one singular or terrible form of dispersion. 
As the dispersal of economic relations continues to elaborate an 
economy, Derrida resists the idea of an absolute and deathly mystery 
transcending every economy. He does not seek to overcome the destructive 
or speculative currents that, it is suggested, could only end in the 
depressive inability to valorise any specific, or especially distinctive, 
term. An idea or sympathy might claim a special or essential distinction 
but this distinction will have been articulated by virtue of economic 
relations. Where it might be argued no analogy exists between the home 
and the tomb, because they are the same and demand an attitude equal to 
this awful fact, Derrida continues to aver an analogy is at work. This 
would, perhaps, be a metaphorical attempt to resalvage the City as the 
space of dispersalj i.e. the proper or habitual space of all dispersal. It 
is, frequently, a metaphorical attempt to turn the intractablli ty of 
elements within a mooted city-space into a limit against the outside 
world by insisting such elements are the responsibility of the city, of 
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its own finitude and, obliquely, of its eternal, transcendent dimension. 
This view exploits what it claims to respect (i.e. the dead), insofar as 
such elements maintain a strange or autistic communication in a wider 
discourse, or with the wider world. As Derrida continues to mount an 
analysis of signs, even mysterious or funereal signs, there is a positive 
element to his work62 • His insistance that silence is an issue, and one 
that remains to be exploited analogically, serves to highlight the 
positive effects of whatever is deemed unfathomable. He does not remain 
with the silence of the tomb, but the way such silences begin to sketch 
intra-social communication: albeit a communication gravely dispersed. 
Derrida, however, is not quite a positivist, he sketches an utter 
recasting of positivism. The possibilities ventured in every attempt to 
express the dereliction of a political sphere do not continue to imply 
an urban space, as Fustel insists. Such expressions, in their 
concentration or dispersal, could not provide the condition for the 
possibili ty of any or every city. There is no longer a necessary or 
predetermined condition equivalent to the city, or equivalent to the 
distress 'of' a city (even as the stable city or the derelict city are 
more or less analogous). That which is exercised by such effects is an 
economy and not a politics. Derrida does not simply promote an attempt 
to reterritorialise the Political space in the gaps between Fustelian 
homes (i.e. within their grave dispersal). Rather, he looks at what 
continues to be positive in these silences. This will not imply the 
construction of the possibility of another city but, rather, the 
deconstruction of the Political in the fluidity of economics. 
f • • f 
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On the conditions informing anti-trust 
The Lesson offered by either Heidegger or Pound, the form of a 
'Paideuma', smacks suspiciously of xenophobia. In articulating this 
suspicion, a certain distinction becomes criticali a farm reminiscent of 
xenophobia has been cast as two differing dispositions: Hydrophobia and 
Necrophiliai two similar affections, insofar as the Fascist vision of 
Politics indicates both, two differing states insofar as the Fascist 
Lesson is reopened through this distinction. What would it mean to be 
impressed by this difference? to feel a difference has been made? 
Derrida insists the distinction is worriesome. Where he insinuated a 
trace of 'Gehenna' into Heidegger's Lesson, it promised less a vision of 
utopia, than a place of suffering. It seems, in suspiCion, Derrida escapes 
Heidegger, only to discover a new source of disquiet. 
Twa paints can be made about Heidegger's lesson. Firstly, if his 
lesson had been taken to heart, it might have meant the end of 
democracy; to accept the farce of Heidegger's lesson would have been to 
settle an issue, to have finally made a decision. Secondly, if Heidegger's 
lesson continues to be worrying, the sense of worry closest to Heidegger 
has now evaporated. This new worry could nat presume upon the same kind 
of forum once receptive to Fascism. Both these points hint at lossj the 
presentiment of loss indicates J(ourning. It has been seen that Fascism 
is distinguished by an air of dereliction. The sense of mourning here, 
however, is irreducible to FaSCism. The issue of mourning, as it is 
raised here, is itself lost as Fascism exploits dereliction in the cause 
of Politics. J(ourning, here, 1s not attributable to the Political as it is 
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promoted in Fascism, nor could it owe its distinctiveness to any 
Political form as such. Mourning, here, is articulated through economics; 
it cannot be recouped under a political form. Thus, two further points 
can be made: firstly, to raise mourning, as a distinctive issue, is to 
mark a difference; secondly, to raise such an issue is to defer a 
decision upon the Political. This, double, work of difference and deferral 
is broached through Derrida's neologism 'differance'. I Differance' 
publicises effects at work in the economic space; across its old-and-
new-day. Primarily, however I 'dlfferance' publ1cises mourning as an issue. 
A sense of deferral, or adjournment, could mean a respite. If this were 
so, the sense of respite would seem to indicate the lesson had lost all 
its force. However, in 'differance', this continues to exercise an effect, 
a suspicion that the form of respite remains unsettled. 
Derrida's fear of 'depoliticisation' has already been noted. 
Depoliticisatlon is an effect of econo11Jics, even of the deconstruction of 
politics; picturesquely, the DClIIOi (articulating laws) have already 
deviated from any sense of the oikos (the home or what is habitually 
represented as the Political). Derrida's works are intended to draw 
attention to the punctuation and elisions at work in the deconstruction 
of politics; that is, to attend to the form of this deconstruction rather 
than simply enjoying the dream of fluidity. Above all, his work makes a 
difference; it raises an unregarded motif as an issue; a forensic issue. 
Thus far, the form of deconstruction has been given as an 'Ellipse'; in 
the following pages this form will be articulated through the term 
'Differance'. Primarily, through 'differance', the 'elliptical' will be 
stressed as a kind of symptomtic gap, a silence, a sense of Mourning. 
Xourning is a form of inhibition; an inability to act beyond a certain 
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point, a feeling that certain things remain unfathomable. It could be 
that a forensic Form of Government (a form of debating government, like 
democracy) is necessarily inhibited; certainly Heidegger or Pound bank 
upon a sense of inhibition as they exploit the intimation of the 
intractable for political ends. Here, mourning will not be taken to 
further a sense of Political closurei as it is raised, mourning will be 
exploited as an opening, not a closure. However, if mourning could be 
exploited, a sense of inhibition remains; mourning could never be wholly 
erased, nor recouped in a new venture. This is the problem: what does 
mourning offer as it opens onto a new vista but, also, as it remains 
radically dislocated from any sense of ease or profit upon this vista? 
Derrida's account of deconstruction is virtu1211y universal, or 
catholic; it centres upon the West, upon its genius and its perpetuation 
in the metaphysical writings which, following Heidegger, Derrida terms 
'Ontotbeology'. Derrida examines the systematic claims to universality 
promoted in ontotheology and the philosophies that. together. form a 
Western 'system' in its economYi as though a commitment to the West. as 
regards its universality. tended towards the elaboration of a peculiarly 
Western thought. in its oblique economy. For Derrida. any Western claim 
to dominance. by virtue of its universality. is already defused though 
the differences and deferrals at work in its various apologiesi l.e. by 
virtue of • differance' in its economy. The term differ12nce first appeared 
in Q1 Grammatolagy63. This work. as has been seen begins by referlng to 
economiCS. Q1 Grammatolagy's very last sentence speaks of the economy of 
differlJnce. Thus. the opening and the closIng of the book of 
'grammatology' are traversed by economics. The ostensible reason for the 
essay ~ dIff9rance is as a footnote to the earlier work. Derrida first 
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explains what happens through this neologism; i.e. the fact that there 
has been a substitution of one letter by an other. He says: 
HI reclJll then, and in lJ quite preliminary way, that this 
discrete graphic intervention, which neither primarily nor 
simply aims to shock the reader or grammarian, came to be 
formulated in the process of writing upon the question of 
writing. Thus and, as I would say, through the facts, it is 
found tha t this graphic difference (a instead of e), this 
marked difference between two apparently vocal notations, 
between two vowels, remains purely graphiC: it is read or it is 
written but cannot be heard. Ve cannot a t tend to it and we 
will see how it escapes the attentions of the understanding. It 
promotes itself as lJ mute mark, as a tacit monument, I would 
even say as a pyramid, thus imagining not only the form of the 
letter as it is impressed in upper-case or as it is 
capitalised, but by this the text of Hegel's 
Encyclopaedia where the body ot the sign is compared to an 
egyptian pyramid. Thus, the a at the difference is not heard; 
it dwells in silence, as secret and discrete as a tomb: o1kes1s. 
Let us thus mark, in our anticipation, this place, the familiar 
residence and familial estate where the econoay of death is 
produced through differlJnce. This stone is not flJr from 
announcing the death of a dynast, provided we know how to 
decipher its legend." CD 4 )6. 
Derrida, here, makes an issue of an analogy; i.e. an economic 
phenomena. It is, however, an analogy of a peculiar kind. The French 
pronunciation of 'difference' would not be able to distinguish the 
substitution of the letter 'a' for an 'e'. The analogy is sonic: a pun. In 
writing Derrida is able to emphasise differences, such as puns, lost to 
spoken language. If writing is capable of creating such a distinction, it 
could be argued that it is incapable of emphasising something yet more 
subtle, the moment when the vocal inflexion is lost. Derrida forcefully 
argues this is nat the case. In the instance of a pun, its written form 
not only indicates the difference the pun passes over, but also the loss 
of the pun. In writing, the pun, or the voice of the pun, 16 lnslstantly 
deferred whilst the difference upon which the pun turns is emphas ieed. 
That is, both difference and deferral become an issue. Thi6 i6 the 
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moment at which Derrida's exploitation of writing gains force, the 
difference will have been needed before the pun works, just as the 
moment of deferrment is needed before the vocally similar words slide 
perfectly over each other. Writing, despite its self-effacement, its 
inhibitions, gains a certain piquancy from the loss of the vocal 
inflexion. It produces an effect alien to the voice. The lesson here is 
that writing introduces a new, possibly earlier, meaning into the voice. 
Or does so when differance is precociously raised as an issue. 
The rebuttal will always be: How serious are puns? How serious is a 
mark introducing the moment of punning without being able to effect the 
pun? A pun is, after all, somewhat indifferent to meaning; the mark 
introducing the possibility of indifference whilst, yet, deferring it may 
seem insidious. A waste perhaps, which - in effect - it is, writing 
emphasises its modesty, its inability to capitalise upon the effects it 
produces. Like mourning, writing produces an additional and only 
apparently indifferent effect from the loss of its objective; l.e. here, 
the meaningful, there, the State. In I'.hi.te. Iythology Derrida promotes a 
pun upon 'ontology' and 'anthology', a good pun in French66 • In the 
instances Derrida choO-ses to emphasise writing destroys philosophy -
and everything Heidegger would hold dear - when it introduces the 
possibility that an anthology is indistinguishable from a book of 
ontology. A moment as indifferent to the concentration implied by an 
ontology as to the dispersed distribution implied by an anthology. 
However, writing also produces an effect in excess of the destruction of 
philosophy, of the fear that philosophy might be destroyed, or the belief 
philosophy must be defended in its essential structure. 
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In ~ democratie ajQurnee Derrida insists it is no longer a question 
of concentration or dispersal; it is, rather, a question of 
multilateralism and reciprocitYi and of a formal awareness that protects 
reciprocity, This sense of the reciprocal is engendered through the term 
differance, ~ diff8rance begins with the line: 
"I will speak, then, of a letter, 
Of the first letter, if the alphabet LJnd the greLJter part of 
the speculations ventured through it must be believed.""" 
Here, Derrida highlights both the alphabet and the expressions 
ventured wherever this system holds sway. In accentuating its leading 
letter, he emphasises an order of understanding, a system that enables 
intelligibility. This opening shot, both at order and speculation, would 
reflect upon Hegel's philosophy. Derrida follows this allusion to the 
alphabet with a remark upon the pyramids, apparently rferring to the 
hierarchical structure attributed to the dialectic in ill ill uc1. t.l:w. 
Pyramid. Derrida, in short, analogises from one system of intelligibility 
(the alphabet) to another (Hegel's). He does this through the 'LJ' of 
differance: the first or foremost letter, the letter which resembles a 
tomb or an hierarchy. It is, nevertheless, only an analogy, Hegel never 
said a letter, any letter, resembles the pyramids. He simply states: 
"the pyramids although astonishing in themselves LJre just 
simple crystLJls, shells enclosing LJ kernLJ1, LJ dep1Jrted spirit, 
and serve to preserve its enduring body LJnd form."57 
Hegel, as is usual in his system, finds a current use for the 
archaic 'significance' of the pyramid. A use that, in Derrida's work, will 
be taken to intimate or sYlIIptomise something other than Hegel's system 
of recoupment-, When Hegel comments upon Egypt and the value of letters, 
his remarks actually concern hieroglyphS: 
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• hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb 
writing."68 
Hegel's claim is that writing cannot depend purely upon its 
graphicity, the element Derrida particularly emphasises. Through 
'differlJnce' Derrida looks at the introduction of silence into language, 
desp1 te Hegel's claim that "intelligence expresses itself immedilJ tely and 
unconditionally by speaking'69. Derrida wonders how silence might become 
obvious, or how intelligence might become effective through the deaf or 
the dumb. In La. differance such silences are not attributable to a 
predetermined dependancy upon the alphabetical system of writing but to 
the way this system, in its economy, begins to express other issues in 
silence. Here, Derrida's emphasis upon the breath of the vowel begins to 
intimate those persons or peoples who enjoy the stifling quality of an 
unbreathed Betagami like the semitic races, in their diversity. Thus, in 
silence, Derrida emphasises the moments when Hegel's speculative 
manouevres also draws attention to other elements, differing symptoms. 
These symptoms would supplement Hegel's eurocentric view of the alphabet 
and, by extension, the providence of Greek philosophy. For Derrida, this 
is not a way of capitalising upon a reading of Hegel. Rather, and in the 
places where the economic virtue of promoting different analogies holds 
sway, Derrlda begins to detect ways in which different passions or 
sympathies might be distinguished. Which is to say, differences might 
emerge where only speculative equivalences <similar silences, similar 
systems) had been evident. Derrida terms this emergence of difference 
'clJtachresis'j i.e. a more or less violent publ1c1sation or exploitation 
of difference7o • It is not, however I the violence that enthralls him but 
the possibility of reciprocity, even a law of reciprocity, that emerges 
through such effects. Which is to say, a new law of communication 
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emerging out of the deconstruction of the West. This 'lawful' effect will 
be discussed, below, through comparing a recent quotation from Derrida 
with a passage from Hegel upon economics, war and the State: 
" 'deconstructions', which I prefer to speak of in the plural, 
has certainly never named a project, a method or a system. 
Above all, not a philosophical systell. In short, and by 
metonymy, it is one of the possible names designating the 
awareness of a certain dislocation within contexts that are 
already very determined. A dislocation which, in its effects, 
regularly recuTSj which, in its passing, comes to pass or fails 
to, and does so everywhere there is something rather than 
nothing. Certainly, and for example, in that which is 
classically termed the texts of CllJssical philosophy, but also 
in the whole 'text' in the general sense of the word I have 
attempted to justify; which is to say, simply in experience, in 
the social 'reality': historically, economiclJlly, technically, 
militarily etc. The event called the Gulf (War) [du Golfe), for 
example, is a spectacularly powerful and tragic condenslJtion of 
these deconstructions."71 
Derrida, here, can be seen to insist upon a kind of positivism 
against any evocation of nihilism ('everywhere there is something rather 
than nothing') and to insist upon the empiricity of his work <'simply in 
experience'). In fact, he is concerned with the experience of disparate 
relations, syntheses or artifices that, here, have been termed 'economics' 
and, above, Derrida terms the 'social reality'. In the last two sentences 
Derrida, admittedly, adduces more effects to 'deconstruct ions' than 
simply the economic. However, the fact that even the term 
'deconstructions' could only be emphasised by metonymy indicates that 
every experience (historical, economical, technical, military) is 
articulated by virtue of economic relations. Which is to say, the 
economic continues to flow, even around the violent and condensed 
disruption termed - by metonymy, in short or for economy the Gulf. 
The, above, passage continues by proposing a sense of the Law, of 
international law. This is particularly reminiscent of the current SOCial 
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Reality; i.e. of War and the ubiquitous hope for a New World Order. The 
conditions for the possibility of perpetual peace were championed by 
Kant72. Hegel is scathing about any hope of perpetual peace, as he is of 
those that fail to discern the significance of War in the way it 
exercises a community. In a passage that begins in the style of 
Ecclesiastes, he affirms the effect of War . 
.. Var is the state of affairs which deals in earnest with the 
vanity of temporal goods and concerns - a vanity at other 
times a common theme of edifying sermonizing. This is what 
makes it the moment in which the ideality of the particular 
attains its right and is actualized. Var has the higher 
significance that by its agency, as I have remarked elsewhere, 
'the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their 
indifference to the stabilization of finite institution; just as 
the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness 
which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also 
corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let 
alone 'perpetual' peace.' This, however, is said to be only a 
phllosophic idea, or, to use another common expression, a 
'justifation of Providence', and it is maintained that actual 
wars require some other justification."73 
Hegel claims war unsettles the vain, or light, enjoyment of goods; 
i.e. of chattels and commodities. )(ore surprisingly, he claims that war 
has no higher - and, hence, requires no other - justification than this 
distinctive property. Whilst it might be held that the role of war is to 
preserve the Idea - as opposed to the current appearance - of a State, 
it is the way War upsets everyday commerce that represents its final 
role. Certainly, in his next breath, Hegel retreats to the view that: 
·successful wars have checked domestic unrest and consolidated the power 
of the state lJt hom~'. This political justification, however, bears only 
an accidental relation to his primary insighti Vars break up the 
repetitious forms that give the appearance of comfort, of vanity, of 
business being taken too lightly. He claims the apparent inertia of 
fluids produces dream6 of stability, of the perpetual or the eternal. 
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Hegel never ceased to rail against the theory of inertia. His claim being 
that inertia is not primarily a property of nature but a provisional 
suggestion of Kind7~. Hegel identifies inertia as the projection of 
mental habits, and of the habitual and deathly inertia of those minds as 
yet uncommitted to their highest form and, thus, alienated from 
themselves as from Bature. The virtue of War, in short, is to inhibit the 
fluidity of the sea and bring to the enjoyment of goods a proper sense 
of gravity, the property commerce habitually forgets. Hegel might retreat 
to the idea that a definite State is buttressed through armed conflict. 
However, the distinction of the above analysis lies in his remarks upon 
the way economic fluidity is articulated through warfare, and this is 
the only justification war requires. 
Derrida is entranced by effects of catachresis in the apparent, or 
vain, enjoyment of analogous commodities and their currency. He does not, 
however, affirm the violence of Warj i.e. its pure violence or 
overwhelming violence. Hegel's account of war suggests war is justifiable 
only as a differential articulation of economics. Which is to say, as a 
F~ of articulation, it is a question of the Law rather than of War as 
a violent consummation of nihilism. It has been seen that monopolisation 
depends upon dyssemmtrical relations. Where various ventures are 
possible, the chiefmost possibility 1s taken to be the repetition of the 
same type of experience over and overj for instance, the repetition of 
Fra Pacil1o's catholic vision, or the imperial power of Athens as the 
major issue or interest in every relation across the world. In the 
disruption of such monopolies, Derrida identifies Law where others have 
accentuated War. Here, what is formal, or lawful, is the communicated 
experience of the repetition of differences or of disruptions (even 
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modesties, inhibitions, dlfferances) rather than any attempt to promote 
the repetition of the same; i.e. the monotonous or the hegemonic. Finally, 
as it not a question of the eternal repetition of the Ideal of perpetual 
peace, nor of the perpetuation of definite states, it is - neither - a 
question of jettisoning the hope of law; specifically, inter-national law. 
It is a formal problem, the formal communication of the repetition of 
difference rather than the repetition of the same. For Derrida, it 
remains a formal problem; one distinguished through its infinite and 
exhausting character. A question of international law as the way in 
which all 'deconstructions', in general. become formally articulated (if 
silently or in discretion). as they become a part of general experience: 
.. The event called the Gulf, for example, is a spectacularly 
powerful and tragic condensation of these deconstructions. The 
cloven genealogy of all the structures and all the foundations 
of which I have spoken tremble in this conflagrl!Jtion, this 
upheaval: The Vest and the history of philosophy which binds 
it, on the one side, to several grel!Jt and irreconcilable 
monotheisIDs (whatever one says) as, on the other, to natural 
languages and national sympathies, to the idea of democracy 
l!Jnd to the theologico-political; but finally, to the infinite 
progress of an idea of international law, the limits of which 
appear IDore clearly than ever. Not simply because of those who 
represent them or irrationally exploit them to the profit, 
alwl!JYs, of determined hegemonies l!Jnd thus only inl!Jdequately 
approach the infinite, but also because of what is founded (and 
through being limited) upon the concepts of modern european 
philosophy (nation, State, deJ11oorl!Jcy, democratic relations 
between states, whether these latter are democratic or not, 
etc.)1I7a 
In this analysis of the Gulf war (still current at the time of 
speaking) Derrida reaffirms the forensic quality of the Gulf qua 
upheaval. Which is to say, he reaffirms the ties which bespeak intra-
national communication. democracy and the law rather than the so-called 
'irrational' aspects; i.e. the affirmation of the laws failure. For 
Derrida, it could only be a kind of law, a kind of general enabling of 
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communication, that articulates the problem termed the Gulf; even if it 
is a law observed only in the breach. The irrational view would simply 
work to the benefit of hegemonies; i.e. the kind of monopolistic effect 
that perpetuates the same sympathies, the same ties, the same blocs in 
every dispute. In sum, Derrida refuses to allow the 'depoliticising' 
tendencies of 'deconstructions' to remain, as he refuses to allow such 
deconstructions to remain unarticulated, mare or less at ease in silence. 
The problem of accentuating the extent and variety of non-symmetrical 
relations, rather than allowing any single such occurence to gather 
force as a mooted world-view, is denoted by the term 'infinity'. It is, 
as can be noted from the above passage, an infinity which fails 
("tbrougb being limited'), which passes over its failures, or which 
communicates in eliding failure. Derrida spake, above, of "c2 certc2in 
dislocc2tion wbicb, in its effects, regulc2rly recurs; which in its pc2ssing. 
comes to pc2ss or fails to." To read the infinite ways each recurrence 
might be differentiated is seen to be formal rather than war-like. It 
could be said, Derrida replaces the even repetition of a marching beat 
with the uneven tempo of jazz drumming. In any case, he argues it is a 
question of the Law and its articulation rather than War and its 
inexorable passage. He has, in short, understood war in a different way, 
in a weaker way, a way he understands - insofar as in its effects it 
continues to be communicative - as the slips and beats of a Law 
existing in and throughout any national arena. It can now be seen this 
law is perpetually troubled, a law which is never quite the same. 
However, as this law is a weaker simulation of war, in the sense that it 
promotes debate rather than conflict, this weakness becomes a strength. 
In its every nuance, the law remains differentially compelling, those who 
ignore it could only facilitate the enjoyment of hegemonic pleasures. 
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.. These violent deconstructions are current, they hlJppen (ITa 
arrive), without waiting for what has been achieved in the 
philosophico-theoretical analyses I have come to evoke in a 
word: these latter are necesslJry but infinite lJnd the relJding 
such fracturings make possible will never be lJble to drop down 
over the event: they simply intervene there, they are inscribed 
tbere."76 
In this last quotation Derrida again promotes the piquancy of 
writing. It is a piquancy which inscribes or intervenes in the violence 
of any conflagration. Such interventions continue to broach the kind of 
secret communication ignored in the violent passage of the 'current', 
which never waits (attendre). In such passages, and in the violence of 
such a passage, writing is necessary to the extent 1 t articulates that 
which has happened. Which 1s to say, writing inscribes the ways in 
which the current has passed, or become past. It 1s in this respect that 
writing resembles the work of mourning. Xourning is, traditionally, 
represented as a disposition devoted to the derelict and inhibited or 
repressed rather than the potentially stimulating: the open chance, the 
current venture. With the phrase, '~a arrive' Derrida uses the French 
term for the unconscious: the id. Rather than regarding )(ourning as 
inhibited as regards the conscious or intelligible and stultified by a 
devotion to inarticulable or unconscious desires, Derrida accentuates the 
way in which unconscionable desires might be articulated i raised as 
issues or as symptoms. Here, the work of mourning, like writing, has 
begun to communicate different symptoms as the objects of forensic 
analysis, but in such a way as to disrupt or subvert the indifference 
that identifies themj or identifies them as, in some way, analogous (like 
currency). Xourning Is differentially compelling insofar as it is 
symptomatic of varying currents and inscribes these symptoms with a 
peculiar, forensic significance. In short, neither writing nor mourning 
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represent the essentially inhibited (as the Political must represent the 
essentially inhibited, in order to represent an internal limit). For 
Derrida, the current passion for destruction betrays a flicker of 
modesty every time it is represented, communicated or differentiated. 
Inscriptions publ1cised as effects of mourning break the 
indifference of economics; in its currents or in its currency. Where the 
property of being analogous, 
commodity, might come to 
which is the virtue of any economic 
underwrite monopolies, the forensic 
communication of mourning introduces effects which disrupt this general 
inertia, or the enjoyment of this inertia. This property of mourning is 
similar to the one Hegel ascribes to warfarej a grave articulation of 
whatever has been idly promoted as the same. As has been seen, war for 
Hegel is war between states. Its end is the integrity of a Political 
whole. However, war, which 1s a disruption and articulation of 
economics, cannot then be made into a recoupment of the State. The work 
of mourning inscribes the passing of states. Whilst it remains forensic. 
its forum could not come to be represented as a Political whole, nor 
have a significance only in relation to local precepts. As mourning 
remains differentially compelling, 1 t cannot be resettled locally i it 
could only fail to represent the same locale, even as it JIIakes this 
failure an issue for forensics. 
The representation of the law through the Fascio was designed to 
denote the way differences might be maintained by the same structure. 
This was seen in the work of Ezra Pound and, by extension, in the 'form' 
or 'plJideia' promoted by Heidegger. As has been noted, LA. difUrance 
explo1ts the term faisceauj sheaf. This insinuation of a term similar to 
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'fascia' could, by analogy, be taken to invoke the kind of structure 
vaunted by the Italian Fascists or German Nazis. It might be argued that 
the term ventured, here, is nothing other than the form proposed by 
various apologists of totalitarianism. This would, in a very certain 
sense, be an illegitimate accusation. Certainly, through this translation, 
as through his promotion of wri ting, Derrida moves from one 
representation of the law to another. However, through this move, there 
is no sense that the law 'of' the State is recouped. 'Which is to say, 
from a representation of the law's authority Derrida moves, through 
translation, into a space where the integrity of the fascia begins to 
unfold. In short, he treats the form or the authority 'of' the law with 
suspicion and has done so by virtue of another kind of law i a law of 
suspicion. In moving from the presence of authority (re-presented by a 
sceptre: fascio) to a kind of writing which negotiates with author! ty, in 
suspicion, Derrida promotes a form of law which is not given as such 
but, in general, remarks upon 'a certain dislocation'. Here, through his 
championing of writing, Derrida again suggests Rousseau but, as ever, to 
the unfolding of Rousseau's popular contracts in an arena which cannot 
be identified with the State, with the State's authority, or with a 
predetermined form of government77 . 
Further on in La.. diff9rance, Derrida asks how Heidegger has sealed 
the providence of difference (here, to lrhreon). Here, he draws his 
audience's attention not simply to writing but to the seal which 
represents the closure of the sheaf; l.e. its legal import7e. This 
strategy is designed to replicate the closure of forensic discussion 
under the jurisdiction of a Court. Derrida, again, simulates the kinds of 
expression indicating a closure, a sense of final commitment, but 
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continuess to promote other and different expressions at the end of any 
such closure; i.e. at the bankruptcy of any final expression of 
commitment. As always, this is an economic effect. The effect which 
allows the 'reserve' to be metaphorically represented as a place, a 
site, a political institution. Such a 'reserve', in its simulation, rather 
denotes suspicion. This effect, as has been stressed, continues to be a 
forensic problem but not one identified with a specific forum or the 
authority it represents. The way of writing does not constitutionally 
preserve any sense of a final objective, it weakens such commitments. As 
the pol! tical significance of war is not the preservation of terri tory 
but the breaking up - articulation - of different regions, so writing 
continues to frame the way regions are broken, reopened, passed over or 
continue to communicate. It is weaker than whatever power might be 
represented in war, but is insistantly (even irredeemably) forensic in 
the way it continues to record such effects. After writing, or any effect 
raised as a forensic issue (either the trace of writing or the 
symptomatic trace of mourning), the differences current around regional 
or colloquial voices will never be identified with anyone region 
claiming political integrity. This, for Derrida, is the infinite progress 
of the idea of international law i a progress he records through the 
skips or elisions apparent in its formal scoring. 
It is, above all, a recognisable effect, a recorded effect which 
becomes an issue only in its forensic appreCiation. Modern states are 
based on anti-trust lawsj both internally and in the relations passing 
through each. Here, in an ethos of anti-trust, suspicion becomes 
generally intelligiblej l.e. does not imply a loaded or predetermined 
position (a reserve) but, rather, in its suspicions (reservations) allows 
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commerce to continue. The revolutions that formed the modern state come 
to be elided in this perpetual breaking of trusts, of monopolies or 
idealised recipients of credit. In a sense, the revolutions that formed 
modern government never happened because no Popular WUI, in the sense 
of a definite populace, could ever enjoy a definite space consecrated as 
their own. As regards the revolution, it happens (~a arrive). but all 
that is enjoyed through its memory is the differential desires of an 
economYi an economy always recurring, and recurring differently in its 
every passage. What Derrida has came to highlight is a certain formal or 
legal providencei monopolistic dynasties or monopolising tyrannies can 
be read otherwise, can lawfully be read otherwise. The 'law' does not 
determine the property or the rights of a certain nationality or 
national sympathy, rather the law is that which enables the 
communication of different sympathies and alternative positions. Thus, 
the memory of the revolution, the faint memory of a revolution cast in 
laws that dissipate its popular image, has come to suggest a new idea of 
freedomi i.e. the idea of freedom as making a difference, through 
expressing a reservation. The conclusion addresses the tradition with 
which this idea may be associated. 
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Conclusion: An inside ",here 'We' are? An Apology for the We6f? 
Iha linda 01 ~ uses one word for the First World, Economics, or rather, 
its Hellenic root: Oitoncmia. The preceding thesis has elaborated this 
difference; the difference between an object of political commitment 
the oikos, or the home of a unified people - and the discourse 
elaborating this commitment otherwise: fluidly, economically or in 
passing. Economics is a detour, an invisible hand writing the text of a 
politics without a proper, familiar end. It would seem, then, the concept 
of the Political ought now to be consigned to the past of Economics. 
This would imply the detour through economics has a history; a moment 
at which it becomes obvious the Political has neither the constancy nor 
universality to be treated as a conscienable goal and, hence, must be 
constructed through the ruse of economics. Whilst there is neither an 
'origin' nor a 'prehistory' to economics, this thesis has suggested a 
possible 'history of economics' through marking the closure of Politics 
at different times. The history of economics is 'elliptical' insofar as 
the State lies forgotten in every opening into economics. 
The power of any 'Political' unit is never, then, an internal matter 
but the result of external relations. Such relations, im11Janent only to 
economics, emphasise the continuation of an idea only as a symptom of a 
monopolistiC power, not a Political project; such ideas, for instance, as 
Athens or the Church. In the Second chapter, it was seen how depression 
- the failure of business - might be represented as a means to re-order 
economic phenomena under a Political formi hence, the analogy between 
the gallows of depression and the shadow of fluidity. A discourse taking 
Politics as its end - its object or rationale - might be distinguished 
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by: (1) an obsession with mourning and the remoteness of the objects 
closest to its heart, and (11) an inability to close its account or to 
settle upon a theme because, as a political discourse, it remains fixated 
upon relations lying outside its vaunted terms; the highest of which 
would be the Body Politick and its idealised integrity. Politics, wrapped 
in the shadow of Depression, remains all at sea. 
This would seem to be the theme of ~ ~ 01 MAn. There, Derrida 
characterises philosophy as an apology for the metaphysics of Presence; 
i.e. for a transcendent ethos characterised by stability and integrity. 
His brief account of the "llJnguage of the Vest", argues its philosophy 
stays this ethical idea only in dereliction; its Oikonomia now a 
graveyard of hope [EX 161). Iha Enda c! ~ ends with the question -But 
who. we?' [EM 1641j like Fra Pacioli's businessmen, it seems 'we' are 
always in a great deal of mental trouble. As the Foreword suggested, we 
already understand depression. suffering from our awareness as though 
this were the result of providence; of an original Hellenic fate (' to 
threon') or of mercenary expedience <khremlJtisenoi). Philosophy enjoys 
an obsession with dereliction as it emphasises dereliction at every 
turn. If it is admitted that economics could never elaborate a closed, 
stable realm, is it a matter of fate or expediency that ''We' who enjoy 
its benefits are neither comfortable nor secure? In this turn, or through 
this detour, is it possible to say anything other than a PoliticlJl ethics 
is 1I1ore or less similar to c!I 1I1ournful demeanour? In effect, that ''We' 
remain locked within a problem that, if never the same, retains a 
depressing sense of eXigency? A quotation from Den'ida's Ellipsis, noted 
in the Second chapter, suggested the idea of an 'inside', an inner-limit 
to every problem, continues to exert an imperious effect: 
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-And yet did we not know that the closure of the book was not 
a simple limit amongst others? And that only in the book. 
coming back to it unceasingly, drawing all our resources from 
it could we indefinitely designate the writing beyond the 
book." 
Which is to say, the sense of 'our' ethos depends upon the inner-
limit of the 'book' (of its contents or its ethical content) as upon a 
reserve or a capital-reserve. This thesis, however, has insisted that the 
difference between the inside and outside of the 'book' is a difference 
in the 'text'; i.e. is immanent only to external relations. In the Third 
chapter Derrida was seen to state that 'text' is, finally, another term 
for the "social realitj'. Derrida might resemble those philosophers 
intent on remaining within the confines of a stable Political form but 
cannot be said to haunt an 'inside where we are'. Rather, he haunts the 
(outer) edge of a virtual inner-limit; a limit articulated by virtue of 
economic processes. Whilst he might resemble more traditional thinkers, 
his dissemblance is distinctive in other ways 1. For Derrida, the 
'reserve' is not an essential fall-back position but a trace of doubt, a 
question mark. If this suspicion is raised at the moment the difference 
between the inside and the outside of a State becomes an issue. it will 
not finally be a question of the seemly or unseemly, of the true coin of 
State or its counterfeit. Everything, here, depends upon artifice. 
This thesis assiduously exploited the term 'forensics'j referring to 
a closed Political forum and an open market. The term was designed to 
broach these questions: "Where is democracy without reciprocity?" Where? 
Where might one make a public use of reason? lot within a determined 
forum. If Derrida focuses upon the West, he does not attempt to justify 
its integrity. When ill Ends. c1 Xu speaks of this 'inside'. it states: 
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"A radical trembling can only come from outside."2 
If Derrlda accentuates the irredeemably oblique character of 
economics, why does he continue to insist upon an inside? If he no 
longer haunts a carefully demarcated forum, why does he resist 
abandoning this nebulous inner-limit? This thesis has, at best, indicated 
why Derrida's work should be taken seriously as an economics; as a 
rigorous account of what is at stake in Classical pol1tical-econo]Jlics. 
Here, classical economics has been understood as an attempt to establish 
an ethos like that of the older Polis. Perhaps, speculatively, a ruse 
designed to recoup a forgotten ideal. Rather than constructing the 
conditions for the possibility of the Political, Derrida's discourse is 
deconstructive. This discourse has been linked to neo-classicism, with 
the emphasis upon the lew <althought, here, there were problems; Derrida 
is suspicious of novelties, of accelerating cycles of hype). 
Deconstruction does not return to bolster a definite position. With such 
ideas as the 'strategiC bet', Derrida clearly has no designs upon a 
position offering a broad or wide appeal; i.e. with the appearance of a 
popular ethics. In fact, he affirms the way in which a monopoly 
position, a more or less stable or generally enjoyed pOSition, might be 
subject to elisions or to tre111blings. As has been seen, it is as much a 
virtue of the West as a cause for mourning that certain positions fail. 
The term neo-classicism came some way towards describing Derrida's 
resistance to abandoning a seemingly Political inner-limit. The term 
helped to express Derrida's dual sense of 'reserve'; both an ideal that 
calls for re-presentation and an object of suspicion, an object drawing 
attention to differences rather than uniformity. From the First chapter 
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it was seen that the origin or foundations of government need not be 
subject to approval. Government might, in fact, be treated with open 
suspicion, by virtue of its artificiality or the fact it 1s articulated 
through stranger, more elliptical relations than had been supposed. The 
Second chapter argued the break with Classicism, the distinction of 
Modernism, need not be taken as read. The Classical optimism that a 
stable ethos is always on the horizon was treated with utter suspicion 
by various Modernists. Through deconstruction, it was found that 
Modernism continued to negotiate with Classical doctrines, in economics 
or philosophy, and did so across the break established as the basis of 
the one's suspicions or the other's Shortcomings. The third Chapter saw 
that intra-national relations need not depend upon an all encompassing 
faith; there continues to be ways to negotiate in an atmosphere of 
general, even international, dischordancy. Indeed, it was argued that 
with the ascendancy of an ethos valuing anti-trust laws and the 
inhibition of monopolies, there is a greater virtue in emphasising the 
fractitious dissemination of relations than their regular and stately 
continuation. It has become the virtue of economics to crack the face of 
monopolistic relations. The world market no longer dances to the same 
tune but to a multiplicity of rhythms offering different appeals. 
To accentuate this virtue already implies an ethical dimension; 
another story. As will be seen, Derrida speaks of his fears for 
liberalism. Hayek, a self-proclaimed liberal, identifies liberalism with 
anti-rationalism <Hayek p. 337) . Here, Hayek is not referring to 
irratioDal1slI but to an attitude that remains alien to the rationalist, 
constructivist pretensions of Franco-German philosophy. Derrida, as has 
been seen, constantly strives to read Hegells dialectic otherwise. It 
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might be thought that, schooled in French philosophy, he remains closer 
to such prejudices than Hayek. Certainly, he sems to worry more. However, 
if constructivist pretensions continue to exert a power, they could not 
do so as Political projects. Derrida recognises their force as an 
economic force, a monopolising power, when he states: 
N Kiscon s trued , treated lightly, Hegelianism only extends its 
historical domination, finally unfolding its immense 
enveloping resources without obstacl€!'3 
This explains Derrida's emphasis upon the West and its philosophy. 
The West is not a cohesive political group and could only dissemble such 
a group. The 'West' is agonistic, articulated by virtue of a variety of 
competing affections. It could never retain a stable providence in every 
instance, nor ever suffer as a single ethos. The question, then, is two-
fold: is it a blessing of the West that, far from representing a distinct 
set of sympathies, it is elaborated through the deconstruction of 
relations remaining alien to any vaunted position'? Or, is it to 'our' 
shame that something like the West remains dominant throughout every 
deconstructioni i.e. that the West retains the power of a monopoly 
position? !he ~ c1 ian broaches this problem: the idea that the West 
is not continuous, its clutches remain uncertain. In every instance, the 
fragility of the West and the insistancy of its domination ls to the 
fore. The inner-limit to Derrlda's discourse is not that of an ethos 
secure within its own precincts. It ls, rather, a question of power; of 
what it means to be more or less weak, or powerful, through every 
deconstruction. The West is either fractured by strong suspicions, or 
strong insofar as it sustains only weak suspicions. It is not, however, a 
question of concentration or dispersali of reconvening upon the West's 
more or less weakened state or exploiting the weaknesses in an 
197 
conclusion econoaics of depression 
otherwise strong state. This inner-limit, rather, reflects upon the 
suspicions between relative strengths and weaknesses. If Derrida returns 
'unceasingl~ to this inner-limit, it is because the possibility of 
reciprocity is endangered here; the virtues of the West might be 
exploited in favour of new hegemonies, or ignored despite the western 
weakness for allowing monopolies to extend their domination without any 
sense of limit. Certainly, Derrida provides an apologism for Western, 
liberal democracy. He does so, however, by highlighting power relations 
and the possibility of reciprocity. The inner-limit to his debate is a 
question of deconstruction and of dominance. 
In sum, Derrida does not act as an apologist 'of' the West in its 
nature or its integrity. He identifies an inner-limit to western 
discoursesj to their power and their weaknesses and to the way the issue 
of the more or less compelling is always under suspicion, in the course 
of deconstructions. It is difficult to speak of Derrida, 
straightforwardly, as a neo-clasSicist. The term, applied frequently to 
Hayek, was here used to stress a similarity between Hayek and Derridaj 
the fact that Hayek, in his extreme anglophilia, exemplifies a liberal 
tradition in which Derrida is, at least, steeped. However, it may be 
argued that, as Derrida resists abandoning a certain feature of this 
tradition, he develops a definite philosophical tradition anew. This 
conclusion ends with three last sections: 
(1) An account of Socrates defence in the ApolQiY. Socrates attempts to 
make a public use of reason whilst casting doubt upon the concept of a 
stable political forum. Despite highlighting the way economic pressures 
destabilise a Political realm, Socrates continues to claim a distinctive, 
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public role. Like Derrida, Socrates remains at the virtual inner-limit of 
a discourse which, if not Political, conspires to resist the more 
powerful economic pressures. 
(i1) An analysis of the way Derrida continues, in a style reminiscent of 
Socrates, to highlight the death of the Political space. It will be seen 
that his own attempts to make a public use of reason are folded onto 
what he terms a 'new physiology'; a techno-economic mutation of the 
Public realm. 
(11i) An analysis of Derrida's attempt to affirm a style of negotiation 
which is not simply obsessed with the death of the Political; i.e. is 
affirmative rather than mournful. A negotiation which, like Socrates', 
implies a sense of economic resistance. In effect, Derrida affirms a 
similar limit to that of Socrates. This section concludes with a brief 
analysis of what it may mean to abandon this 'reserve' or 'resource'; i.e. 
the virtual inner-limit of an intelligent and liberal ethics. 
f f f f 
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Socrates Apology: on the margins of an antique fonm 
As has been seen, Plato's attempt to think the immutable core of the 
Polis was determined less by a passion for 'transcendent truth' than 
economic factors. Business has no firm basis in the City, as Perikles 
was aware. For Plato, the denial of this core, something both immutable 
and essentially 'of' the City (in its ideal integrity) is tantamount to 
treason. The Republic opens in a port, awash with alien influences and 
dead to the inherent attractions of the city. Here, treason bas becoJDe 
second nature. Plato's later LMts. argues a maritime city is condemned to 
delinquency, to false money and inflation. As in the work of 
Aristopbanes, or even David Hume, the vagaries of a credit economy are 
associated with the wiles of the sea; the fluidity of currency is in 
thrall to the debauching sea and market forces. In consequence. Plato's 
idea of the city remains aloof from the credulous market. The clarity of 
the position in the Republic might lead to a retrospective attribution of 
similar themes to his, earlier, Apology. However, this work is startling 
in its contrariness, the Socrates of the Apology goes with the flow. 
The ApQlQg1 revolves around a simple dialectic: the city is the sum 
of its parts. This equivalence, never directly alluded. to, is the subject 
of repeated insinuation. After opening his apology by stating: 
"observe and pay attention just to this, whether what I say is 
Just or not, for that is the virtue of the judge, and an 
orator's virtue is to speak tbe truth.". 
Socrates arrives at a variety of versions of this dialectical 
equivalence. His elliptical route to Justice proceeds by cross-
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questioning the prosecutor, Xe1etus. If Xe1etus's virtue is to recognise 
Justice, Socrates' questions are designed to confuse. He asks Xe1etus 
about the general and the particular, and the relation between the two. 
Specifically, he asks if it is possible to have a general conception of 
the human without believing in any particular human6 • The issue, here, is 
that a general concept of citizenry remains vague if nothing could be 
subsumed under it. It is, above all, the virtue of Political Justice to 
enfranchise a citizenry. However, only by virtue of its citizenry is the 
general extent of a Polis maintained. For Socrates the maintenance of 
the City is crucial, a matter of life or death. As Socrates is arraigned 
before the citizenry, it is the responsibility of the citizenry to assess 
his defence and to pass judgement. Athenian Justice was juridical, any 
judgement passed upon Socrates depended upon it being assessed by his 
peers against a context of general, and generally intelligible, laws. 
This, according to Thucydides, is one of the central issues for Perikles, 
the greatest defender of Athens and of its constitution: 
"The name given to this constitution is democrlJcy, beclJuse it 
is blJsed not on lJ few but on lJ larger number. For the 
settlement of private disputes LJ11 LJre on LJn equal footing in 
LJccorolJnce with the lLJws."7 
Socrates' questions are designed to problematise the relation 
between a general concept of juridical justice and a particular 
indictment presented within a juridical forum. If Keletus cannot judge 
the relation between the general and the particular, how can he 
prosecute a particular offence under a general form of law? 
Socrates insists the relation between a general concept of citizenry 
and the profession of a particular kind of knowledge is uncertain. His 
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first example is the farrier; an apt job for a citizen, without there 
being any reason for everyone to know the farrier's art. Socrates 
quickly moves from an example entailing the care of horses to the care 
of men; i.e. a more 'General' concern. One indictment of Socrates claimed 
his profession corrupted the youth (i.e. was treasonous, debauching). As 
the love of wisdom is held to be a virtue of the Athenian·, so the 
probity of the relation between the general scope of 'Knowledge' and any 
particular piece of pedagogy ought to be a subject upon which an 
Athenian is capable of passing judgement. Which is to say, the ability to 
recognise the proper relation between wisdom and education ought to be 
second nature. If this relation remains uncertain, Justice becomes a 
difficult enterprise. Socrates' Apology, in essence, argues Xeletus never 
appreciates the difficulties of Justice or even the nature of the 
enterprise. Socrates' strategy is to show that the rarefied province of 
the general, whose defence is so assiduously prosecuted by Keletus, is a 
dream. The general, shorn of its sense of difficulty, is an empty core. 
The example of the farrier is one example amongst many. As a trade, 
however, it focuses upon the everyday business of a state. In the 
ApOlogy Socrates makes two contradictory references to the business of 
trade and the virtues of a state. In the first instance, he states: 
n virtue does Dot come from money, but froJlJ virtue COIDes IDoney 
LJDd LJl1 other good things to IDLJn, both to the individual LJnd 
to the state."9 
The idea that Virtue, or Justice, ought to be separate from everyday 
preoccupations and, moreover, the se.:urity of the citizenry's everyday 
life depends upon its having properly assessed its priorities, is the 
ethical idea. Justice is not to be coerced, nor perverted by worldly 
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considerations. In the speech following the Funeral Oratiou, Perikles 
calls for a defence of the City on the basis of its houses and lands 
being Ita pleasure-garden or adornment of (its) wealth". Which is to say, 
the quality of Athens remains sa much more intangible than mere wealth, 
as though its defence were the defence of a higher ideal. Socrates, 
however, later states that the Athenian citizenry know no higher duty: 
.. !tIha t most men care for, money-making and property, and 
military offices and public speaking, and the various offices 
and plots and factions that come up in the state." 10 
In the first instance, the whole City (the sum of its parts) is 
essentially maintained by Justice. In the second instance, the extent of 
the whole is practically determined by the business relations 
elaborating 'its' everyday 11fe. Which is to say, the ethical 
transcendence of the city has not determined its immanent character. The 
ideal City 1s derailed every time something akin to the City is the 
object of speculation. Athens is determined by relations which remain 
external to any essential ethical quality or sympathy. Hence, whilst 
Thucydides has Perikles appeal to the dream of a Polis secured by its 
inherent virtues, he nevertheless insists Athens is secured by virtue of 
the power it wields across the seas of the known world (Ie This power 1s 
not the same as the use of your houses and lands, the loss of which you 
regard as a great blow . ... you should rather think of those possessions 
as a pleasure garden or adornment in contrast to your naval powe['f). A 
power which, although apparently military, is in practice commercial: 
.. Because of the size of our city, everything can be imported 
from allover the earth, with the result that we have no more 
special enjoyment of our native gocxJs than of the goads of 
the rest of manlrincl"'1 
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Thus, when Socrates disrupts the casual, immediate relation Keletus 
would maintain between the General (and its juridical form) and the 
particular (the jurors), he does so because the General is only virtual. 
It has no separate, transcendent status other than those ascribed to it 
through 'money-mlJking. plots and factions'. In consequence, Socrates 
positions himself at the margins of the City, at its exterior but always 
close to its inner-limit. There are two ways to read Socrates' 'marginal' 
role. On the one hand, if the 'inside' is elaborated through commercial 
relations, everyone (in 'their' relations) is external to the city. 
Socrates is as much like an Athenian as any other, either those who wear 
their citizenry with factious greed or those who suffer its coarci ve 
effects. On the other hand, Socrates' style of philosophy affords little 
earning potentialj it does not easily offer the illusion that he enjoys 
the life 'of' a city and 'its' offices. The word he uses to describe his 
position now looks like serious self-condemnation, idiot12 • In fact, as 
it refers to a demeanour of private intransigence, it was already to be 
condemned. Thucydides states, above, that 'private' disputes should be 
opened to public settlement. When Thucydides records Perikles' 
enumeration of Athenian virtues, he writes: 
" The SlJlDe lDen accept responsi bili ty both for their own 
IJffairs lJnd for the stlJte's, lJnd lJlthough different lDep lJre 
IJctive in different fields they IJre not llJcking in 
understanding of the stlJte's concerns: we lJlone reglJrd the .DIlJn 
who refuses to take part in these not lJS non-interfering but 
as useless."13 
Socrates remains resolutely idiotiC, knowing his refusal to enter 
the affairs of state is indictable. He accepts - in principle - the 
indictment not just of Xeletus but of Perikles. His only hope is his 
apology should be judged to be not wholly dissimilar from the affairs of 
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state and, in this more or less dissimilar state, accepted as a cause 
for continuous concern rather than immediate indictment. Thus, even as 
Socrates remains at some remove from the central concerns of the city, 
he accepts he cannot simply be viewed as non-interfering (only if his 
lessons were in vain would he have been innocent). He is ~n interference, 
he h~s interfered with Athens' sons. However, as he is not a part of the 
'inside' of the Polis, he has no use in the city. Here, in conformity with 
Thucydides, he shows why his redundancy might be indictable; it has an 
effect, remaining a thorn in the side of re~l politicks. Xore than anyone 
else, he disrupts the secure illusion of being on the Inside; of 
particular citizens everywhere reenforcing the general extent of the 
Ci ty. He insists upon all the trouble he goes to, even as he resists 
abandoning this inner-limit; he keeps himself somewhere in the frame, 
albeit at the margins. Is this virtual inner-limit simply the nebulous 
heart of an appeal to collectivity? Is it an invidious appeal for a 
hopeless form of political will? As will be seen, below, the inner-limit 
of Socrates' apology is a calculus of the weaker and the stronger. 
It has been said, above, that the ApolQgy devolves upon this 
dialectical equivalencej the whole is equal to its parts. That is, a 
commitment to the forenSic form, in general, is equivalent to public 
deliberation, in its every particular. However, Socrates does not inhabit 
the centre of a forensic debate; he puts himself firmly at the margins 
of this question, without abandoning its imperatives. In undertaking his 
apology, Socrates identifies two different kinds of indictment. The 
central charge is preferred by Xeletus, that Socrates believes in alien 
gods and subjects the Watton '5 youth to unwonted influences. Socrates 
insists this charge is uncompelUng, it is not the stronger charge 
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(although he accepts that being 'alien', or useless, and engendering 
unwonted passions, or interfering, is commonly held to be indictable). 
The stronger charges have unfolded over the course of Socrates' life, 
accusations that have grown through whispers without, ever, having an 
identifiable source. In answering this charges, Socrates 1s: 
"compelled, in making my defence, to fight absolutely with 
shadows and to cross question when nobody answers.·'~ 
As the Nation unfolds through the commerce of its everyday 
relations, so the strongest impression of Socrates' culpability rests 
with these vague and shadowy processes. The impression of indictabllity 
has no direct source, Socrates cannot face his accusers within a 
definite forum. He can only indirectly respond. He can, however, address 
Aristophanes' Ih.e. Clouds. This play would be the source of some of the 
popular conceptions about Socrates, about his idiosyncraCies, and his 
teachings. It is often assumed that Socrates and Aristophanes were 
opponents. However, whilst the representation of Socrates in !he Clouds 
is a comic figure, it is not malevolent. In fact, when asked to teach 
Strepsiades the weaker and the stronger arguments he simply introduces 
the two arguments, the good and least persuasive argument and the bad 
and most compelling argument. Socrates allows Strepsiades to judge which 
argument is the more sui table 1 a. The good argument finally surrenders 
itself to the audience and the commerce of everyday power relations. 
Strepsiades choice is simple: the 'bad' argument, in its shadowy and 
devious turns, 1s the more suited to Athenian life. In sum, the Socrates 
of Iba Clouds does not seduce Strepsiades into nefarious commerce, 
Strepsiades is already seduced; his seduction is complete when the good 
argument surrenders its claims and joins Athenian life. 
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Ih.e. Clouds argues the ability to judge is the ability to judge 
between the more or less effective argument. The Apology is a tribute 
rather than attack on Ih.e. Clouds, making its argument the most pressing 
one of Socrates' defence; the issue he takes the most pains to 
accentuate. The Apolagy argues the stronger arguments are the most 
popular and the more nefarious and asks that this truth be judged, as it 
is the judge's virtue to recognise what is Just in the orator's truths. 
Above all, the Apology is a tribute to what has been given to be 
understood through Ih.e. Cloyds. In repeating its claims, Socrates 
respects the power and the themes of that work and rearticulates these 
in another framework; in a court rather than theatrical forum. Finally, 
he draws a juridical conclusion that could only indirectly be alluded to 
in Ih.e. Cloyds; if the Public is commonly subjected to the stronger, the 
most assured or least risky arguments, to be subject to the more risky 
argument is - paradoxically - to be free to make the most singular 
judgements. In short, Socrates finds a strength through weakness, the 
freedom to overturn popular decisions. 
The way the Apology becomes tuned into Aristophanes' themes, and 
the way it repeats these themes in a more or less juridical form, 
reqUires closer analysis. ~ Clouds argues that the expansion of Athens 
has entrained figures like Strepsiades into its every dealing. When Ih.e. 
Clouds opens, Strepsiades weeps for the 'mouldy and unswept life' enjoyed 
in his farm home, remote from Athens' influence (1.e. in a family farm 
and the 'oikonomia' that implies 'S ). His seduction by his wife and his 
wife's seduction by avarice, have resulted in him becoming Athenian. 
Here, being Athenian means being subject to a credit economy and fully 
condemned to indebtedness. In repeating this theme, Socrates forces the 
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issue of Justice in a specific way; i.e. that Justice must now be 
concerned with the strong and pernicious influence of the discourses 
making Athens so compelling, so seductive. 
It is again. a question of what Socrates' has been given to 
understand, as he elaborates this understanding within a forum. A forum 
that has come to seem like the market-place where Socrates is commonly 
found. Here, certainly, there is a move from the Ideal forum to the 
market forum. There are, however, other resemblances at work; as the 
Apology elaborates the juridical forum as an event entrained by market 
forces, so it also emphasises stranger - comic - effects in the market. 
Which is to say, Socrates rearticulates the effects that a work by 
Aristophanes has given to be understood. He does so as he insists that 
Justice could, yet, become interested in such effects. Socrates' comic 
strain is to the fore when he enters the juridical forum only to elide 
its central concerns. He represents his marginality by insisting he is a 
rustic (like Strepsiades). As a rustic, he insists he knows nothing, that 
he is powerless to interpret the due processes of the law 17. Socrates 
adopts Strepsiades crafty. peasant cunning but highlights this 
cunning's central feature; despite its non-linear character it remains 
useless in a commercial setting. It seems especially at home when the 
home is idealised as a City-state; i.e. is at home insofar as it is 
marginal to the ethical core of the ideal City. However, in its 
exceptional tortuousness, it elides even the oblique advantages of market 
forces, the maintenance of a monopoly. Which is to say, it remains 
marginal even to the commerCial wiles of Athenian life. In sum, it has a 
commercial flavour, but is commercially disastrous. Strepsiades 
commercial failings nevertheless have an effect, exerting a kind of 
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interference. Whilst Strepsiades remains marginal, even redundant, as 
regards any successful enterprise he continues to exert a comic effect 
within the market. How might a general concept of Justice, based on a 
general concept of juridical ability, come to judge the particular effects 
denoted by Strepsiades? If Strepsiades is so marginal as to be useless, 
is it just to indict him (as redundant) because he is commercially 
maladroit? If, in fact, Strepsiades ought to be disenfranchised because 
he is not at home in Athens, is it possible his disenfranchisment could 
become a juridical issue; i.e. a thorn in the side of the court? If such a 
figure, despite its shortcomings, continues to interfere in juridical 
processes, could this become the object of a juridical deliberation? 
Socrates raises such issues insofar as he represents what 
Aristophanes has given him to understand. Which 1s to say, Socrates 
speaks the truth as he understands it and asks that this 'truth' be 
subjected to Judgement. He does so, above all, by respecting what might 
be termed the "gift" of Aristophanes' drama. As a gift 1s offered without 
the expectation of commercial gain, Socrates repeats only commercially 
disastrous effects. He, then, asks that such effects be judged by his 
peers, even when such effects elide the kinds of discourse that 
distinguishes his peers, commonly or in general. He respects what 
Aristophanes has given him to understand a second time, he does not 
simply repackage Iha CloudS for public consumption; in fact, he 
comically fails to do this. In sum, Socrates emphasises what has been 
given to be understood, given in the sense that it cannot be the object 
of profit. This 'gift' is emphasised insofar as it 1s not a commercial 
exchange. Its comic effect is that it is not a commercial exchange. 
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Socrates fails to articulate a popular position. He does so through 
insisting (effectively, comically) that no position could be stable when 
one attempts to represent what one has been given to understand. Any 
such representation is a risk. It is, further, a salutary risk. Salutary, 
insofar as it reminds one of the impossibility of maintaining a stable 
positioni hence, the suspicious nature of any appeal to such a position. 
An insistant risk, insofar as it cannot be assured. The risk cannot be 
lessened by appealing to a dominant position, nor can the risk work to 
the advantage of any apparently stable position, as a monopoly position 
is apparently stable or less risky. In highlighting the shortcomings of 
any risk, Socrates asks whether such a risk could become an issue. Which 
is to say, whether one might enjoy the effects of a more or less weak 
discourse in a way that continues to be an issue; a forensic issue, an 
issue circulated throughout a forum. 
At the end of his 
marginalised rustic, or 
apology, Socrates abandons the 
idiot, in order to adopt the 
guise of a 
language of 
citizenrYi he addresses the forum as though he were amongst peers,e. As 
has been seen, at the close of Ihe linda of !An, Derrida adopts the ruse 
of speaking of a 'we', and of an 'inside where we are'. In effect, both 
finally come to ask if they have c01D1Dunicated the kind of risk they 
sought to raise. As such an issue only resembles a juridical issue, their 
right to citizenship depends upon the risks they take being generally 
appreciated. This risk was represented, by Socrates, through a comic 
discourse that failed to capitalise on its issues. Socrates, however, 
drops other clues to his real interests. The Apology constantly adds the 
rhetorical flourish 'more or less' to many of its formulasj thus 
emphasising the inner-limit of its discourse, a calculus of the more or 
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less powerfu 11 9. In Greek, the phrase can carry a trace of pol! tica 1 
positions i the 'less' is the root of the term 'oligarchy'. If the many. 
Democracy, is opposed to the fewer, Oligarchy, which is the more 
powerful? The 'few', bent on maintaining their leveraged position with 
few risks. or the 'many' continuously subject to greater risks and 
weakened through that subjection? Socrates, as is rarely appreciated, is 
a democrat, he is interested in the many, in all its hues. To be subject 
to the weakening effects of a variety of interests (in all their risks). 
is to negotiate the singular effects of a multivarious discourse, 
circulated without coercion or monopolisation. 
• • • • 
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The Samizdat: 11 salutary reminder 
The Apology turns an unwonted effect into a public issue. LA. demacratie 
ajournge exploits the term 'sam1zdat' 1n pursuit of a similar effect. 
What is a samizdat? A Russian word, it refers to self-publication: a 
personal enterprise in the public's service. Whilst in no way suggesting 
vanity publishing, it could neither be considered a real business. The 
samizdat describes an underground system, aimed against the status quo. 
Derrida exploits both sides of the samizdat: its marginality and its 
system. For Derrida, the samizdat is an 'access', a relation lying 
between those elements pushed into privacy and those others enjoying 
popular approval. To understand the samlzdat, it is necessary to look 
again at this distinction. 
Popular approval has been discussed in terms of monopolies: the 
enjoyment of a mass movement as though it were a stable position. 
Derrida credits philosophy with a pivotal role in the preferrment of 
monopoliesj referring, specifically, to those thinkers who approve an 
appearance of stablli ty as though this reflected a fai th in a 
transcendent world. Here lies the mystery of the monopoly, the 
possibility that heterogeneous expressions might sway to a rhythm taken, 
in faith, to be one of stately continuation. To this extent, a 
metaphysics aiming chiefly at concentration, censures a dispersal it 
never quite resistsj purSUing the mass as though it represented a 
respite from the movement by which it is animated. This suggests 
certain thinkers conspire with the promotion of monopolies. However, as 
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the monopoly carries away the mood of conspiracy i the monopolising 
force is of chief interest. 
Derrida speaks of monopolisation as though it were corporeal, as 
though its logic inflamed a Body like a desire. This thesis has flirted 
with the term Body Politick. Although archaic, the term recalls an age of 
practical politicking, Real Politicksj using the alibi of steering the 
ship of State to excuse every operation upon its crew. wielding the 
scalpel as though disaffection were symptomatiC of a cancerous body 
rather than cabin-fever. The French presaged Classical economics in 
viewing the State, in its economy. as an organism running along 
mysterious but self-regulatory lines, tending towards equilibrium. Adam 
Smith provides a critique of the Physiological School insofar as his 
system is no longer natural but synthetic, operating as though by an 
invisible hand, and hence only as though there were a real Political 
Body. Derrida folds such syntheses onto a new BodYi a mutant physiology. 
As he elaborates the delinquency of this new body, he preserves a relic 
of the alder view. The spectre of the Body Polt tick: is found reanimated 
through the mutant power of techno-econom ics i in its "real eclecticism 
and its 1i beral facade'. If its 'terrible logic' is nat confined to the 
Media, it seems mast real there and: 
"Too, too clear in what we call the 'cultural' press (arts, 
literature, philosophy etc) and in the 'fine' distinctions 
which, being superimposed and overdetermined, do not 
1JJ.ediate1y tempt public opinion like a political judgement or 
electoral decision. Each time a Jlediating Institution 
(insti tution med1atique) commands aspects of the JJlarket upon 
a massive scale, it siezes and censures just as massively; it 
dogmatises. Such is its real eclecticism or its liberal facade, 
its virtues or vices, as it captivates or bores, as we find it 
distinguished, vulgar, or both at once. However one rates this 
or that of its talents, when a lone judge, here or there, sees 
itself entrusted with a JJlonopoly of discernment, of 
dissemination, of exposure on the grand opening day, it 
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determines the goods on sale in culture's supermarket." [DA 
117]20 
Here, Derrida broaches a conspiracy of complacency, and the force of 
a new censure which "menl2ces liberl2l societies" [qui menl2ce les societes 
liMrales, DA 116]. This is not, immediately, a question of censure in 
the old, political, sense of being judged appropriate or not as regards 
the Political realm. The new censure reflects, in general, the ephemera 
of a commercialised culture; or, a media utterly turned onto a new 
commercial Body. He then speaks of the private - or newly semi-private 
elements missed in this broad, petty, movement: 
"It is then, far from the forum, towl2rds the night of a seJli-
private enclosure, that a work suffers relegl2tion as it fails 
to slJtisfy the conditions of visibility in the broad 
belittling mirror which fascinates in deforming, which 
filters and diverts towards itself so much energy, interrupts 
conversation, turns the socil2l body lJnd glJze onto a new 
physiology, which finally throws the last icons of national 
culture to outsiders. Today, on this scale, a book must sell 
itself and, let us note, open itself in upwards of ten 
thouslJnd instances to seem nothing other than se.l-private, 
lJS though it were a confidential correspondl2nce. The Result: 
works termed 'difficult " rebelling against stereotypes of 
depiction or narration, l2re excluded from view, barely 
registering against the cultural norms thereby represented in 
the 'average' (in the Singular, 'opinion' always means 
'average'); blackened, starved of ~ (du jour). In 
consequence, we judge them more lJnd more 'obscure', 'difficult', 
seeing them as 'unreadable' and so they beccme, just as we say 
they are and want them to be: inaccessible. The cycle 
accelerates." CDA 118]20 
However, Derrida says: "let us not oversillplify" [Xais ne simpl1fions 
pas, la encore. DA 1191. In dispersion there is heterogeneity, breeding 
the taste for new venturesj differentiating desire and enabling new 
expressions. The power exemplified by the Media is not unlimited: 
"It also, day by 
always silenced. 
criticise itself; 
body. Has it not, 
day, finds itself evaluated by a public not 
Heterogeneous, it might also, at times, 
from one side to the other of its broad 
finally, judged upon too great a time-scale? 
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according to criticisms which remain necessarily 
indecipherable? If it contributes to a mass success we forget 
the following month, does it not also run across the 
forgotten? Whatever is untimely in its promotion, slipping the 
bounds of visibility, might one day impose itself without 
possible contestation. In the paths towards a work, as one 
knows, the quality of ten readers may sometimes play a more 
determining role than the reality of ten thousand purchasers. 
What would our great mediating machines make of a Rimbaud or 
Lautreamont, of lietzsche or Proust, of a Kafka or a Joyce in 
19897 They were saved chiefly through a handful of readers 
(the minimal asking price), but which ones! Perhaps, alas, 
this analogy already suffers from an anachronism, for without 
doubt the internal history of these ventures were turned onto 
their outside and, whether one denies it or not, to a 
structure that from now on is out of date as regards the 
'public space'." lDA 119-120]22 
Here, Derrida runs through a series of possibl1ties. For instance, 
marginal positions can become uncontestable which, it is implied, is to 
the good. But why? Derrida talks in terms of an asking price, as though 
a certain minority might find the right pricei the cash or credibility. 
There is the spectral suggestion this leads only to the establishment of 
new orthodoxies. Derrida, however, skips this criticism to emphasise the 
anachronistic. The Public is pure expirationj out of date as it opens. 
onto the milieu of relations on its outside. Any science of relations 
remains an immanent critique only insofar as relations remain external 
to their terms. Throughout this milieu (call it 'text', call it 'social-
reality') every issue is immanent only to the commerce of relations. 
Derrida, however, hovers over a reliquarYi a reserve whose continuing 
life is defined by a transcendent concept of worth. He moves from an 
issue articulated by virtue of economics towards a concept whose virtue 
is proposed only through a speculative commitment. Derrida suggests his 
faith seems outmoded. Where he conjures this most passe of concepts, the 
self-unfolding Body, the Body whose every turn emanates from a 
predisposition to the qualitatively 'better', he banks upon a samizdat. 
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His cachet has expired but, he argues; II this feeble cachet holds a 
chance: semi-private, it nevertheless has access to the public space. 
Between the two, the ~1zdat." CDA 120) 
The samizdat relates the untimely to its possible reception. It is, 
as has been said, a system. However, outside of any intrinsic sympathy 
between producer and consumer, it remains outmoded i more or less 
redundant, as it is more or less unappreciated. As such, Derrida's 
evocation of the samizdat can be folded upon two other positions which 
it seems to resemble. Perhaps, on the one hand, in emphasising the 
samizdat and its proper audience, Derrida dissembles those who apologise 
for a metaphysics of presence in the hope that the intrinsically worthy 
will come to be generally appreciated, within the bounds of a forum 
already predisposed to such values. He does so, however, only as his 
sympathy for such philosophies tends to fail, to slip into senescence. 
Through the samizdat, Derrida reserves only redundancy, claiming no 
special dignity. Perhaps, then, he rather resembles Socrates as he raises 
the more or less marginal as a public issue; thereby giving such effects 
to be understood, as one might give the itch to be scratched. This 
second resemblance is the more problematic. Is it that Derrida petitions 
for the same kind of forum, the same kind of Public, as Socrates? 
Whilst it is not the aim of this thesis to present this kind of 
analogy as a conclusion, it is impossible to fully ignore. In away, I.b.a 
ED.si5. c.1 I4n. gambles upon mis interpretation j there, Derrida hopes for 
another space even though he knows this hope seems purely speculative. 
He suggest that, although such a space appears as a mirage, it need not 
necessarily be underpinned by a desert ('inculte': uncultivated, a 
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wasteland) [EM 133], By 1991 these gambles clearly take place alongside 
the Market, but a market that would more closely resemble the political 
ideal of a just forum; a market that remains attuned to the claims of 
the weakest ventures, the 'underground' of the samizdat1. What does this 
mean? That Derrida takes his chances alongside other speculative 
ventures, like any liberal entrepreneur? Offering, always, a new venture; 
or new to the public to whom it remains unwonted. Offering, always, the 
most feeble of ventures; reminiscent of philosophies that seem 
increasingly redundant or, beyond these, Socrates' feeble apology (an 
apology that failed to assure his own life). New and old, different but 
reminiscent; this is the whole problem. How might something be given to 
be understood in such a way as to reflect the untimely; moving across 
the old-and-new-day of an increasingly commercialised Public, insisting 
upon a kind of hope, without hope of profit? 
There are two distinct ways in which Derrida elaborates the opening 
of the old-and-new. Only one, however, is appropriate to this thesis. On 
the one hand, this might be articulated through a theory of productive 
intuition. Here, the 'intuitive' would not be a reservoir from where 
intuitions are safely drawn upon as required. It is rather, a theory of 
the production of disturbances; effects which are not anticipated and, 
hence, might be represented as alien to the body which suffers them. 
This theory occurs in lli lli us1. 1lw. Pyramid as a positive account of 
the production of disturbances, an account that dissembles Hegel's 
dialectic23 • Here Derrida looks at the way discomforting effects arise 
when there is no question of their alleviation in the form of a 
dialectical interiorisation; i.e. their 'releve' or 'Aufhebung'. Here, 
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Derrida talks of this kind of production as a machine, an early 
reference to the machine-like physiology of his ~ d8mocratie ajournee: 
"if the releve of alienation is not a calculable certitude, can 
one still speak of alienation and still produce statements in 
the system of speculative dialectics? Or in dialectics, w,hose 
essence is encapsulated by this system, in general? If the 
investment in death cannot be integrally amortised (even in 
the case of a profit, of an excess of revenue), can one still 
speak of a wor.k of the negative? What might be 'negative' that 
could not be releve? And which, in sum, as negative, but 
without appearing as such, without presentins itself, that is, 
without working in the service of meaning, would work? but 
would work, then, as pure loss? 
Quite simply, a machine, perhaps, and one which would 
function. A machine defined in its pure functioning, and not 
in its final utility. its meaning. its result, its work."2 • 
The dialectic is, here, seen to be racked with effects that relate to 
a machine outside that 'encapsulated' by the dialetic, or its death-
obsessed body. However, this positivistic account of a process is not 
viewed as a result. It will not, then, be offered as a conclusion. In its 
'pure functioning', this machine less highlights the unwonted effect than 
pursues it in a mood of general delinquency. Whilst the physiology 
promoted by ~ f1i awi iha Pyramid raises the issue of the alien (those 
elements represented as being dead to the world, or the system bent upon 
encapsulating the world), it relates such effects to a process now seen 
as pernicious; a mutant physiology. Derrida now wishes to suspend the 
awareness of such effects, rather than pursuing a position that folds 
easily onto the new physiology. For this reason, this thesis will detail 
another account of the old-and-new-day. One reminiscent of Socrates but 
only as it is given to be understood. Which is to say, only in the 
giving, as it resembles a glft. In presupposing a reCipient, a Gift seems 
to antiCipate an audience intrinSically disposed to accepting an offering 
in good grace. However, a Gift is not given in order to capitalise upon 
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its reception. A gift ought not to predetermine a response. In fact, a 
gift in no way presupposes an event. This peculiar thesis can, again, be 
illustrated through Hegel. 
In his Righi, Hegel represents a gift as the prehistory of contract. 
As it implies no history, a Gift could not trace the contours of an 
historical event. A gift proper, as Hegel argues, is a moment of utter 
alienation entailing nothing in return2 &. An exchange proper, a contract, 
succeeds the gift. Exchange entails a story, a process, an anticipation 
of reflexivity. However, for Hegel, perfect exchange is zero-sum 
exchangei the zero indicating contractual equivalence. Again, there is no 
real historYi zero-sum entails no economic growth and so, nothing in the 
way of a process. Hegel then proceeds to show how the exchange of one 
thing (working time) for another (wages) entails controlled productivity. 
This thesis has shown how such an event entails double growthi if work-
time is cast in the form of debt, production occurs twice overi both 
through an increase in goods produced and an increase in interest-
payments. An economy, clearly, depends upon the profit margin on a 
product exceeding the margins of a debt-schedule. If this happens, the 
machine more than pays for itself (do not forget, with every crank of 
its prop-shaft, a machine produces its own dereliction), whilst the bank 
is kept sweet. Profit, then, is the production of a 'surplus' with respect 
to a given margin. This margin. as Keynes or Pound held, is the object 
of state managementj the equitable maintenance of this margin (its being 
discounted at an appropriate rate) will distinguish social-credit from 
anti-social usury. There would be no value in production if this 
supplement did not existj or, to put it another way. production aims at a 
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social 'surplus'i the production of a capital-reserve. For Keynes and 
Pound, State management aims to express a country's potential. 
There are a series of peculiarities in this general account of a 
'surplus' that are not immediately apparent. For instance, how might a 
Government determine a 'fair' interest rate. In devoting his General 
Theqry to this problem, Keynes redefines interest so that it applies to 
'use' in generali i.e. every piece of capital-equipment has its own-rate 
of interest defined in relation to what it would have to produce in 
order to pay for itself (i.e. a difference between the amount it wears-
down, and the amount new equipment is expected to cost at a futural 
date)26. If the bank reduces its interest rates, investing in new 
machinery would seem less expensive. Hence, the old machinery could 
balance the margin over its incipient dereliction, without necessarily 
increasing productivity. If this surge of cheap cash induced a healthy 
market, a consequent increase in productivity would reap a surplus value. 
Here, capital-equipment has two 'redundant' marginsi a capacity it has 
not yet reached and a dereliction it pursues with every production cycle. 
The latter is erased as the former is increasingly diminished in the 
filling of new, profitable orders. The own-rate of interest, apparently 
intrinsic to a machine, is opened up through expanding production in a 
growing market. What of a State? If a proportion of its work-force are 
redundant, do they represent spare capacity or are they discarded 
through every cycle?27 A given industry has a margin of spare capacity, 
and a margin of dereliction it can discount so long as, in principle, it 
might be covered by the value of productivity. A country has no such 
margins. It if attains to greater wealth, this happens through the 
opening of commerce. If this brings people off the dole, it does not 
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mean those on the dole are, in principle, a source of labour. If they 
refuse to be taken as a reservoir, are they necessarily slack? 
What is the capital reserve of a country? To what potential can a 
given 'surplus' be referred, in its management? The spectre for Keynes 1s 
of a time when stability rules28 • When the prop-shaft tUrns evenly, but 
its every turn suffers an unaccountable attrition. The production of 
'surplus', as in Hegel, is designed to erase the inertia of the 
equilibrium position which returns, like the repressed, to haunt every 
business venture hovering at the margins of dereliction. The pure, 
wearying, equilibrium position - the dead body of the State - is never 
'integrally amortised' but alleviated only in the opening of new markets 
and the employment of hitherto unregarded capacity <which might not, 
even, be national; as, later, it might be argued those in employment are 
guest-workers who now should be repatriated). If one looks behind the 
tension of a time when only interest-schedules matter, one might suppose 
'profit' belongs to a country as a pure bounty; a gift of nature. Bath 
Pound and Keynes look behind the Great Depression in the belief that 
men's ingenuity and the forces of nature are as plentiful as ever. 
However, on Hegel's account this gift of pure potentiality does nat refer 
to anything; it has no story and could not then be made to underpin 
economics. Once, perhaps, in a fairy-tale time, the land spread aut like 
a bucolic mirage, but what could be said about it? law, anxiety rules 
and the dream of plenty is folded into the shadows of debt-schedules 
and the possibility that production might never find a market. 
A country's potential can only be mythically represented, beyond 
economic processes and the story they tell of the state and its 
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anxieties. Potential will be represented as belonging to a prehistory, 
before the contours of the state were opened up through economic 
relations. The attempt to represent profit as belonging to a country 
will fail. In erasing the anxiety of staying one step ahead of 
equilibrium, the fear closest to the lation, the market that enjoys 
profit is turned onto a new physiology, outside of the dismal Body 
Politick. Profit will never be integrally amortised, it lives outside the 
creeping attrition of the State. However, if profit is on the outside, 50 
is the general wearing away of capital-equipment. Attrition cannot be 
represented as a source of new potentiali as much as profit, dereliction 
eludes representation as a country's own resource. When the anxieties 
represented as being closest to a State return, they too are folded onto 
the new physiology. 
The question Socrates addresses is how a citizen might be 
represented within a political forum? Both lhe. E.n.ds. 01 ){an. and LA. 
democratie ajournee similarly address the question of political 
representation. In ~ Elu15. c! !.aJl, in an international philosophy 
colloquium. In the later work, through democracy and its parliament. How 
might such structures represent the potential of the publiC, benefiting 
from their participation as they are given a representative voice. This 
is the business of government, a business that, in France especially, 
might be cast in terms of a social contract. It seems, now, the only 
contract promising equality and stabi11ty is the zero-sum of contractual 
exchange. An equilibrium position that, erased through every business 
venture, returns in anxiety on the sea of economics. If, in its successes 
as in its failures, the public is folded. onto this sea-scape, what 
becomes of the idea of the forum? Both Socrates and Derrida argue the 
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Public 1s best represented through a new physiology. which will not be 
the Body Politick. For Socrates. this occurs through whispers across the 
city'S old-an-new-day. For Derrida. through the ephemera of the Media. 
This would include the samizdat. which is also a media organ and is. 
similarly. on the outside. Here. however. the samizdat exercises a 
neglible role; failing the newly commercial body. 
However. four pOints might be raised as regards the samizdat. 
Firstly. it reflects the way certain elements are occluded upon the new 
body. If these blackened or redundant elements provoke an effect. the 
new body will never be at ease in Profit. Neither can these 
discomforting effects be simply consigned to dereliction as to an old or 
anachronistic body. Every element is folded onto the mutant. and hence 
mutable. physiology. Here. when Derrida resembles or dissembles older 
metaphysics. he apologises for them in the sense that he stakes out 
their concerns on a new ground. showing the attempt to think an older 
Poli tics prophetically returns upon the new physiology. Secondly. the 
samizdat articulates relations between the strong and the weak. As 
regards the techno-economic forces associated with this new physiology. 
the samizdat is just another enterprise. It ls. however. an irreducibly 
weak effect and. hence. relates to stronger forces as though they 
occupied same space. even though this 'same' broad band is no longer 
strictly Political. or ever represents a form of status quo. Tb1.rdly. the 
samizdat acts as a salutary reminder of the way the representation of 
the Public becomes a non-issue across the old-and-new-day of the new 
physiology. The samizdat carries a trace of the ethical idea that a 
minority might became a public issue without weakening a State (as such 
a state has already passed). Finally, Derrlda appeals to the role of the 
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samizdati as the critic of Government. In its criticism, the samizdat 
reflects upon the failure of Government. In doing so, the samizdat 
attacks either a phantasm (a structure reflecting a public or its 
potential that, as regards the new physiology, has long past) or a non-
representative ideal (as Government never succeeds in representing a 
potential bound to a new physiology). Thus, the samizdat tackles an 
issue which has seemed only transcendent, mediating the ways its 
critical representation might yet be understood. Which is to say, it 
gives what had seemed the most prehistorical idea (pure bounty, the 
public'S pure potential> to be understood. The samizdat negotiates the 
gi ving, not the gift itself. Derrida is not speaking of a Gift but the 
mediation of that which philosophers could only represent as a mirage 
or a transcendent ideal. The samizdat provides an access for what 
remains a necessarily untimely idea. 
Derrida has said: "the sole choice is not: concentrlJtion or 
dispersal". It is not a question of the concentration of a Body, even at 
the risk of dereliction, nor the dispersal of the Body in the delinquent 
pursuit of any or every venture. Derrida talks instead of reciprocity. 
Through the variety of suspicions surrounding the representation of the 
Public body, Derrida raises issues which resemble the doubtful relics of 
older philosophies. Such issues, like the samizdat, negotiate the forces 
caught up in the dereliction or delinquency of the Body, across its old-
and-new-day. Above all, such effects reflect a kind of reciprocity; a 
public access. It might be said, Derrida resembles other philosophers by 
insisting upon their relics, as upon the moments they lapse into quiet. 
It could be that such philosophies have nothing left to offer. Derrida 
nevertheless mediates their forlornness:Z'. He is, however, more closely 
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reminiscent of Socrates in hovering over a reliquary which, although 
elaborated by virtue of economics processes, cannot be consigned either 
to a history focusing exclusively upon the State, nor to one that only 
pursues its dispersal. He hovers over this untimely space where the idea 
of a gift might possibly be found. As has been said, there is a problem 
with this marked similarity between Derrida and Socrates; they resemble 
each other in the giving, they do not replicate the Gift. This problem 
devolves upon Derrida's work of 1968 and 1991; they are similar, not the 
same. Only the suspicions surrounding the Public, and what counts as 
popular are constant, and then only in the giving. In both works, he 
makes obscure, seemingly spurious, effects into matters of some concern. 
• • • • 
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Abandoning the inner-liDit: On gratuity 
The Foreword included a passage of Freud's on Depression i an intense, 
general inhibition, like that experienced by a speculator bound to failed 
investments. Derrida's sympathy towards the relics of older philosophies 
might resemble a form of depression. In the Apology Socrates associates 
himself with the city's failures, but in humour rather than sadness. His 
affirmation of forensic processes lies in humour, not political failure. 
Derrida too exploits humour. After claiming metaphysical humanism in 
France defined the political discourses of both the Right and Left30 , 
~ E.lld,Q ci. !.all talks of a 'strategic bet I, a laugh: 
.. His laugh will then burst towards a return which will no 
longer have the form of the metaphysical repetition of 
humanism nor, without further doubt, the memorial or the guard 
of Being's mean1ng, of the house or the truth of being, 'beyond' 
metaphysics."31 
If 'humanism' is the modish reference point for every political 
position, laughter bear witness to the trembling of this haven. The laugh 
does not reaffirm the 'inside' of a political space, its transcendental 
delimitation or its dereliction. It bets on the outside track. Socrates' 
technique, often viewed as ironic, has been read as a humourous attempt 
to bring a form of communal reciprocity into play when every common 
reference point seems, at best, sterile. For Derrida humour is, similarly, 
a way to open out reciprocal relationSi not for profit, but neither to 
consign the city to its derelict memorial. 
Derr1da's evocation of the samizdat might seem overly mournful. 
Better to say, the sam1zdat suspends the problem of political failure. 
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'Suspend' might be synomymous with 'adjourn', in the sense of suspending 
a judgement but also bringing a form of judgement into play without 
having settled it. The samizdat suspends the problem of that which fails 
to get a hearing whilst, also, bringing an unlikely effect into plaYi a 
quirk as much as a common problem. Through suspending a problem, 
Derrida resists abandoning the inner limit of a forensic discoursei the 
idea that an issue could be generally appreCiated. The samizdat, a relic 
of the idea of an immediate and general sympathy, remains hovering i 
provoking the possibility of mediation. 
~ democratie ajournee couches this in terms of the need for 
reciprocity. The samizdat brings a 'need' for reciprocity into relief, 
without determining 1t. When the alternatives seem to be those of 
concentration or dispersal, the samizdat provides another access, a 
reciproci ty that suspends the twin dangers of mute concentration and 
blind dispersal. In the First chapter, He1degger was used to exemplify 
the problem of concentration. He was seen to view the relation between 
commitment and expression as a close onei casting experience under a 
taut rather than groundless, floating form, as was seen in his 
expressions of commitment to the State. His, post-kehre, !he. 
Anaximander Fragment continues this theme as it translates 'to .threon' 
(fate) as 'brauch' (use). 'Brauch' is not a literal translation. It could 
not be termed a 'circular reappropriation of the truth '32 , although it 
does attempt to express something latent in the older term. It does so 
by expressing a continuing commitment to the singularity of the Greek 
word. The term 'Brauch' does not secure 'fate'i it rather represents a 
commitment to the wayan early promise might fade. This, too, would be 
'of' fate, even as fate slips away. 
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I.b.e Anaximander Fragment is somewhat inhibited, having no hope of 
profi ting from its terms. Heidegger's Letter an. Humanism, of the same 
year, insists upon the poverty of language33 • When lh.e. Anaximander 
Fragment offers "the early trac€!' (die [ruhe Spur) of Fate as 'Brauch '34 , 
it addresses this poverty whilst remaining committed to the singularity 
of the trace; or whatever remains of it in its dereliction. Derrida has 
maintained a startling sympathy for Heidegger; resisting, always, an 
attack on his central predilections but, rather, choosing to heighten a 
sense of discomfort around Heidegger's minor themes. As was seen in the 
First chapter, Derrida does not attack Heidegger's appeal to the 'we' of 
the political forum but, instead, reads this appeal in relation to 
Heidegger's discomfort at both speculation and translation. In 
consequence, when Derrida writes upon lli Anaximander Fragment, he 
replicates Heidegger's modesty but also, with humorous flourishes, 
exacerbates He1degger's fear of poverty; the fear of being, speculatively, 
over-extended. If the promise of 'to khreon' 1s so faint, why relate to 
it in one way only? Why not increase one's presence in the market? 
In translating He1degger, Derrida gives 'die [ruhe Spur as both "la 
trace .ilia tinal€!' and lila trace precoce'3.. Is the Greek term to be 
referred to as 'matinale', or as 'precocious'? That is, early in the sense 
of being of the morning, but not so early; it could have arrived before 
morning. Or is it precocious? too mature for its years, or too prodigal 
to be simply a trace? Perhaps, even, delinquent (overly precocious) or 
deranged (dementia praecox)? and so tending to be dispersed. Derrlda 
brings a humour to his translations. Heidegger's commitment precludes 
humour. As his translations are questionable, so the business of raising 
questions remains serious. Derrida brings the lapse between commitment 
228 
conclusion economics of depression 
and expression back into play, modestly offering several ways to relate 
the earlier term. Heidegger once, without a trace of modesty, believed 
Germany's vocation lay in the public affirmation of a radically unique 
Fate; in bleakly hilarious language: 
.. The German people has been summoned by the Fiihrer to vote; 
the Fuhrer, however, is asking nothing from the people. Rather, 
he is giving the people the possibility of making, directly, 
the highest free decision of all: whether the entire people 
wants its own Dasein or whether it does not want 1~'36 
When Heidegger begins to exhibit a kind of 'reserve', a kind of 
modesty, Derrida introduces other uncertainties in translation. Here, 
Derrida knows that his uncertainties, his own inhibitions, reflect upon 
Heidegger's central anxiety; here, a concern about speculation and about 
poverty. However, Derrida's concern is not simply identifiable with 
Heidegger's; it differentiates other interests as it defers any, final, 
similarity with Heidegger. In effect, Derrida conveys a way in which 
Heidegger's texts might continue to negotiate, outside of their 
singleminded compression of every theme into singular lessons. 
Certainly, in negotiation, the term 'reserve' is doing a double work, 
conflating inhibitions about communication, or about the possibility of 
communication, with the ground of communication: a forum, as a 
demarcated enclosure. However, in suggesting this, the term also begins 
to exhibit wayward connotations which are not finally determinable; 
refleting upon this forum only in humour, in play. 
Against concentration is dispersal. lli E.nd.a Ilf. In. speaks of 
'Journalistic responses' and of 'nlJiviety'. In LA. democratie ajournee, the 
)(edia is seen to enjoy a mutant powerj exacerbat1ng a mood of casual 
indifference. Here, delinquency has become second nature, a new body. 
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Bakunin was used to exemplify this trend. His diffuse, expressionistic 
style talks of principles and commitment but enjoys only disperal. He 
speaks of Spirit as though it were a principle of universality, but 
pursues universal destruction. He insists destruction is a luxury, an 
addition: "The passion for destruction is .!! creative p.!!ssion, tad'. 
In a system where oppression depends upon time, there is no 
possibility of saying 'No'; resistance is not viable. In such a system 
the oppressed are committed (in the sense of being conSigned) to 
suffering. This poverty-stricken theme, exploited by Heidegger, is still 
best voiced by Paciol1; "without rest, merchants would .!!lways be in a 
great deal of mental trouble.- To dream of profit, would be to dream of 
escape; a time when noone had to suffer so. How, then, to represent the 
possibility of transformation? the movement away from grinding 
dereliction? when the path from unhappiness to plenty remains a mystery, 
wrapped in shadows. Bakunin's affirmation of the luxury of destruction 
seems to reify this mystery. He cuts though the whole problem by moving 
straight into the sMdow as though into a conclusion. For Bakunin, 
Destruction alone is free, is pure freedom. Vithout a race of modesty or, 
even, pausing to reflect upon the ends of any process, be luxuriates in 
tbe vagaries of the transformative process. 
In tbe original German, Bakunin's destructive passion is expressed 
tbrough a peculiar typograpbical quirk wbich allows 'lust' <passion) and 
'luft' (air) to be written in identical form. Like a preacher. he calls on 
those who would resist the 'premonition' of revolution by stating: 
"Even in RUSSia, in this endless snow-covered kingdom which we 
know so little and which perhaps a great future awaits. even in 
Russia dark clouds are gathering, heralding storm. Oh, the lurt 
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is sultry and heavy and filled with lightning. And therefore we 
call to our deluded brothers, Repent, repent, the Kingdom of the 
Lord is at hand! ... The lu/t for destruction is a creative 
passion, toO."37 
Bakunin's call to revolution conflates two forces, an imperious 
necessity <earlier termed, a "redeeming woro') , heavily suggestive of 
redemption, and another force which drives directly into destruction as 
into a new creative possibility. Bakunin leaps into the shadow by 
insisting the premonition is already the madness of revolution. Bakunln 
dreams have ceased to presage change, they have become immediate, 
expressionistic and destructive passions. There is no reason to wait, to 
hesitate; destruction is free. Bakunin exploits the relation between 
commitment (to the "redeeming word", the sign of revolution) and 
expression (to revolution, immediately in creative passion), even when he 
denies it by affirming the shadows of the suI try air as an immanent 
desire cut loose from any necessity. 
There is something of the ironist in Bakunin's style; insofar as 
irony means saying one thing whilst promoting another. This style of 
detour is the one by which economics Is explained; i.e. the offer to 
elaborate the political through the ruse of economics. Bakunin's twist, 
here, lies in his indifference to any relation between commitment and 
expression. Only insofar as he ironically conflates the immanent 
expression and the transcendent sign does a relation persist; the link 
that allows the weIght of a shadow to be read as a sign, but affirmed 
as pure delinquency. DerrIda, it must be assumed, would focus on this 
relation as an acceSSj suspending the process by which a principle of 
universality (an imperative, the Word) is enjoyed only in its dispersal. 
Where Bakunin is indifferent to this relation, or the way it might 
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somehow reflect upon a determined position, Derrida's difference from 
Bakunin can clearly be seen; firstly, in that the indifferently slewed 
words are accredited to Spirit as to a new physiology of desire and, 
secondly, their dispersal takes place under a single sign, a sign taken 
to be both 'universal' and, in its indifference towards any end, infinite. 
Here, for Derrida a monopoly or popular position extends and accretes 
without being markedi exploiting the limits of irony without allowing 
these limits to be a debated, communicated issue. 
The idea that Bakunin conspires with the formation of monopolies 
seems strange; Bakunin's affection to ignore any stable principle is his 
most anarchic statement. Derrida, it must be thought, is providing a 
warning. To differentiate the trace of irony is to distinguish a limit; 
in pursuing infinite dispersal, one misses the way in which the limit 
slides or gives. Derrida argues that to ignore this trace works to the 
advantage of determined hegemonies; arguing that the promotion of an 
undifferentiated band as though it were a popular view leads to: "Nixon's 
'moral majority', Bush's 'main-stream " etc." CDA 106] 
If Derrida treats Heideggerian 'necessity', in both its pre- and 
post-kehre forms, with some wariness the senSe of a pressing issue 
continues to inspire his sympathy. If they are not seen as peculiarly 
distressing, they nevertheless traces a peculiar effect; a communicated 
effect, a humorous effect. This may be illustrated by reference to two 
literary styles: tragedy and romance. Tragedy, the more imperious, 
depends upon the catharsis of a singularly public shock. Romance is both 
more modest and more private; bringing an unusual piquancy to a delicate 
issue. It may now, no longer be possible to feel fully at ease with 
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either style. As their pretensions are deflated, their effects seem the 
more doubtful. In communicating their themes humour becomes unavoidable; 
ironically representing the tragic, humourously reworking the romantic 
<black comedies, romantic comedies). These two derelict forms, then, are 
folded onto a new 'physiology', a surface which could only elide their 
true, or original, significance. However, this need not fatally undermine 
their forensic representation. Humour, certainly, signals a growing 
suspicion, a frisson of doubt but, as has been argued, the breaking of 
trusts is not necessarily anti-social. If a trace of humour creeps into a 
representation, an effect that could not have been banked upon becomes 
insistant, bringing a different edge to prematurely senescent forms. It 
might be said, outside the book of romance or tragedy, humour provides 
the access that animates their continued circulation. Humour introduces 
suspicion but not necessarily the suspicion that either tragedy or 
romance are entirely comfortable upon the new physiologYi suspicion can 
be lighter, weaker, and still peculiarly haunting. 
What would it mean to abandon either tragedy or romance without, 
ever, communicating anything reminiscent of their peculiar power. For 
instance, in Melodrama. Melodrama unreflexively dissembles the two other 
styles. piling up catharses in ridiculous piles, whilst treating the 
fragile with a relentlessly heavy hand. It might be said, Melodrama is 
both too weak and too strong. Where, it seems, a certain force is 
required, melodrama substitutes the repetition of effects which never 
qUite go far enough. Where a certain restraint is called for, melodrama 
rushes blindly ahead. In effect. melodrama abandons the questions that. 
still. haunt either tragedy or romance to gratuity. The only clue to the 
way Derrida might engage with Melodrama lies in his apparent sophistry. 
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As has been seen, the strategy of emphasising side-issues in the work of 
other philosophers is less a question of artistry than an attempt to 
relate anew to the themes more commonly credited with being central. In 
consequence, it must be thought Derrida would pursue a similar strategy 
in a reading of melodrama; painstakingly suspending its gratuity in 
order to highlight the way it reflects upon more difficult or compelling 
issues. How else might one engage with something that is simply 
gratuitous, abandoning itself to an unreflexivity that - it can be said -
is stupid? Derrida began his Q1 Grammatolgi1 by referring to 'ignorance'. 
He recently approved the term 'stupid'; referring not to the process of 
dissembling, nor to passing off a dissemblance as the 'real' thing but, 
precisely, to an unreflexive gratuity3'. This bears comparison with his 
previous castigation of the naivety of journalists; in effect, a 
distinction between philosophers (those who make a 'public use of 
reason') and those who mindlessly pursue the public beyond reason. The 
journalist Dr H Thompson exploits a loose, melodramatiC style: 
• Kost smart people tend to feel qUeLJsy when the conversation 
turns to things like 'certain deLJth' and 'total failure' and the 
idea of a 'doomed generation '. But not me. I am comfortable 
with these themes .".0 
The word 'comfortable' betrays Thompson's abandonment. Rot an 
abandonment of the Public, or of Public ideals (his terms all refer to 
the Public), but an abandonment that publicly pursues delinquency. A 
casual abandonment. On this basis, upon the distinction between good 
philosphers and mere journalists, the question of stupidity is open; how? 
The appeal to a broad band as though it reflected a popular position 
is clear in the term 'Ioral lajority' or 'Kain-stream '. This anonymous 
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band is taken as both a medium and a ground-plan. Here, an hegemony 
extends its appeal because its terms evade question; its limits are 
circulated only in order to censure the vociferous and never as these 
limits also bear upon the right to appeal to silence in order to reflect 
upon a public issue, an issue of democratic representation. Derrida, who 
is neither for the vociferous nor the silent (whether these are 
representative of majorities or minorities). stresses the access between 
the two. The access negotiates relative strengths; as a silent majority 
might be vociferously represented through the media, or a minority over-
represented through the same media. The access, the samizdat, bears upon 
the notion of representation even when this notion seems, finally, to 
have lapsed in favour of a monopoly. 
The 'Xonopoly' refers to the pretension to regard the breadth of the 
techno-economic milieu as a reflection of a stable position. As though 
the Media reflected both the 'main-stream' and the principle authority. 
As though, for instance, the West were really the First World. What of 
this new physiology, not in its monopolisation, but in its abandonment? 
The force of the Gratuitous or Stupid lies both in its weak indifference 
and in its utterly compelling nature. This double movement raises the 
question of the bad or stupid. Whatever is stupid will (1) obscure any 
trace of a relation reflecting upon the relative force of any position 
(the access between the weak and the strong, the public and private. the 
majority or minority) and (ii) obscure any suspicion reflecting the 
uncertainty of this relation. Whatever is stupid betrays a weakness that 
fails to register any pOSition and a strength that brooks no lingering 
doubts. The stupid are tWice-damned, being too gratUitous to register 
uncertainty qua 'trace' (as, above. the trace of reserve. its limitations 
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and inhibitions) and being so thoroughly abandoned as to consolidate the 
dark qua 'shadow'. Derrida believes in stupidity as in a transcendental 
evilj those abandoned to weakness in registering nothing, those 
abandoned to strength in the ease with which they ignore every position. 
With terms like 'reserve' Jacques Derrida resists abandoning the 
hope for a transcendental Politics. In the first instance, the role of 
such terms, is to amalgamate differing senses of the same word; the 
capital reserve and the reserve symptomatic of depression. This 
conspires to draw certain parallelsj e.g. a concern for the State and a 
concern about poverty. However, in the second instance, the role of such 
terms is also to differentiate desire. Here, the hopes and fears for the 
State are not conflated but, rather, folded onto a new topOlogy. Upon 
this surface, the primary issue is not the failure of the State, or its 
representation, but the awareness that such ideals might continue to be 
mediated, pressed or negotiated. Thus, in critically relating to moribund 
ideals, Derrida allows for other, differing ways in which such ideals 
might inspire debate. Is this how he will be remembered? or for 
providing the contours of an opening abandoned to stupiditYi an opening 
he reflects upon as though, in its delinquency, it conspired towards 
every evil? Here, again, the work is double. In this opening, the stupid 
betray all hope of a coherent politics and betray all trace that their 
indifference is negotiable. Derrida laughs at such betrayals, but 
continues to worry. The view that Derrida fails as a philosopher ignores 
his deep sympathy for philosophy and for debate (whether this is 
philosophical or political). ieverthe1ess, perhaps the time has come for 
another kind of philosophy, if only to report from the abandoned heart 
of that which other, smarter people, remain queasily aware. 
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1. "La dimension de l'espace 'public' accede sans doute a sa 
moderni te philosophique ave les Lumieres, les Revolutions 
fran~caise ou americaine ou des discurs comme ceux de Kant qui lie 
I' Aufklarung ... a la 11 berte de faire un usage public de la 
raison dans tous les domaines." DA 113. 
2. The 'invisible hand', rare in Smith's work, appears once only in 
Wealth c1. Nations [IV 11 9) and Theory c.L Koral Sentiments [IV 
10). It is, however, a response to Hume's economics. Hume argues, 
against Xercantilist protectionism, that Mit is impossible to keep 
up JDOney, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level" <Of. Koney 
334) That is, a national currency is articulated by economic 
relations that do not begin and end upon a specific locale, upon a 
Nation. In consequence, the State, a Political unit, could only be 
obliquely constructed as regards economic relations. Sm! th goes 
further, giving a practical account of an ethos sustained by 
virtue of economic relations, rather than through immediate 
ethical or national sympathies: "By preferring the support of 
domestic to that of foreign industry, (the entrepreneur) intends 
only his own security; and by directing the industry in such a 
manner lJS its produce .lDlJy be of the grelltest value, he intends 
only his own glJin, and he is in this, as in ml2ny other ClJses, led 
by lJn invisi ble hlJnd to proJDDte lJn end which is no part of his 
intention." [Wealth c.!. lations) 
3. The exergue to ~ ~ c1. ~ quote's Kant: "Now I SlJY thlJt man, 
and in generlJl every rlJtionlJl being, exists as lJn end in himself 
and not merely lJS lJ melJns to be arbitrlJrily used by this Dr that 
will. He must in lJll his actions, whether directed to himself or 
to other rlJtionlJl beings, always be regllrded at the SlJme time liS 
an end." [GroundiUi f..c.I:. t.l:!.e. letaphysics 01. Korals, 428) That work 
also states: "Ir'hatever hlJS reference to generlll hU.lDlJn inclinlJtions 
and needs hlJS lJ J1JlJrket price ... but thllt which constitutes the 
conditions under which something clln be lJn end in itself hlJS not 
merely II rellltive worth, i.e. a price, but hlJS an intrinsic worth, 
i.e. dignity.M [434-435). 
That is, there is a distinction between one general space of 
arbitration, the economy of relative ends, and another, the 
tribunal of intrinsic ends. Derrida highlights the vacillating 
meaning of 'end' in his chosen passage, as it is the distinction 
of man, and of every rational being 'in general' (although ){an 
might be the only possible example); but also in the 'economy' of 
ends, where ends may be exchanged (which they may not be, once 
accorded a dignity). A distinction, then, between Economics and 
Justice; a distinction upon which the Critique Q1. Eu..r.e.. Reason 
depends. Kant, at many moments is prepared to think of his science 
of relations (syntheses) an economy; even terming ita 
'commercium'. In reflecting upon this economy, however, he states 
the task of the age is to institute a tribunal which will: MlJssure 
to re~son its lawful claims ... This tribunal is nothing other 
thlJn the cr1t1que of pure reasoD.- [Critique Qt ~ Reason A xi-
xii]; which is to say. Critique is Political in the sense 
adumbrated in this thesis. 
This thesis argues that economics are taken to reflect a Politics. 
Derrida talks of this strategy as both a ruse and a detour. 
AI though Derrida' s work cannot be conflated with that of Gi lles 
Deleuze's, Deleuze's Kant's Critical Philosophy states: fI The 
suprelle ends of Re~son form the system of CuI ture ... RelJson I s 
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defining characteristic is rather a particular way of realising 
the ends shared by lMn and animals. Reason is the facul ty of 
organising indirect, oblique means; culture is trick, calculation, 
detour." [p. 1] 
4. "Car il faut bien qu'a la purete diaphane de cet element il arrive 
ou soit arrive quelque chose." [EM 132] 
5. The term 'ellipse' first appears in Ellipsis where it refers to 
Derrida's characterisation of Xetaphysics and its relation to its 
'other' , however this looser simulacrum of metaphysics is 
characterised. Ellipsis refers, amongst others, to ELQm Restricted 
iQ General Economy and the relation between Hegel, as exemplar of 
metaphysics, and Bataille. The 'ellipse' of this latter essay is 
emphasised in White Mythology, explicitly in the last few 
paragraphs of White Mythology where the relation between Hegel and 
Bataille is termed 'ell iptical' [Karg1 ns c.1. Philosophy 270-2711. 
The term 'detour' also appears in this essay, which is a work upon 
the role of usury in an economy that aims at profi t only via a 
detour through usury, the over-used and the expendable. The pOint, 
here, is that all such economic terms will be read in the context 
of Derrida' s political work. They will be regarded primarily as 
economic terms, rather than terms that Derrida has borrowed from 
economics and exploited for the sake of a different science: 
either Hegelian logic, or semiology. 
6. "la mise en rapport des differences, c'est Bussi la complicite 
promise d' un element commun: Ie colloque ne peut avoir lieu que 
dans un medium ou plutot dans la representation que doivent se 
faire tous les partiCipants d' un certai n ether transparent" [EM 
106) 
7. "Ce pouvoir techno-economique permat a l'opinion de se constituer 
et de se reconnaitre comme opinion publique." [DA 106) 
8. "Aujourd'hui, qu'est-ce que l'opinion publique?" "Aujourd'hui? La 
si1hoette d'un fantome, 1a hantise de la conSCience democratique." 
[DA 103) 
9. In his Iha ~ and ~ ld (1923), Freud describes depression as a 
"pure culture of the death instinc~' (XI p. 394). He also, there, 
associates the institution or concretisation of this instinct with 
the formation of the super-ego, which has become a "tyran~'. This 
thesis will approach the Political through this tyranny, the 
government and the culture of an ethos fully absorbed in its own 
finitude. For a discussion of Freud in this thesis. 
10. It could be argued that Derrida is obsessed by mourning. 
Economies, at least Since his essay LA. dif1erance, has been 
thought in terms of an economy of death. His most detailed work 
on Hegel, G.l..4a (funeral bell), uses the motif of mourning to 
discuss themes raised by Hegel's politico-juridical work. A 
recent work, like his !emoires: EQL ~ da~, reemphasises the 
importance of mourning for Derrida (cf. David Farrel Krell: Of. 
Xemory, Reminiscence, u.d Writini). However, Derrida also draws 
upon mourning as a socia-cultural obsession. Here, the question 
is; how might those elements of a SOCiety that seem dead to the 
world, maintain a form of social desire or express a social need? 
Which is to say, what is the continuing value of death, its 
economic significance? 
11. "Ce qui s'ebranla peut-~tre aujourd'hui, n'est-ce pas cette 
securite du proche, telle qu' elle habi te at s' habi te e11e-
mame dans la langue de l' Occident, dans son oikonoDia, telle 
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qu'elle s'y est enfoncee, telle qu'elle s'est inscrite et oubliee 
selon l'histoire de la metaphysique M • [EX 161) 
12. II Let us, then, mark, in anticipation, this place, the famil i al 
residence and famili12r tomb, where the econoIq of death is 
produced through differance." "Xarquons ainsi, par anti cipati on, 
ce lieu, residence familiale et tombeau du propre ou se produit 
en differance l'ecoDoBde de la .art.· [D 4) 
13. La.. democratie ajournee commemorates the French Revolution. I.l.uit 
E.lld.a Q1. M.zul begins by stating ·Every philosophical colloquium 
necessarily has a politic12l significance . ... Nevertheless, when 
the philosophical colloquium 12lso announces itself as an 
international colloquium, this essential and gener12l 
political impart weighs upon philosophy's a priori, it both 
aggravates it in some way and determines it." "Tout colloque 
philosophique a necessairement une significance poli tique. 
Essentielle et generale, cette portee politique alourdit 
neanmoins son a priori, l'aggrave en quelque sorte et Ie 
determine quand Ie cOlloque philosophique s' annonce aussi comme 
colloque international." [EX 131) 
Derrida goes on to state that" the gener12l politic12l implications 
of our colloquiuJd' (des implications politiques gener121es de 
notre colloque) concern the form of democracy [EX 133-134). One 
of the ways in which this implication is aggravated is the 
problem of representation; i.e. what significance might the 
presence of one foreign national represent within the 
international? For Derrida, the international is an economic 
problem. The problem of democratic representation is again 
broached in La.. democratie ajournee. There, Derrida follows 
Rousseau in stating that the "idea of representatives" is modern 
("l'"idee des representants· que Rousseau disait Mmoderne M.") [DA 
112J. The problem arises, in "post-revolution12ry modernity" [DA 
113], when the act which founds representative structures cannot 
itself be represented. As the revolution has sunk into memory. 
the imperaU ves it comes to represent might, now, have only the 
force of a spectre. The spectre which. as Derrida argues. has 
come to have its own techno-economic agenda. 
14. "it reawakens through the deconstruction of ontotheologY'. "elle 
se revei lIe par la destruction de I' onto-theologie". [EX p. 161). 
Derrida's own translation of destruction is used here. as the 
passage refers to Heidegger's elaboration of the 'destruction of 
onto-theology' in Being and. I.1..me.. The point being, for Derrida. 
that even in tbe 'destruction' of value. as Heidegger adumbrates 
this process. an economy continues to function, and will function 
even as untenable values succomb to deatb as to redundancy. 
Hence, Derrida's insinuation of construction into destruction. 
Derrida describes Heidegger's project as 'deconstruction' on tbe 
following page of ~ Enda ~ Ian. 
15. Who can say exactly why anyone voted for Fascism? levertbeless. 
as Fascism in Germany was presented as a revolutionary 
alternative. it must be supposed that tbe Great Depression seemed 
to call for a revolutionary solution. John Xayard Keynes 
suggested that the prescriptions of his General Theory were best 
suited to the conditions of totalitarianism <1936 preface to lha 
General Theory ~ Employment, Interest a..nd. 1a.n.e3.). There is a 
suggestion, bere, that democracy is unequal to the economic 
problems of a modern, world economy. Could this explain Germany's 
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thinking? <Keynes and Heidegger will be discussed in the second 
chapter of this thesis). Derrida recognises the problems faci ng 
democracy as a 'techno-economi mutation'; a problem to which 
democracy is, apparently, unequal. He is explicit that democracy 
will not be saved by traditional democratic positions, by the 
Right or the Left [DA 113; cf. the same indifference in EX 138]. 
16. "I often feel that the questions I atte111pt to formulate on the 
outskirts of the Greek philosopbical beritage bllve IlS tbeir 
'other' the JDOdel of the jew." [Derrida, speaking to Richard 
Kearney in Dialogues ~ Jacques Perrida, 107]. 
17. "Dans sa premiere edition, cette opinion, j'ose a peine dire 
cette fiction, reste la chose du monde la mieux partagee." [DA 
124) 
18. In a passage from LA. democratie ajournee, Derrida explicitly 
criticises the left-liberalism of, for instance (as he says), 
Habermas when he considers the international aspects of the 
techno-economic Media: "Since the end of the First florld War, 
above all in Germany, the crises which radio might introduce into 
the traditional space of democracy have given rise to grave 
debates ... Tbese debates are out111Oded: who would think the 
f~dfately internlltional effects of tomorrow's television upon a 
public opinion taken, primarily, as national." "Des 1a fin de 1a 
Premiere Guerre 111Ondiale, surtout en Allemagne, les crises que la 
radio pouvait introduire dans 1 'espace traditionnel d'une 
de1110cratie parlementaire ont donne lieu a de graves debats ... 
Ces debats ne sont pas perimes: pensez aux effets l..edlate.e»t 
internationaux de la television de demain sur une opinion 
publique qu'o» tenait d'abord pour nationale."[DA 114]. 
Analysing Derrida's relation to leftist thinkers is problematised 
by his insistance, for instance, that Marx represents a 
deli berate 'lacunae' in his work [Posit10ns 62]. lB., also, his 
frequent insistance on 'reading from left to right and from right 
to left' [cf. note 15, above]. However, in the above quotation on 
Habermas, he does demonstrate a Marxian view, that Capi tal is 
international, it cannot be comprehended on the basis of the 
State. Cf, Engelsj Letter to Cuno 24/1/72: "Bakunin maintains 
that tbe state has crellted cllpitlll, thllt the capitalist has his 
capitlll only by grace of tbe stllte . ... the stllte Ilbove 1111 must 
be abolished; then capital will go hell of itself. fie, on the 
contrary say: AboliSh capital, the appropriation of tbe meanS of 
production in the hands of the few, and the state wi 1 1 flJll of 
itself." Here - we must note - Derrida is closest to Xarxism 
when Marxism most resmbles classical thought [cf. note 2, above]. 
This is also clear in POSitions, Derrida resembles Marxism in 
that both are engaged in Critique against a form of 'nlJi viety' 
[Positions 66]. Which is to say, if Derrida has a readi ng of 
Marx, 1 t resembles most an expl ication, and least a break, with 
the Classical thought of the Enlightenment. 
19. • 11 faut auss1 lutter contre les effets de 'censure' au sens 
large, contre une 'nouvelle censure', s1 je puis dire, qu1 menace 
les societes liberales, contre les accumUlations, les 
concentrations, les monopoles, bref, tous les pheno~nes 
quanti tat1fs qui peuvent marginal1ser ou reduire au silence ce 
qui ne se mesure pas a leur echelle. Kais on ne peut pas non plUS 
plaider silipleEnt pour la plural1 te, la dispersion, le 
fractionnnement, 1a mob111te des 11eux de filtrage au des sujets 
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qui en disposent. Car des forces socio-economiques pourraient encore 
abuser de ces marginalisations et de cette absence de forum general. .. , 
Or la 'nouvelle censure', c'est la force de sa ruse, combine concentration 
et fractionalisation, accumulation et privatisation. Elle depolitise. Plus 
sensible dans I' 'audiovisuel', cette terrible logique ne s'y confine pas." 
[116-117] 
20. ")(ais Ie faible tirage garde une chance: quasi.ent prive, il a 
neanmoins acces A l'espace public. Entre les deux, Ie sallizdat." CDA 
120) 
21. MIa 'central1te' du forum democratique ne do it se confondre avec 
celIe de la masse, de la concentration, de l'homoglmeite au du 
monopole." CDA 116] 
22. EX 162-163, quoted at length in Chapter One, cf, note 19 to that 
chapter 
23. In Glien. I.imel. Ihe. l1.m.e. 01 :tha ~ Derrida reflects upon themes 
that will be broached in this thesisj e.g. the 'metaphorical' quality 
of currency (sovereigns, sovereignty etc). He also broaches a kind 
of stupidity that comes through economics; quoting Baudelaire: II To be 
mean is never excusable, but there is some merit in knowing that 
one is; the most irreparable of vices is to evil out of stupidity." 
Where the stupidity arises from a gratuitous act. Cf. also, Q1 
Grammatology [po 6], which speaks of an ignorance that comes 
through economics. 
Iotas to Foreword 
1. Freud: Inhibitions. Symptoms AIl.d. Anxieties (1925), p.241 
2. Freud: :Mourning ~ :Melancholia (1915) 
3. 'Ecclesiastes' translates the hebrew 'kohleth', which has the secular 
connotations to which the text alludes. A careful discus10n of this 
question occurs in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica. 
4. Kant: ~ 15. Enl1ghtenement?, p. 3 
5. ibid., p. 8. Ecclesiastes seems to describe a form of mourning and of 
liberation. Cf. Hegel's Phenomenology c.f. Spirit: the 'unhappy 
consciousness' enjoys misery as a form of liberation. There, Hegel 
describes the one who mediates the relation between misery and 
freedom, towards a form of eventual relief, as a 'priest'. Paragraph 
228, Phenomenology c1 Spirit. 
6. Freud: Iha Ego. ~ ~ Id, p.394 
7. Xarcuse: Liberation ~ Affluent SOCiety, p. 175 
8. Liddel and Scott's Lexicon provides scores of references to the home 
as an analogy for the state, cf. Chapter Three. Plato thinks the city, 
and its sovereignty, by reference to the family and its patriarch. 
The immediate connotation is that they are similar. Plato, however, 
exploits rather than depends upon this similarity. As Socrates was 
indicted for corrupting Athen's sons, Plato will show that fidelity to 
the ideas Socrates teaches is of a different order to the fidelity 
owed to a father. However, by referring to the similarity between 
state and father, Plato profits by both exploiting, and discounting, a 
similarity. It is such processes that Derrlda sees as distinctively 
philosophical: cf. w..h.1.:tii llythology. In that work, Derrida exploits a 
pun (a 60nic analogy) between 'use' and interest-schedules <i.e. 
'usure', in English, use 1s the old word for an interest rate), when 
he states of analogies that they seem: "to involve the usage of 
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philosophical discourse in its entirety... the usage of natural 
languages lJS philosophical language." Margins cf Philosophy, p. 209. 
9. Kant describes ideogenic effects as both necessary and dialectical; 
i.e. as 'necessary illusions of pure reason': "Ve have already entitled 
dialectic in general a logi.c of illusionS' (Critique 01 Ew:.e. Reason, A 
293), where logic refers to the formal, or necessary, truth in an 
otherwise specious development. The exemplary 'Idea', Kant's chief 
example, is the Republic; the idea of a Political order. This idea, 
whilst not a pattern, nevertheless exerts a beneficial effect upon 
discourse; i.e. whilst not a realisable goal, it maintains a regulative 
effect upon philosophical discourse qua a Just discourse (ibid., A 
316-317), There is a difference, here, between the way in which 
discourse works, and the way in which discourse is adequate to 
justice. When Kant criticises the assumptions of Descartes idealistic 
proof of god he shows the argument is effective only as it is 
economical. Economics is not, here, an arbitrary metaphor. In order to 
show that an assumption is both erroneous and necessary, Kant shows 
the necessity of counting upon an assumption as upon a debt: "The 
attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being by means of 
the famous ontolical argument of Descartes is therefore merely so 
much labour and effort lost; we can DO more extend our stock of 
insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by 
adding a few noughts to his cah account." [ibid., A 602] 
10. Derrida highlights the way Hegel thinks of his work as an economy. 
In lli ill lUIJ1. the. Pyramid he asks, of Hegel's 'theoretical elemen t' 
(i.e. the dialectic), II Vhat is meant by this medium?': "In the 
EDcyclopaedia (Sec. 458) Hegel express his regret that in 'logic and 
psychology, signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as 
an appendix, without any trouble being taken to display their 
necessity and systematic place in the economy of intelligence.' [lhe 
Margins c! Philosophy, p. 71) 
One of the main contentions of this thesis (cf. Chapter Two), is 
that deconstruction is a positivistic account of general economic 
exigencies; as such, it begins with a critique of the selective 
economic advantages of Hegel's dialectic; i.e. the fact that for Hegel 
the possibility of relief is always on the horizon. Hegel rather 
than Kant most interests Derrida at the time he speaks 
predominately in terms of economics. Although Derrida repeatedly 
sidelines Kant in collections such as I..h.e. largins 01 Philosophy I be 
is careful to note pOints at which: "[Hegel's] debate with Kant 
resembles most an explication and least a break." [ibid., p. 793. 
11. Derrida commitment to formalism 1s clear in I.ha wa 01 hn.: "The 
attention given to system and structure, in its freshest and 
strongest aspects ... is a question of determining the possibility of 
meaning on the basis of a "formal- organisation which in itself has 
no meaning'. "L'attention au systeme et a la structure, dans ce 
qu'elle a de plus inMit et de plus fort ... 11 s'agit plutot de 
determiner la poss1bil1te du sens a partir d'une organisation 
'formelle' qUi en elle-m~me n 'a pas de sens". [EX 161] 
Iha ~ c1 IAn 1s concerned with the problem of political 
disquisitionj i.e. the Political Forum. In consequence, as a 
formalist, Derrida insists upon speaking of "the fCll7l of dw.ocracj'. 
However, he immediately states: "And this is 121so why I proposed to 
place the accent on for. no less than on deJIDCrlJcy." "C'est ce que 
je proposais de faire porter l'accent sur for.e non moins que sur 
deJIocrat1e." [ibid. 135, p. 1141. This accent 1s well placed. Derrida 
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finds that the form of democracy depends upon what he terms the 
'oikonomia' of the West. 
12. Economics and politics do not mix. This idea can be credited to 
laissez-faire positions. However, economic processes have been seen 
as antithetical to Political justice since antiquity (cf. Chapter 3). 
In consequence, the liberal position is simply an affirmation of a 
hitherto derided strategy. Furthermore, if liberalism is to be 
opposed to interventionism, the contention remains the same: 
Politics and Economics do not mix. The one side insists this 
distinction be respected, the other argues some intervention 
invigorates otherwise dissolute developments. 
13. In both instances, Derrida is highlighting the way in which the 
'proper' is subverted in more or less discrete ways. On the one 
hand, usury emphasises that property cannot be both stable, workable 
and profitable; in order to be all three it must be something other 
entirely. On the other, a proper name cannot be both stable, 
discursive and authoritative; in order to be all three, it must have 
already admitted some form of doubt (cf. his Signature EYeui 
Context). If property represents an investment - in the voice, in 
the home or for a state - it must also be a form of anxiety. 
Writing casts doubt as the market-price of interest-rates might 
devalue any security. 
14. Freud: Inhibitions Symptoms ansi Anxieties, p. 240 
Bates for Chapter One 
1. In ill ED.dQ.. 01 1aJ:.I.., the question of the 'form' of Democracy finally 
turns in to one on the economy of the Vest [EX 161l. LA. democratie 
ajournge reflects, in very general terms, upon "the functioning of 
liberal democracy, if not its principles" ("le fonctionnement de la 
democratie liMrales, sinon sur ses principes' DA 109). It could only 
be a western generality, as it seems to owe its origins to western 
revolutions. 
2. !he. Ell.d.a 01 !..an. praises form as it "determines the possibility of 
meaning" without predetermining the meaningful [EX l6U. Derrida is, 
here, concerned with 'anonymous necessity'; l.e. a response to or of 
need. LD.. g,emocratie ajournee associates the form of democracy with 
the 'right of response' [OA 1211 
3. "Fa ire preuve de responsabilite, n'est-ce pas d'abord essayer de les 
reconsider? T&che phllosophique et pol1tique, theorique et pratique, 
Uche difficlle mais aussi dangereuse car elle risque de toucher au 
concept m~me de representation, aI' "idee des representants" que 
Rousseau disait "moderne". Xais un democrate n'a-t-ll pas la 
responsabilite de penser les axiomes ou les fondements de la 
democratie?" [DA 112] 
4. "For the future of democracy is in question. The dimension of the 
'publiC' space no doubt gained its philosophical modernity with the 
Enlightenment, the French or American Revolution or discourses, like 
Kant's, which bind the 'Aufklarung' - the Light of progress and the 
day - in every domain, to the freedom to make public a use of 
reason ... In this post-revolutionary modernity, the techno-economic 
mutation of the media represents another break." "Car 11 s'agH bien 
de 1 'avenir de la democratie. LlJ di11lension de 1 'espllce "public" accede 
sans doute 4 sa 11Iodernit~ pbilosopbique avec les Lumi~res, les 
Revolutions franfaise ou americaine ou des discours comme ceux de 
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Kant qui lie 1 'Auftliirung - le progres des LU11lieres et du jour - Ii 
1a 1iberte de faire un usage public de 1LJ raison dans tous les 
domaines ... Dans cette modernite post-revolutionnaire, 112 lDutation 
techno-economique des medias 11Iarque une autre scansion." CDA 113] 
5. Hayek: Iha Legal and Political Philosophy of D4Y1d Hume 
o. It might be said that the fate of deconstruction is to leave a trace 
of uncertainty (which, qua a trace, is itself determined, or very 
certain) in the relations articulating other texts. This thesis argues 
Derrida exploits this pOSSibility. In leaving traces that could 
otherwise only be forgotten, there is a definite sense in which 
Derrida resists, or exposes, prejudice. 
7. Rousseau is not usually termed a rationalist, Hayek is conflating 
rationalism and irrationalismj not to be confused with Humean anti-
rationalism. Derrida, however, makes similar judgements. The 
difference. he says, between rationalism and irrationlism is 
symmetricali i.e. mutually supportive. As is the one between 
Rationalism and Nihilism [Ihe. Principles of Reason: the. university 1.n. 
:the. ~ c1 its. pupils p. 15), 
8. Hayek quotes Hume to the effect that secular magistrates replace the 
idea of the King as supreme magistrate (Hayek, p. 355, cf. also p. 
359). For Hegel, this transformation is dialectical: the replacement 
of a Sovereign'S power by another, abstract, formulation will have 
tended to draw the truth out of the earlier formi i.e. the abstraction 
becomes a more closely rational expression of bLJsicLJl1y the SLJme 
idea: "[(hen a nation begins to acquire even a little culture, its 
customary law must soon come to be collected and put together. Such 
a collection is a legal code, but one which, LJS a mere collection, is 
markedly formless, indeter11linate and fragmentary. The main difference 
between it and a code properly so-called is that in the latter the 
principles of jurisprudence in their universality, and so in their 
determinacy, have been apprehnded in terms of thought and expressed' (lUihi 135], Which is to say, it is nothing other than sovereignty 
which is rationalised as a Political institution. 
9. A negative advantage, not predetermined by relative strength. If 
competition between different interests is economical, legally the 
interested parties are regarded as of potentially equal in merit; 
until the market expresses a free choice. Thus, this question arises: 
If the 'law' suspends the relative strength of any single interest; 
what is the form of the arena where this suspension occurs, as it is 
no longer takes the form of the national state as such. cf. Chapter 
3, the question of anti-trust laws and their international character. 
10. Hayek is describing the possibility of the death of liberalism in 
• the approach to totalitarian de11locracy" [Hayek, p. 3591. An approach 
of which Hayek is very aware, leaving his native Austria for England 
with the approach of NaZism. Hayek's critique aims to dispel an idea 
which already has come to enjoy a kind of force or dominance [ibid 
p. 358), Whilst it might be held that an institution should be 
reified as the embodiment of the State, Hayek argues that nothing is 
effectively embodied in this way. In this respect, Reason is 
impotent [ibid p. 343J. Two questions arise: (1) as Hayek critiques 
the approach of totalitarianism, of what necessity and of what force 
is someone Hire Hegel, as Hegel symptomises a kind of anxious 
delusioni either the dream of totalitarianism, or the dream of 
formless fragmentation [R1gh.i 1351, as both delusions express fear 
for the State. cf Chapter Two. (11) as the public, or the market, 
eventually decides upon every venture (having, in some way, 
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negotiated the possibility of unfair trading practices) to what 
extent can the Market be justly equated with a court? This question 
specifically concerns Derrida. 
11. In retrospect, the 'General Problem' of Kant's First Critique is cast 
thus! "How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?'; a question 
he associates with Hume [B 19]; especially upon the delusions of 
reason, and their oblique effectivity as an 'artefact' (cf. Hayek p. 
343). Kant's First Critique is divided in two: 'The Transcendental 
Analytic' and 'The Transcendental Dialectic'; the transcendental farm 
ascribed to the farmer will depend upon the transcendental 
psychology articulated in the latter: l.e. experience depends upon 
human, ar rational, psychology. Whereas Hume has shown Reason's 
chief possibility is delusion [B 191, Kant asks how a possible 
delusion may be necessary; a dialectical illusion. 'Critique' 
formalises such experiences as nonsensical or paradoxical relations 
(paralogisms and antinomies); i.e. will give a formal role to psychic 
effects which, thereby, are not merely impotent but also. or 
obliquely, effective through judgement. 
12. "A travers Ie spontaneisme et un certain utopisme naturaliste. on 
prenait sans doute conscience du caractere artificiel, artefactuel 
des institutions. On n 'a pas attendu 68 pour Ie savoir. certes, mais 
peut-~tre pour en prendre une conscience plus pratique, plus 
effective: ... parce que ces institutions non naturelles, historique. 
fondees. ne marchaient plus, on ne les trouvalt plus fondees en 
droit, legitimes. Ajoutez a cela Ie fait que les medias et avec eux 
toute la culture prenait des formes at des dimenSions qui marquaient 
une veritable mutation. jusque la production m~me de I' "evenement" 
68. Cela l1Mrait toute sorte de questions sur la legitimite et 
l'origine des pouvoirs: de sanction, d'evaluation, de publication, de 
communication. etc." MagaZine Litteraire Xarch 1991. p. 24) 
13. Cf., notes to introduction: 5, 18. 
14. The claim to 'whittle down the claims of reason through rational 
analysis' is Hume's (Hayek p. 358). It may be applied however to 
Kantian critique, insofar as Kant also asks where such criticisms 
occur. i.e. in Public, in a tribune or forum. 
15. After having spoken of the 'oikonomia' of the West, Derrida speaks 
of the "inside where 'we are'" (lldedans OU 'nous sammes"') [EX 162); 
i.e. the inside of the West, or the forum for 'we westerners'. 
16. "II faut maintenir la riguer formelle, sans laquelle aucun droit n'est 
protege, et donc inventer des dispositifs plus fins, une legislation 
plus differenciee, mieux ajustee aux mutations techno-economique du 
'l1bre-marche'." lOA 115] 
17. "Or, ce dieu d'une pol1tologie negative ne peut donner signe de vie. 
au grand jour, sns un certain Jled.luJI. Le rythme quotidien. qui lui 
est essentiel, suppose la diffusion massive de quelque chase comme 
un journal." [DA 106) 
18. -Que devient alors cette reserve d 'experience, d 'evaluation et m~me 
de determination (les 'modes' les 'gouts', les 'moeurs') qui ne releve 
pas du jugement (oui ou nan) et de Ia representation, a tous les 
sens de ce mot?" 
19. "1. To attelJpt "n ex:1t "nd deconstruction without changing terrain 
... the risk here lies ill confirming, consolidating or reliev1ng 
without end a depression more stubborn even th"n th"t which one 
claims to deconstruct. The explication progressing tOWlirds the 
opening, risks sinking into the autism of the closure; 2. To decide 
to ch"nge terrain, in a discontinuous and irruptive manner, through 
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installing oneself brutally on the outside ... language, simply and 
practically, without end, reinstalls the 'new' terrain upon the oldest 
ground. Through numerous precise examples one 111ight show the 
effects of such a reinstallation and such a blindness." "1. tenter 1a 
sortie et la deconstruction sans changer de terrain ... Le risque est 
ici de confirmer, de consolider ou de relever sans cesse a une 
profondeur toujours plus sure cela m~me qu'on pretend deconstruire. 
L'explication continue vers l'ouverture risque s 'enfoncer dans 
1 'autisme de la cloture; 2. decider de changer de terrain I de 
maniere discontinue et irruptive, en s'installant brutalement dehors 
... la simple pratique de la langue reinstalle sans cesse Ie 'nouveau' 
terrain sur Ie plus vieux sol. On pourrait montrer sur des examples 
nombreux et precis les effets d 'une telle reinstallation ou d 'un tel 
aveuglement." [EM 162-163) 
20. "La 'liberte de la presse' est Ie bien Ie plus precieux de la 
democratie, mais ... cette 'liberte' fondamental reste a inventer. 
Chaque jours. Au mains, Et la democratie avec elle." 
21. "C'est lA qu'on peut interroger l'autorite de l'opinion - non pas 
dans ses contenus, mais dans sa forme de jugement pre-electoral" 
22. "d,en analyser sans repit les determinations historiques, celles qUi, 
en 1989, peuvent ~tre delimiter et celles qUi ne Ie peuvent pas" 
23. "But who, we?" ["Mais qui, nous?" EM 164), As will be seen, I.ha E.w1a 
of !all.. refers to the 'we' as a 'magnetic attraction'. 
24. Derrida wonders how the colloquial might be represented within an 
international colloquium; or how his political interests might be 
represented when "the philosophers present here do not assume the 
official politics of their country'. He goes on to note however, II It 
would be illusory to believe that political innocence is restored." 
"les phllosophes lei presents n 'assument la poli tique offieielle de 
leurs pays ... Il serait illusoire de croire que l'innocence politique 
est restauree" [EX 134) 
25. Bakunin: Iha Reaction ~ Germany p. 385 
26. Secondary work on Bakunin is characterised by either embarrassment 
or dismissal. Studies of Russian thought find him unphilosophical, 
but decisive in any account of the westernisation of Russian 
philosophy. Studies of labour find he suffers in comparison to Xarx. 
His contemporary reputation was blighted by an ugly struggle with 
Marx for the leadership of the IWA, by his alleged authorship of the 
'Catechism of the Revolutionary' and by his influence upon 
terrorists. There is no evidence of direct terrorism on his part. He 
was, however, one of the most famous philosopher of his day, and the 
most widely travelled upto that time. 
27. ~ German Critique p. 104-107. 
28. "meideggerl never denied his entanglements in the movement of the 
tille ... But he was neither an uncritical fellow-traveller, nor an 
active party leade.r'4 Hermann Heidegger p. 469 (an introduction to 
the Ih.e. Rectoral Address). Heidegger f.11s refers to the judgement of 
the post-war trials that Heidegger was a 'fellow-traveller' with the 
ISDAP. Insofar as Iha Enda c1 I~ refers to the 'magnetic attraction 
of the 'we', this would refer to the necessity of such indictment, to 
response to a juridical indictment <like Heidegger fils), as to 
Heidegger's wish to campaign on the NSDAP platform, either for 
Hitler or as an ISDAP sympathisers. 
29. "We have the new Reich and the university that is to recieve its 
tasks from the Reich's will to existence. There is a revolution in 
Germany, and we must ask ourselves: Is there a revolution at the 
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universty as well? No ... through the new life-culture [durch die 
Bildung neuen Lebensl in the work caJ11p and the educat.1onal 
associat.1on as well as at the un.1versity, the latter has been 
relieved of educational tasks to which it till now has believed it 
had an exclusive right. ... It is a battle for the Far. of Teachers 
and Leaders at the University. [ein Kampf um die Gestalt des Lebrers 
und des Fiib.rers an der Universitiit.lN [1.eK German Critique p 99-100, 
translation modified), The form of Teaching and Struggle is the 
theme of !he Rectoral Address. At all times, Heldegger insists that 
Education, Form and Culture [Blldung) and Warning, Doctrine and 
Lesson [Lehrel should be thought in terms of the active 
participation in Revolution. 'Lehre' and 'Bildung' are thought by 
reference to a ground-shaking movement in the history of thought in 
his Plato's Doctrine 0.1. Il:.u1h. and to the will to understand the 
force of Revolution in his ~ ~ ~ Thing? 
30. Letter QII.. Humanism p. 200. This letter was solicited as a response 
to Sartre's Existentialism ~ a. Humanism. Heidegger's contention is 
that he never produced a 'humanist' doctrine, did he then intend a 
mare revolutionary lesson? As his Letter en. Humanism takes the 
thought of 'paideia' to be that which is covered up in Humanism, is 
he still striving for a revolutionary form of education? His pre-
Kehre Plato's doctrine 0.1. II:.u:t.h. discusses the Platonic form of truth 
as a 'Lehre' and the Platonic form of education <paidiea) as 
'Bildung'. Hence, any attempt to think a difference between his pre-
and post-kehre work is complicated, if it is a political question. As 
will be seen, Derrida exacerbates such problems by speaking of the 
'magnetic attraction' of the 'we'. 
31. "la distinction entre telle ou telle periode de 1a pensee 
heideggerienne, entre les textes anterieurs et les textes poster leurs 
a ladite Kahre, a moins de pertinence que jamais." [EX 148] 
32. "the prevailing value accorded to the phenomenological metaphor, in 
all the varieties of phalnBstlud, of sh.1n.1ng, lighting, clearing, 
Lichtrms, etc., open onto the space of presence and the presence of 
space, understood in the opposition of the near and the far" ["la 
prevalence accordee a 1a metaphore phenOllenologique, a toutes les 
varietes du phainestbai, de la brilliance, de 1'ec1airement, de la 
clairiere, de la Lichtung, etc., ouvre sur 1'espace de 1a presence et 
la presence de 1'espace, comprls dan l'opposition du proche et du 
lointain." EX 158] 
33. That analogies have the effect of erasing distinctions is the 
subject of i.b..1.te. Xythology. Derrida states: .. This explains the 
distrust that the concept of metaphor inspires in Heidegger." [po 
226). 
34. This 1s the subject of the very closing paragraph of Le:t.:t~ en. 
Humanism. 
35. "Qu'une declaration d'opposition a que1que pol1tique officielle soit 
autorisee, autorlsee par les autorites, cela signifie aussi que, dans 
cette mesure m~me, elle ne trouble pas 1 'order , elle ne gADe pas. On 
peut entendre cette derniere expression, 'elle ne g~ne pas', en tous 
ses sens." [EX 134] 
36 . Kearney: DialQgue !d:th. Jacqyes Derrida p.1 07 
37. II Le seul choix n 'est done pas: concentration ou dispersion. 
L'alternlJtJ.ve sarait plut6t entre 1 'unl14tM-al ou 1e .ult11JJU!nIl dans 
1es rapports des medJ.4s 4U 'public " aux 'publics'. La respcmsab111tll, 
a savoJ.r la lJ.bert~ de 14 presse et dsvut la presse, dependra 
toujours de 1 'effectivite d'un 'droit de mpcmse' qUi permet au 
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citoyen d'etre plus que la fraction (privee, en somme, et de plus en 
plus) d'un 'public' pass if et consommateur, necessairement lese par lA 
m(Jme. Y a-t-il democratie sans nkiprocite?" 
lotes for Chapter Two 
1. Derrida describes the 'magnetic attraction' of the '''We' through the 
logical relation of 'disjunction': "One sees tben tbJJt Dasein, although 
not man, is nevertheless noth1ng other tblJn man." ("On voit donc que 
le Dasein, s'il n'est pas 1 'homme, n'est pourtant pas autre chose que 
1 'homme." EX p. 151) j i.e. the 'given' (dasein), although not man, will 
have been represented to 'us' as 'us'. 
2. Freud: Inhibitions Symptoms and. Anxiety p. 241 
3. Freud: Mourning a.nd Ke..lancholia p. 252 
4. Freud: On Narcissism p. 96 
5. ibid p. 66 
6. Kant: Critique c1 ~ Reason A73, my emphasis. 
7. In LD.. democratie a journee , Derrida's claim is that Kant's distinction 
is to have made 'public a use of reason in every domain'. Only 
through the disjunctive relation could the 'tribune of pure Reason' be 
nothing other than the general sphere of knowledge, whilst also 
making public the distinctions between one particular domain or 
sphere and another. 
8. Xournini a.ud Xelanchol1a p. 256 
9. Thucydides History Book II, 37.2 and 41.2 
10. "Topologie deroutante. Comment identifier ici 1 'opinion publ1que? A-
t-elle lieu? ou se donne-t-elle a voir, et ccm..e telle? L6errance de 
son corps propre, c'est aussi l'ubiquite d 'un spectre. 11 n 'est 
pr~nt co_a tel en aucun de cas espaces." 
11. Derrida: ~ Restricted tQ General Economy 
12. For instance, Kant's criticism of the Idea of the Republic in the 
Critique c1 rue. Reason. The point being that such an ideal may be 
'followed up' -and, wbere tbe great pb:ilosopber le4ves us w:1tbout 
help, to place it, tbrougb fresb efforts, in JJ proper ligbt, ratber 
tblJn to set it lJside uselessly" [A 316], 
13. "By preferring tbe support of domestic to thlJt of foreign industry, 
be intends only bis own security... in this he :is led by an 
invisible band to promote lJn end wbich was no part of h:is 
:intention" [Wealth c1 lations IV 11 91. The 'invisible hand' describes 
the process by which this selfishness ends in a social ethos, a 
process which nevertheless will have to be analysed in its 
particulars. In this instance, 'friction' explains much of the 
entrepreneurs preference for local tradej i.e. the concept of wasted 
time, wasted costs, in travel. If we live in a frictionless world, 
now, will the invisible hand continue to work? Can the invisible 
hand work without wastage? 
14. For Kant, Descartes 'ontological proof', like Plato's idea of the 
Ci ty t calls for a "following up'. However, his criticism of Descartes 
finds Descarte adds nothing new to our idea of God other than a 
sense of wearinessj it is "so much l~bour and effort losti we CJJn no 
more extend our stock of inSight by mere idelJs, thlJn a 1J1erch~nt c~n 
better his position by adding ~ few noughts to b:is cash account' 
[Critique of. ~ Reasou, A 6021. Which is to say, it adds nothing 
new but conveys a wider sense of speculation, of percieved profit, 
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and failure. This is not an isolated metaphor; cf. Grounding foI:. tll.e. 
Metaphysic 01 Morals, discussed in notes to introduction; 3, above. 
15. Heidegger: Address 01 November 11. ~ p. 104 
16. Keynes: General Theory 01 Employment Interest ud.. !on.ey. p. xxvi. 
17. Keynes: Essays ill. Persuasion p. 135 
18. Keynes: Ihe End 01 Laissez-faire p. 312 
19. Keynes: General Theory 01 Employment Interest and ~ p. 155 
20) ibid., p. 160 
21) Heidegger: ~ ~ lima H 169 
22. Pound: Ecz: a. IelL Paldeum p .254 
23. E.M 161, quoted in french Notes to Foreword; 11, above. 
24. EM 161 
25. Mle non-sens ou 1 'absurdlte angolssante r6dant aut our de 1 'humanisme 
metaphysique" EX 161 
26. As is being emphasised here, Derrida reads across the 'kehre', not in 
indifference to its content but by way of highlighting the ways in 
which the 'same' form (here, a demand; for whatever) might be 
reflected in Heidegger's work as that work raises different, 
pressing issues. Hence, Derrida reads the Letter an. Humanism, with 
its questioning of the way the lesson or 'paideia' has been 
forgotten in the history of humanism, through Heidegger's thoughts 
upon the form of the question in ~ ud.. lime. EX 148-153. 
27. 'eigentlich': properly, really, authentic. This word, used throughout 
B.eing. and.. I..1.m.e., comes from • eigen' : own. cf. also 'eigenschaft· : 
property. Derrida is concerned with a discourse upon the proprietal 
which whilst clear in Heidegger's work is assumed rather than 
'worriesome'. In common with the work before, after and during the 
kehre, Heidegger is obsessed with the idea of 'dwelling', of securing 
a home, or of bearing feelings of the 'unheimlich'. cf. "Langu"-ge is 
the house of Being. In its home man dwells."[Letter en. Humanism 193] 
28. The 'Problematic' is defined by Kant as being purely formal, 
concerning the "v"-lue of the copula in rel,,-tion to thought in 
general' [Critique 01 puz:.e. Reason A 741. What concerns this thesis 
is the form of • communi ty' • which Kant defines as • disjunctive' 
[ibid., second edition B 112], The disjunctive relation has a value 
in judgement. but a wholly problematic value when its copular 
function <its relation to the General) is disjunctive, It relation of 
separation/exclusion. 
29. This brief account of positivism is intended to stress that a 
critique of Concepts, if this is a Critique of the Understanding, may 
take the form of a semiological critique of the way in which signs 
are formally articulated; l.e. attends to their positive value for a 
semiology rather than their transcendental status for .Man, for 
Politics or for Kind. Derrida's rejection of this path, whilst 
stressing his sympathies with it, 1s seen 1n ill ~ 01 bn.. When 
he affirms Heidegger's formalism. he does so because it falls into 
neither 'cultural gossip' or "in the best cases, into the purest 
'structuralist' traditiDIl of metaphysiCS." [lldans Ie meilleur des cas, 
dans la plus pure tradition 'structuraliste' de la metaphys1que." EX 
1611 
30. Fate or destiny (SchicEsal). in German. has the connotation of being 
'fitting' or 'proper'i 1.e. an inheritance and a vocation [" in 
(Schicksal> D,,-sein luuJds itself dotnJ to itself, free for dSlJth, in a 
possibility which .it h"-s inherited yet chosen." Being. Imd ~ H 
384], In Beill& lmd. I.1.mii. Dasein becomes known on the basis of the 
possibility of death, even the fact that death has left a trace for 
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Dasein: "The deceased ... has been torn away from those who have 
remained, and is an object of 'concern' in the ways of funeral rites, 
interment and the cult of graves" [ibid. H 2381. There is a clear 
sense in which Dasein IS fate (as opposed to sequential history) 
depends upon it dwelling upon death. This theme and the cult of 
graves is covered in Chapter Three, as is the fact that there is a 
view of the Stately that is commi tted to redundancy as to a 
vocation. 
31. "anxiety can mount authentically only in a Dasein which is resolute. 
He who is resolute knows no feari but he understands the possibility 
of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood which neither 
inhibits nor bewilders him. Anxiety liberates him from possibilities 
which 'count for nothing' (nichtigen), and lets him become free for 
those which are authentic." [ae.ing. IlIld. I1m.e. H 345] 
32. Heidegger: Rectoral Address, p. 471, German edition p. 11 
33. cf. note 31 above, the possibilities which 'count for nothing' are to 
be overturned with the Dasein's ascension to its authentic 
possibilities. It is at such moments that nihilism and Heidegger's 
account of a 'falleness ' or an 'oblivion' become associated. 
34. Descombes: Modern French Philosophy p. 117. 
35. 'ta khreon' (destiny) I translated as 'brauch I, [Anaximander Fragment 
52], Heidegger argues that I to khrean' is the trace of that which 
was distinctive between Being and beings, thus the trace of their 
disjunction and the oblivion that comes with this disjunction [ibid. 
50), cf. LA.. differance p. 26. 
36. In Plato's Doctrine c1 Inrtll. Heidegger antiCipates his Letter en. 
Humanism by ten years when he says of humanism that its form, or 
its form of forgetting, is such that: "man ... esteems everything 
real according to values." p. 191 
37. Heidegger: ~ is. a. Thing p. 121 
38. ibid p. 112 
39. ibid pp. 57-59J 
40. ibid pp. 150-151 
41. Heidegger: ~ ~ ~ H 25] 
42. Freud: !ourning ~ lelancholia p. 256 
43. Derrida: Of. QrammatolOiY p. 6, p.15 of French editionj my emphasis. 
44. Freud's account of the valorisation of inutile, obsessive behaviour 
is elaborated by reference to 'anality'. Hence, Bataille's use of 
Freud, cf. I The Pineal Eye' (Yisions c1 Excess). Here, the seat of 
Reason is conflated with the anus: the site of expenditure. Bataille 
questions the institutionalisation of Ivalue '; asking about the status 
of non-value (anti-capital, anti-matter) and its bearing upon 
economics. This informs Bataille's reading of Hegel where 
Sovereignty (or Capital institutions, the places where value is 
secured and produced) are taken to be similar to the machinery 
producing non-value: excrement, redundany etc. 
45. Iha Anaximander Fragment asks about the disjunctive relation insofar 
as 'to khreon I is the 'early trace of this distinction' <p. 51>. 
Having identified it with a Kantian term, and having translated it 
into German as 'brauch " the question becomes one of the peculiar 
distincti veness of 'to khreon I . 
46. For an exposition of Derrida IS translation of the I a ufh eben , cf, 
translators notes to largins g1 Philosoph1' pages 19 (note 23). 43 
(note 15), 88 (note 16). Derrida states: "Aufheben is relever I in the 
sense that relever atteIJpts at once to say relieve, displace, elevate 
and promote, in one and the salle lIovemenr' (IIAufheben, c'est relever, 
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au sens ou 'reI ever , veut dire a la fa is deplacer, elever, remplacer 
et promouvoir dans un seul et m~me mouvement." EM. 143). This thesis 
is highlighting 'promotion', in the sense of bringing something into 
relief, or forcing an issue. 
47. The allusion, here, is to the unhappy community, in general, as 'The 
World of Self-alienated Spirit' Phenomenology c.1 Spirit para. 487-
537. This 'world' is established earlier (para 477) when Hegel states 
of the Political order: "The universal being thus split into a mere 
multiplicity of individuals, this lifeless Spirit is an equality, in 
which all count the samf!'. The truth of Politics will be found in 
the form of the reconciliation of the unhappy to their contentious 
position; i.e. self-sacrifice. Here, the Political self and the 
alienated self are conjoined as "The reconciling Yea. in which two 
'I's let go their antithetical existencf!' (para 671). This last quote, 
from the Phenomenology, is a more spiritual reconciliation than 
Political. However. cf. note 66 below, the same form of self-
sacrifice is replicated in his Philosophy c.1 Eight. 
48. As has been noted iarcissistic identification has a beneficial role 
as "the libidinal complement of the urge to self preservation". 
However, this role is found through the analyst and the analyical 
discourse which Freud himself warns, suggests "a crippling 
dependance upon his helper in need' ~ Narcissism p. 96. Freud's 
solution is to elevate the Form of discourse over the position of 
the analyst qua new love object (ibid.) 
49. Derrida: Ellipsis p. 295 
50. Hegel aims at pure profit by insisting that the Form of disputation 
(qua dialectics) is the Form of secured profit (a process of sure-
fire relief) i as emphasised in :the. ill and.. the. Pyramid and Wl:l..ita 
Kythology. Derrida reads the dialectic otherwise, as a system which 
also involves loss. That this other reading is a positivism is 
signalled in the former work where the dialectics is read as a 
process "Quite simply, a machine, perhaps, and one which would 
function. A machine defined in its pure functioning. and not in its 
final utility,its m~ning, its result, its work." (Xargins of. 
Philosophy p. 107) 
51. Derrida states: II This will not budge from Aristotle to Hegel. The 
prime mover, as 'pure act I, is pure presence. As such, it animates 
all movement by meaIlS of the desire it inspires. It is the good, and 
the supre11leley desirable. Desire 1s the desire of presenefl' Qusl4 
!llld. Gramme p. 52, my emphaSiS. 
52. "Elle ne commande rien, ne regne sur rien et n 'exerce nulle part 
aucune autorite. ... Jon seulement il n'y a pas de royaume de la 
d1fferance mats celle-ci fomente la subversion de tout royaume. Ce 
qui la rend 'evidemment mena~ante et infailliblement redoutee par 
tout ce qui en nous desire de royaume, la presence passee ou a venir 
d 'un royaume." m 22] 
53. Freud: Xpurning ud.. lelanchol1a p. 252 
54. Derrida: DA 110, 116. 
55. DA 121 
56. Keynes: General Theory p. 234 
57. ibid .. p. 170 
58. ibid. p.230-235 
59. Keynes gives a variety of ways 1n which money might be dead money: 
when it 1s poured into redundancy, or into living when redundant. 
But also in speculation, in the pure desire for liqUidity, in 
idleness. These would have to be differentiated, but there are 
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overlaps; e.g. when idle money (savings, the speculation on interest) 
indirectly causes unemployment. Keynes counters the problem of 
redundancy by recommending large-scale public works [ibid, p. 119-
1311. He argues it might seem foolish to bury money in bottle in the 
ground, for others to retrieve; but it isn't if it stimulates more 
productive demands [ibid., p. 1213. Here, he comes close to thinking 
an economy based on waste, he cites the building of the pyramids 
twice as an example of large-scale public works that had the oblique 
effect of maintaining an economy [ibid., p. 130, p. 220], 
60. D 21 
61. cf. Josef Steindl: Stagnation and.. Growth, a post-Keynesian work on 
the production of stagnation but within a manifold of competing 
industries, not a 'general' economy per se. 
62. In La. differance [D 21-22], Derrida is careful to read Freud without 
reserve; l.e. the most sympathetic reading possible (this practice, 
the strengthening of arguments, and its effect 1s discussed in the 
Conclusion, section i). Freud often uses term drawn from hydraulics; 
often as though the unconscious were a reservoir from which 
cathexes flowed and returned. In French, cathexes are described as 
investmentsi hence, there is a strong sense in which Freud exploits 
reservoirs and capital reserves, fluidity and the fluidity of cash. 
63. Heidegger's post-kehre work seems to suggest the utter remoteness 
of Being, in language, is itself a gift of Being. Dwelling, then, 
remains forever an uncanny (unheimlich) dwelling upon the alien. 
64. Kant: Critique 01. ~ Reason A 235-236 
65. "Human life, distinct from juridical eXistence, existing as it does 
on a globe isolated in celestial space, from night to day and from 
one country to another - human life cannot in any way be limited to 
the closed systems assigned to it by reasonable conceptions. The 
immense travail of recklessness, discharge and upheaval that 
constitutes life could be expressed by stating that life only starts 
with the deficit of these systems It is only by such 
insubordination - even if it is impoverished - that the human race 
ceases to be isolated in the unconditional splendor of material 
things." Bataille: The. Notion 01 Expenditure p. 128. Here, material 
splendour includes excrement; its local flavour (juridica1/ political 
impoverishment) and its celestial splendour. 
66. The sections alluded to are para 444-483, 'Tbe Etbic/2l Order in the 
PhenomenologYi i.e. the sections directly preceding the 'unhappy 
world', acting as its reserve, its base, its ethical reservoir. These 
sections are discussed in Derrida 's ~. Also, Hegel's R1g.h:t. where 
patriotism (a form of self sacrifice, in favour of the 'substantive 
unity' and 'subjectivity' of the state, para 260) is defined as "the 
sentiment wbich, in tbe relationships of our daily life and under 
ordinary conditions, b/2bitually recognises tb/2t tbe community is 
one's substantive groundwork and encf' p. 164 (note to para 2681. 
Hence, what was previously (and still is) recognised as 
uncomprehending, lonely drudgery, finds a higher, Political, form of 
sacrifice. 
67. "Au-dela de ces frontieres, ce que j'appe1erai 1e mirage 
phllosophique consisterait aussi bien a percevoir de 1a phl1osophie 
une phllosophie plus au moins const1tuee et adu1te - quia 
percevoir un desert. Or. cet espace n'est ni philosophique ni 
desertique, c'est-a-dire inculte." EX 133 
68. nu.e. XytholaiY characterises the 'detour' through economics as a 
'hel1otrope'j i.e. a turn of the sun. Again an ellipse. The relation 
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between, for instance, Hegel and Bataille is a 'heliotrope'j a detour 
between the sun and its other, or the institution representing the 
light of Reason and its other. 
69. Derrida: Ellipsis p. 295 
70. "11 brule son texte et efface les traces de ses pas. ... 11 dansera, 
hors de la maison, cette alrtive VergeszlichJreit, cette 'oubliance 
active' et cette f~te cruelle (grausam) dont parle la Genealogie de 
la 111orale. Nul doute que Nietzsche en a appele a un oubli actH de 
l'~tre: 11 n'aurait pas eu la forme metaphysique que lui impute 
Heidegger. EX 163 
71. EM 164 
72. "Le texte de 1a metaphysique est ainsi cD111pris. Encore lisib1ej et a 
lire. Il n 'est pas entoure mais traverse par sa limite, marque en son 
dedans par Ie sillon multiple de sa marge. Proposant a la fois Ie 
monument et Ie mirage de 1a trace, la trace simu1tanement tracee et 
effacee, simultanement vive et marte, vive comme toujours de simu1er 
aussi la vie en son inscription gardee. Pyramide. Non pas une borne 
a franchir, mais pierreux, sur un muraille, autrement a dechiffrer, 
un texte sans voix" La. differance p. 25 
73. It will be noted, here, that text is taken as synonymous with 
economicsj in brief, if the virtue of signs is to be exchangeable, 
this is an economic virtue. If it is the distinction of writing to 
become an issue (to stand in relief) in Derrida's work, then this is 
a distinction articulated by virtue of economic relations. Hence, 
writing is an economic issue, economics is not simply a form of 
script <only cash is a script) cf. next chapter. 
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Hellenic literature: a tombstone or memorium. Perhaps this explains 
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Cette pierre n'est pas loin, pourvu qu'on en sache dechiffrer la 
legende, de signaler la mort du dynaste." La. ifferance p. 4 
65. "no language can reduce into itself the structure of an anthology. 
This supplement of a code which traverses its own field, endlessly 
displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle, and no 
ontology will have been able to reduce it" ~ Xythology p. 271 
66. "Je parleral, donc, d 'une lettre. / De la premiere, s'il faut en croire 
l'alphabet et Ia plupart des speculations qui s'y sont aventurees." 
La difference p. 3 
67. Hegel: Philosophy of. :/U.lld. p. 363 
68. ibid., p. 218 
69. ibid., p. 218. 
70. Kearney & Derrida: Interyiew Hiih. Jacques Derrida p. 123. 
71. II 'deconstructions', que je prefere dire au pluriel, n'a sans doute 
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systeme philosophique. Dans ces contextes toujours tres determines, 
c'est l'un des noms possibles pour designer, par metonymie en somme, 
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les textes de philosophie classique, bien sur et par exemple, mais 
aussi dans tout 'texte', au sens general que j'essaie de justifier 
pour ce mot, c'est-A-dire dans l'experience tout court, dan Ia 
'rea lite , sociale, historique, ecanomique, technique, militaire, etc. 
L'evenement de la guerre dite du Golfe, par exemple, est une 
puissante, spectaculaire et tragique condensation de ces 
decanstructions." Derrida & Ewald: ill 'fo11e' d..o.ii veiller sur. k 
penses: interview with Jacques Derrida. Kagazine Literraire p. 26-27. 
72. Kant: Perpetual ~i however, in his Critique 01 Judgement he is 
able to appreCiate the sublimity of War. 
73. Hegel: Philosophy of. R1gh:t., p. 210. 
74. Hegel writes on inertia in Philosophy of. Nature; of the physical 
world and mental habits. Cf. his History of. Philosophy where Isaac 
Newton is subject to a vicious attack for his misunderstanding of 
the significance of inertia for Reason. This identification of 'habit' 
and 'inertia I is given through his concept of Duty in both the 
Phenomenology and R.1i.hii i.e. habit has to be subject to a sense of 
uncomfortable exigency in order to be recognised as Duty. cf. para 
278-280 in Phenqmenology. Here, inertia is not a law, it always 
falls outside of a law because it expresses no sense of the 
difficult or problematic. Which is to say I pain is found to have a 
significance for Reason and its laws which pleasure casually elides. 
The conflation of pleasure (or elision of unease) and inertia occurs 
in Freud: "Since we have a certain knowledge of a trend in physical 
life towards avoiding unpleasure, we are tempted to identify that 
trend with the primary trend towards inertia [j .e. towards lJvoiding 
excitation]' Instincts a.n..d. ill1r.. Vicissitudes p. 117, translators 
note I from the Project. Here, the pleasure principle is closest to 
being a Nirvana prinCiple, or a death drivei death being either 
pleasurable, or a mindless avoidance of 'good' pain. 
75. "L'evEmement de la guerre dite du Golfe, par exemple. est une 
puissante, spectaculaire et tragique condensations de ces 
deconstructions. Dans la m~me conflagration, dans Ie m~me se1sme 
tremble Ie genealogie clivee de toutes les structures et de toutes 
les fondations dont je viens de parler: l'Occident et I'histoire de 1a 
phllosoph1e, ce qui Ia lie a plusieurs grand monotheismes 
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irreconciliables <quai qu'on dise) d 'une part, a des languages 
naturelles et a des affect nationaux 8 l'idee de la democratie et au 
tMologico-politique d'autre part, au progres infini d'une idee du 
droit international, enfin, dont les limites appaissent mieux que 
jamais: non seulement parce que ceux qui Ie representent au s'en 
reclament l'arraisonnent toujours au profit d 'h 'eg'emonies determinees 
et ne peuvent d 'ailleurs que s'en approcher inadequement a l'infini, 
mais aussi parce que qu'il est fonde (et par 18 limite) sur des 
concepts de la modernite philosophique europeenne (nation, Etat, 
democratie, rapports de democratie parlementaire entre les Etats, 
qu'ils soient au non democratiques, etc.)" !!n.e. 'folie' do.it yeiUer 6llI: 
~ pen see , p. 27. 
76. "Ces deconstruct ions violente sont en cours, ~~ ~rrive, cela n 'attend 
pas que soit achevee l'analyse philosophico-theorique de tout ce que 
je viens d 'evoquer d 'un mot: celle-ci est necessaire mais infinie et 
la lecture que ces lezardes rendent possible ne surplombera jamais 
l'evenement; elle s'y intervient seulement, elle y est inscrite" ibid., 
p. 76. 
77. cf., Derrida Violence c.1 the. LIDl., where he affirms writing as 
contract writing. The idea of the Rousseau 'social contract' seems, 
in the end, to be the primary reason for Derrida's highlighting of 
the written. Tying in with his introduction of the written, in Of 
Grammatology, with a reading of Rousseau. 
78. Lll. differance p. 26. 
Iotas far Conclusion 
1. Derrida's recent book, Donner le temps, includes a reading of 
Baudelaire's Counterfeit Money. This has been translated as: G.iv.en. 
Lim.e.: The. Lim.e. o.f. :tlle. Killg.. As an essay on ethics, setting out from 
economics, it covers many of the themes of this concluding section. 
Here, the significance is that a question of Ethics cannot depend, for 
Derrida, solely upon the question of the authentic or counterfeit. As 
has been seen, Derrida himself dissembles other philosophers, whilst 
'economics' confounds the difference between the homely and the 
foreign. In consequence, it is the question of 'suspicion' and the 
suspicious gift that concerns Derrida in his reading of Baudelaire. 
Baudelaire's essay concerns the propriety of giving a beggar a 
counterfeit coin [~ ~ 187]. 
2. "Un ebranlement radical ne peut venir que du dehors." EX p. 162 
3. E.r..cm. Restricted :t..Q General Economy p. 251 
5. Plato: Apology 18a 
6. ibid., 27b 
7. Thucydides: History 20-23 
8. ibid., "We are lovers of wisdom without softness" 
9. Plato: Apology 30b 
10. ibid., 36b 
11. Thucyd ides: History 38 11- 14 
12. Plato: ApoloiY cf. 31-33, e.g. Idioteyeis 32a 
13. Thucydides: History 10-12 
14. Plato: Apology 18d-e 
15. Aristophanes: lha Cloud§ 
16. cf. Xenophon's Oikonomia..; a practical gUide to house and farm 
management. 
17. Plato: Apology 17d-18a 
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18. ibid., 35d onwards, here Socrates recognises the populace as his 
judges. 
19. 1 bid., 19d, refelcting on 'oi polloi' and upon the 'more and less '. 
This reflects upon discussion of his behavious under an Oligarchy 
[32c), and upon his final recognition of another virtue in the 'more' 
as judges. 
20. "C'est trop evident dans ce qu'on appelle la presse 'culturelle' 
(arts, l1tterature, phllosophie, etc.) et dans ces evaluation 'fines' 
surdeterminees, surcodees, qui n'induisent pas iJDJDedi12teJDent 
l'opinion publique comme jugement pol1tique ou decision electorale. 
Chaque fois qU'une institution mMlatique commande des phenomenes de 
marche a une echelle massive, elle confisque et censure aussi 
massivement, elle dogmatise, que Is que soient son eclectisme reel au 
son liberalisme de fa<;:ade, ses vertus au ses vices, qu'elle captive 
au ennuie, qu'on la trouve distinguees, vulgaire, au les deux a la 
fois. Quand un seul juge, quoi qu'on pense de tel au tel de ses 
talents, se volt contie lci ou la un monopole d'evaluatlon, de 
f11trage, d 'exposition au grand jour, 11 determine les ventes dans 
les supermarches de la culture." DA 117 
21. "Une oeuvre alors est releguee loin de la cour, vers la nui t d 'un 
enclos quasiment prive, si elle ne remplit pas les conditions de 
visibilite dans ce grand petit miroir qui fascine en deformant, 
filtre et detourne vers lui tant d 'energie, interrompt la 
conversation, plie Ie corps et Ie regard social a une nouvelle 
physologie, projette enfin a l'etranger les dernieres icones de la 
culture nationale. AUjourd'hui, a cette echlle, un livre doit se 
vendre et, distinguons, se lire a plus de dix mille exemplaires pour 
~tre autre chose qu'une correspondance confidentielle et qU12siJDent 
privee. Resultat: les recherches dites 'diffic11e', rebelles a la 
stereotyple de L'image au de la narration, peu soumises aux normes 
de la culture ainsi representee dans sa 'moyenne' (au singulier, I' 
'opinion' signifie toujours la 'moyenne') sont exclues de la scene: 
occultees, privees du jour. Par suite, on les juge de plUS en plus 
'obscure' 'difticile', volre 'illisible' et elles deviennent ainsi ce 
qu'on dit qu'elles sont et veut qu'elles soient: inaccessible. Le 
cycle s'accelere." DA 118 
22. "Elle se trouve aussi evaluee de jour en jour par un public qui n 'est 
pas toujours sllencieux. Heteterogene, elle peut parfois parfois se 
cri tiquer elle-m~me, d 'un lieu a la autre de son grand corps. B 'est-
elle pas finalement jugee sur un temps plus long et selon des 
criteres qUi lui restent necessairement indechiffrables? Si elle 
contribue a des succes de masse qu'on oubHe Ie mois suivant, ne 
court-elle pas aussi a l'oubli? Les avancees intempestives qui 
echappent a sa grille de l1sibllite peuvent un jour s'imposer sans 
contestation possible. Pour Ie cheminement a venir d 'une oeuvre, on 
Ie sait, la qualite de dix lectures joue parfois un r&ole plus 
determinant que l'actual1te de d1x mille acheteurs. Nos grandes 
machines med1atiques, que feraient-elles de Rimbaud au de 
Lautreamont, de lietzsche ou de Proust, d 'un Kafka au d 'un Joyce de 
19897 Us furent d 'a bard sauv'es par une po1gnee de lecteurs (taux 
d '$coute minimal>, ma1s lesquels! Peut-~tre cette analog1e souffre-t-
elle deja d 'anachronisme, helas, car l'h1stoire intrinsique de ces 
aventures fut sans doute liee b. son debors et, qu'on Ie denie au non, 
a une structure desormais per1mee de I' 'espace public'." DA 119-120 
23. I.lla Ell. a.n.d. the. Pyramid p.78,79. 
24. ibid .. 107 
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25. Hegel: Rigll, Hegel's theory of zero-sum equilibrium begins his 
discussion of the first section of R.1ght; l.e. the basis of Ethical 
life. 
26. Keynes: General Theory, Book IV, Chapter II. 
27. As has been noted - Chapter Two, note 61 - post-Keynesian's do not 
speak of a country as a delimited region, but as an aggregate of 
industries. 6. 
28. Keynes: General Theory, p. 343, Here, in a footnote, Keynes expresses 
his fears, and his reservations abut the ubiquitous idea of 
equilibrium. 
29. Derrida, most recently in L'autre ~, lingers obver the idea of 
regions long past their he1ght. That work considers 'Europe'. Works 
like ~ discuss SOCiety through the motif of the funeral bell. 
30. "ainsi defini, l'humanisme au l'anthroplogisme etalt A cette epoque 
une sorte de sol commun des exitent1alisme, chretlens au athees, de 
la philosophie, spiritualiste au non, des valeurs, des personnal1smes 
de droit au de gauche, du marxisme de style classique." 
31. "Son rire alors eclatera vers un retour qui n 'aura plus la forme de 
repetition metaphysique de l'humanisme ni sans doute davantage, 'au-
delA' de la metaphysique, celle du memorial ou de la garde du sens 
de l'Mre, celle de la maison et de la verite de l'etre." [EX 163) 
32. The term 'circular reappropriation of tbe trutb' describes the work 
of metaphor in ~ Mythology. A work Heidegger regards with 
suspicion. 
33. The admonition to dwell on the 'poverty of language' ends 
Heidegger's Letter en. Humanism 
34. "die fruhe Spur" I.b.s Anaximander Fragment 
35. L4. difference p. 25 
36. Address of November 11, 1933 104-105. 
37. Bakunin, tbe original appeared in the labrbuche of 1842, cf. Cbapter 
One. 
40. Hunter S. Tbompson; Generation Q.f ~. Gonzo Papers Volume II. 
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